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INTRODUCTION
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.C.), D
K- found herself trapped in an abusive marriage and sub-
jected to escalating violence.1 She was too fearful to go to the
police because of her husband's governmental ties, as well as
her knowledge that the police would not intervene in domestic
matters. 2 She could not flee to a battered women's shelter be-
cause not a single shelter existed, despite the pervasive domes-
tic violence in her country.3 D- K--'s status as a married
woman further diminished her options. Married women are
1. In re D- K- , slip. op. at 4 (EOIR Immigr. Ct. Dec. 8, 1998),
available at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/ij/1i7.html.
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id. at 6.
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subordinated by law in the D.R.C., and are prohibited from
owning property or engaging in employment without their hus-
bands' consent. Although D- K- fled to her brother's
house in search of safety on numerous occasions, her husband
always found her and forced her to return home. 4 Finally,
D- K- fled to the United States to seek asylum after an
extremely violent incident: her husband beat her until she lost
consciousness and then raped her in front of their children.5
The immigration judge who heard D- K- 's case de-
nied her asylum claim. The judge characterized the acts of do-
mestic violence as "atrocities,"6 but, nevertheless, held that
D- K- failed to show that her husband persecuted her on
account of her membership in a "particular social group." 7 The
Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) similarly affirmed the
judge's decision and D- K- was scheduled for immediate
removal to the D.R.C.8 At the eleventh hour, the Federal Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals stayed D- K- 's removal, allowing
her to pursue a newly available form of protection based on Ar-
4. Id. at 5.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 6.
7. Id. at 7. Pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act § 208, 8
U.S.C. § 1158 (2004), a person seeking asylum in the United States must have
been persecuted or have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group. Interpretation of "membership in a particular social group" has fluctu-
ated substantially, particularly with regard to gender-based claims to asylum.
At the time the immigration judge issued her decision in In re D- K- ,
the seminal Board of Immigration Appeals case interpreting social groups was
In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), which held that a social group
must be composed of members who share a characteristic that either is immu-
table or is so fundamental to their identities that they should not be required
to change it. See discussion infra note 102 and accompanying text. Once a per-
son demonstrates statutory eligibility, the grant of asylum is at the discretion
of the Attorney General. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1) (1999).
8. In re D- K- , slip op. at 1 (B.I.A. filed Jan. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/bia117-bia.pdf. A sharply divided three-
member panel dismissed the appeal. The author of the majority opinion based
it on a recently decided precedential case that made it nearly impossible for
women fleeing domestic violence to qualify for asylum protection in the United
States. Id. at 3-5; see also In re R- A- , 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999),
vacated, (Att'y Gen. 2001) (characterizing the long-standing "immutability"
test set forth in In re Acosta as merely a threshold requirement, and holding
that once the test has been met, the applicant must also demonstrate that
group members understand their own affiliation within the group, that they
are recognized as a societal faction, and that the form of persecution is "an im-
portant societal attribute"), infra notes 132-63 and accompanying text.
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ticle 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture (Arti-
cle 3 or Torture Convention).9
Ultimately, the same immigration judge who had denied
asylum and ordered D- K- to be returned to her abuser
found that the domestic violence at issue constituted "tor-
ture."10 Moreover, she held that the Congolese government
maintained a policy of "willful blindness" because it was aware
of the prevalence of domestic violence in its country, yet did not
act upon that knowledge.1' Although U.S. asylum laws had
failed to protect D- K- , the immigration judge's grant of
relief under the Torture Convention freed her after two and a
half years of detention and, more importantly, prohibited U.S.
immigration authorities from returning her to her abuser in
the D.R.C.12
9. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment in 1984. G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at
197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention]. Article 3 of
the Torture Convention mandates that signatory states shall not return a per-
son to a country in which there is a substantial likelihood that she would be
tortured. Id. President Reagan signed the Torture Convention on behalf of the
United States on April 18, 1988. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH
CTR., THE U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: OVERVIEW OF U.S.
IMPLEMENTATION POLICY CONCERNING THE REMOVAL OF ALIENS 4 (2004). In
1990, the U.S. Senate ratified the Torture Convention with a substantial
number of reservations, declarations, and understandings. See 136 CONG.
REC. S17,486-92 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). However, the United States did not
become a full party to the Torture Convention until November 20, 1994, one
month after President Clinton deposited the ratification instrument with the
U.N. Secretary-General. Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Tor-
ture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478, 8478 (Feb. 19, 1999). Because the United States
adopted the position that the Torture Convention was not self-executing, see
GARCIA, supra, at 4, it was not until Congress enacted implementing legisla-
tion in 1998, see Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2822 (1998), followed by INS and De-
partment of Justice regulations in 1999, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-.18 (2004); 8
C.F.R. §§ 1208.16-.18 (2004), that the nonrefoulement provision of Article 3 of
the Torture Convention became a viable defense against removal in U.S. im-
migration proceedings. The 1999 INS regulations specified that the Attorney
General would have exclusive jurisdiction over Torture Convention claims
arising under Article 3. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(c), 1208.18(c).
10. In re D- K- , slip. op. at 6 (EOIR Immigr. Ct. Aug. 1, 2000).
11. Id. at 5-6.
12. See id. at 1-2, 6. However, unlike asylum protection, a grant of Tor-
ture Convention protection, as implemented in the United States, does not
lead to permanent legal status or allow for family reunification. See infra
notes 49, 333 and accompanying text. Thus, D- K- found herself in the
untenable situation of having to choose between her safety and the chance to
reunite with her five children. D- K- pursued her asylum appeal to the
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Many advocates hailed In re D - K- for its recogni-
tion of domestic violence as torture, and the decision reflects
the potential that Article 3 holds for refugees asserting gender-
based claims for protection. 13 Its interpretation of Article 3 of
the Torture Convention is consistent with the Torture Conven-
tion's underlying premise: torture is morally unacceptable, re-
gardless of its perpetrator's underlying motivations. Unlike
asylum law's requirement that a nexus exist between the per-
secution and the asylum seeker's political or religious beliefs,
race, nationality, or social group membership, 14 the Torture
Convention does not contain a nexus requirement. The Torture
Convention therefore holds particularly strong hope for women
fleeing domestic violence and other forms of gender-based tor-
ture who have been denied asylum protection.
The promise of the Torture Convention offered by In re
D - K- , however, proved to be short-lived. Indeed, instead
of charting a more broadly remedial course, subsequent inter-
pretations of the Torture Convention by both the Board and the
Attorney General have fallen into many of the same rigid pat-
terns of U.S. asylum law-patterns that disregard trends in the
international community, that impose overly formalistic legal
thresholds upon claimants, and that are heavily driven by do-
mestic political considerations. These interpretive limits have
Third Circuit. See In re D- K-, No. 01-3120, slip op. at 1 (3d Cir. Jan.
15, 2002). She was ultimately granted asylum by the Board after the Justice
Department agreed to withdraw its opposition in exchange for D- K-
withdrawing her case from the federal court of appeals. See In re D- K- ,
slip op. at 1 (B.I.A. Mar. 21, 2002) (per curium). For D- K- , gaining asy-
lum meant the possibility of reuniting with her children and obtaining perma-
nent safety more than four years after her arrival in the United States. The
Justice Department's position in this and similar cases, however, has been
characterized as part of an effort to avoid federal precedent in the area of gen-
der-based asylum jurisprudence. See Stephen M. Knight, Seeking Asylum from
Gender Persecution: Progress Amid Uncertainty, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES
689, 693-95 (2002).
13. See, e.g., Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 473 n.8 (3d Cir. 2003) (cit-
ing In re D-K----- for the proposition that the Board has recognized domes-
tic violence as torture); Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, and the Hu-
man Rights Paradigm, 15 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 133, 141 (2002) (stating that
"the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals held in [In re D- K- ] that a
husband's continual brutal assaults on his wife, including years of rape and
sexual violence, constituted torture within the terms of the Convention
Against Torture"); Evelyn Apgar, Seton Hall Law Clinic Helps Congolese Na-
tive Stay Here, N.J. LAW., Aug. 14, 2000, at 10; Steve Chambers, A Hard Jour-
ney to Freedom: Congo Asylum-Seeker and Lawyers Finally Post Victory, STAR-
LEDGER (N.J.), Aug. 7, 2000, at Al.
14. See supra note 7 for the statutory requirements for asylum.
2004]
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deprived women of important protections from state-condoned,
gender-based violence abroad and suggest the need for a gen-
der-sensitive interpretation or passage of gender-specific legis-
lation.
Asylum law, as it has developed in the United States, has
largely failed to appreciate or accommodate the unique circum-
stances faced by female refugees. Both textual and interpretive
shortcomings account for this insensitivity to the different ways
in which women experience persecution. The text of the Refu-
gee Convention, from which U.S. asylum law is derived, omits
gender from the enumerated protected categories. Many coun-
tries, however, ameliorate the disparate impact on women by
interpreting the social group category broadly to include gen-
der-based groups. In contrast, the United States excludes social
groups based solely on sex and requires strong evidence that
the claimant's membership in a "gender-plus" protected group
served as the primary motivation for the persecutor's conduct. 15
Thus, the failure to enumerate gender as a protected ground
under the Refugee Convention, combined with the United
States' interpretation of the law through the lens of the more
public male experience, too often leaves refugee women unpro-
15. See, e.g., In re R- A- , 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated,
(Att'y Gen. 2001) (holding that Guatemalan women who are abused by their
partners are not a cognizable social group, and establishing a new set of re-
quirements for social group membership once immutability has been estab-
lished). As discussed infra notes 132-63 and accompanying text, the decision
in In re R- A has been highly criticized. In December 2000, the INS
proposed regulations for adjudicating domestic violence-based asylum claims.
Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec 7,
2000). In anticipation of the finalized regulations, Attorney General Janet
Reno vacated and remanded the In re R- A decision to the Board in
January 2001 so that it could reconsider the matter after the regulations were
finalized. See In re R- A- , 22 I. & N. Dec. at 906. However, the new Ad-
ministration never finalized the regulations, and the In re R- A- case
has been pending for over three years. In the meantime, Attorney General
Ashcroft recertified the In re R- A- case and stated his intention to is-
sue a new decision. See In re R- A- , No. A-73-753-922 (Att'y Gen. Feb.
21, 2003) (Order No. 2661-2003). After intense public pressure following
Ashcroft's refusal to allow the parties to submit briefing on the issues,
Ashcroft set a briefing schedule. In its brief, the Department of Homeland Se-
curity (DHS) revealed that it has changed its position and now supports asy-
lum for R- A- . Department of Homeland Security's Position on Respon-
dent's Eligibility for Relief at 2, In re R- A- , 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A.
1999), vacated, (Att'y Gen. 2001) (No. A-73-753-922) (on file with author)
[hereinafter DHS's Position]. The DHS also stated that it plans to issue regu-
lations soon to clarify that, in limited circumstances, domestic violence can be
the basis for an asylum claim. Id. As of this writing, Ashcroft has yet to rule in
the In re R- A case.
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tected from less public harms such as domestic violence. 16
In contrast, Article 3 of the Torture Convention mandates
protection from torture inflicted by the government, or with its
consent or "acquiescence," for any discriminatory purpose.
17
The Torture Convention further requires that the infliction of
torture be intentional, excluding inadvertent or negligent con-
duct as grounds for relief.18 Notwithstanding the inherent gen-
der bias accompanying the limitation of torture to that commit-
ted in the public realm, In re D - K- construed
"acquiescence" in a gender-sensitive manner by focusing on the
state's inaction in the face of prevalent domestic violence.
The In re D - K- decision now lies at the crossroads
of what has become sharply divided interpretations of Article 3
between the Board and Attorney General on the one hand, and
the courts of appeals on the other. 19 The Board and Attorney
General have moved toward a stringent interpretation of gov-
ernmental "acquiescence" that is analogous to the nexus re-
quirement in asylum law. The Attorney General now requires
that the home government "willfully accept" the torturous ac-
tivity, seemingly excluding "willful blindness" to pervasive so-
16. See infra notes 132-63 and accompanying text.
17. Torture Convention, supra note 9. See infra note 76 and accompany-
ing text for the definition of torture under the Torture Convention.
18. Torture Convention, supra note 9. See also infra notes 224-57 and ac-
companying text (discussing the intent requirement).
19. See infra notes 206-13, 217-57 and accompanying text. Compare In re
J- E- , 23 I. & N. Dec. 291 (B.I.A. 2002) (interpreting narrowly the Tor-
ture Convention to require a "specific intent" to inflict torture), and In re M-
- B- A- , 23 I. & N. Dec. 474 (B.I.A. 2002) (en banc) (ignoring the gen-
der-based aspect of the claim and elevating the "more likely than not" stan-
dard of proof the United States utilizes for Torture Convention claims to some-
thing more akin to the criminal "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard), and In
re Y- L- , 23 I. & N. Dec. 270 (B.I.A. 2002) (interpreting "acquiescence"
under the Torture Convention to require "willful acceptance" rather than "will-
ful blindness"), with Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 473, 474 n.8 (3d Cir.
2003) (citing In re D---- K- as an example of the Board's recognition that
domestic violence can constitute torture under the Torture Convention and
rejecting the Board's "specific intent" requirement as contrary to both the Tor-
ture Convention and congressional intent as expressed in the implementing
legislation), and Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the
Board's and Attorney General's interpretations of "acquiescence" as requiring
"willful acceptance" and stating that awareness or "willful blindness" is the
standard that is consistent with the Torture Convention and congressional in-
tent). Most recently, the Second Circuit weighed in as well, rejecting the
Board's and Attorney General's "willful acceptance" interpretation of "acquies-
cence" under the Torture Convention. See Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161
(2d Cir. 2004); infra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
2004]
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cietal problems such as domestic violence. 20 The Board has also
interpreted the Torture Convention to require a "specific in-
tent" to inflict torture.21 For women fleeing intentionally in-
flicted "private" torture (such as domestic violence or female
genital cutting), the United States' interpretation bars relief
absent a showing that the abuser's intent was to inflict torture.
Even in situations in which the state imprisons women with
full knowledge that torture, such as rape, is prevalent under
such circumstances, this interpretation forecloses relief unless
the state imprisons such women with the specific intent that
they be raped.
In addition, implementation of both the Refugee Conven-
tion and the Torture Convention in the United States has been
limited by domestic policy considerations. With respect to the
Refugee Convention, the United States has, as described, in-
terpreted gender-based violence claims grudgingly (and, unlike
international counterparts, has refused to explicitly recognize
gender alone as an appropriate characteristic for defining a so-
cial group), largely because of a claimed commitment to deter-
rence. Specifically, the United States has been guided by its
concern that a more liberal approach to gender-based asylum
claims would trigger an unwanted influx of women seeking asy-
lum. 22
Article 3 jurisprudence, on the other hand, is largely silent
as to the gendered aspects of torture. This invisibility of women
results from both Article 3's requirement of state action that
insulates "private" harm and the United States' efforts to con-
stru6 the law narrowly in order to exclude "criminal aliens"
from protection. 23 Unlike asylum law, the Torture Convention
contains no specific provision excluding from relief "criminal
aliens" who can otherwise prove they will suffer torture in their
home country. As a result, a large proportion of claims under
the Torture Convention involve such "criminal aliens." The
United States has narrowly interpreted the substantive re-
quirements of Article 3 as part of a multifaceted effort to re-
move "criminal aliens" from the country, consequently under-
mining the possibility for the broad, flexible application of
20. See In re Y- L- , 23 I. & N. Dec. at 280-81; infra notes 206-13,
281 and accompanying text.
21. See In re J- E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 298; infra notes 232-63 and
accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 105-25 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 258-82 and accompanying text.
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Article 3 that is necessary to protect against gender-based vio-
lence.
This Article examines asylum law's uneven history in pro-
tecting women from gender-based harm and uses this history
as a basis for understanding how the United States is inter-
preting Article 3 of the Torture Convention to the detriment of
women fleeing gender-based violence. Although there is a sub-
stantial body of scholarship exploring the intersection of gender
and refugee status,24 little attention has been paid to the gen-
der consequences resulting from the United States' narrow in-
terpretation of Article 3.25 Because interpretation of Article 3
by the Board and the courts is still evolving, the opportunity
exists to prevent Article 3 from falling victim to the same for-
malistic approach that has undermined the more robust protec-
tions for women under U.S. asylum law.
Part I provides a historical overview of the international
refugee protection regime and compares three forms of protec-
tion currently available to refugees under U.S. law: withhold-
ing of removal, asylum, and Article 3 of the Torture Conven-
tion.
Part II focuses more narrowly on the application of asylum
law in the United States to women fleeing gender-based vio-
lence. Specifically, this Part examines the inconsistent results
of the Board in adjudicating gender-based asylum cases. The
Board's jurisprudence is analyzed through the lens of the grow-
ing international recognition that refugee and human rights
laws need to protect women from gender-based harm. Such a
framework shows that the Board's decisions are marked by a
24. See, e.g., Deborah Anker et al., Women Whose Governments Are Un-
able or Unwilling to Provide Reasonable Protection from Domestic Violence
May Qualify as Refugees Under United States Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 709 (1997); Audrey Macklin, Refugee Women and the Imperative of Cate-
gories, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 213 (1995); Melanie Randall, Refugee Law and State
Accountability for Violence Against Women: A Comparative Analysis of Legal
Approaches to Recognizing Asylum Claims Based on Gender Persecution, 25
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 281 (2002).
25. For an example of one of the few recent articles to touch upon the gen-
der consequences of the state action requirement under the Torture Conven-
tion, see Dawn J. Miller, Holding States to Their Convention Obligations: The
United Nations Convention Against Torture and the Need for a Broad Interpre-
tation of State Action, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 299 (2003) (arguing that the Tor-
ture Convention's emphasis on the severity of the harm can serve to de-
privatize gender-based violence under human rights law). See infra note 333
for a Note assessing the applicability of Article 3 of the Torture Convention to
gender-based violence claims.
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restrictive and gender-biased approach that is altered only
when sufficient political pressure exists to bring its interpreta-
tion of the law into conformance with international human
rights norms.
Part III examines implementation of Article 3 by the
United States, arguing that Article 3 can provide an additional
layer of protection for women who thus far have fallen through
the cracks of asylum law. An analysis of both the text and the
intent of the Torture Convention-within the broader context of
the male-focused human rights regime existing at the time of
its origin-shows how the Torture Convention's focus on state
action in the public realm fails to take into account the differ-
ent ways in which women experience torture. For Article 3 to
be inclusive of women's claims based on gender-specific vio-
lence, "acquiescence" must be interpreted in a gender-sensitive
manner. By analyzing the United States' narrow interpretation
of the Torture Convention in the context of a broader domestic
concern with criminality and so-called "criminal aliens," as well
as entrenched notions of the private nature of domestic vio-
lence, this Part explores why (noncriminal) women with gen-
der-based torture claims are at risk of remaining outside of the
realm of Torture Convention protection.
Part IV focuses more sharply on the issue of "acquiescence"
and argues that, in order to provide meaningful protection from
gender-based torture, this term must be interpreted to include
a state's failure to prosecute or to protect against torture by
nonstate actors. An approach that encompasses such "willful
blindness" is consistent with the dramatically altered interna-
tional human rights framework since the drafting of the Tor-
ture Convention, as well as recent circuit court decisions, and is
also consistent with the Canadian approach to interpreting the
Torture Convention.
Part V examines alternate methods for protecting women
fleeing gender-based harm and makes recommendations for re-
structuring the United States Refugee Protection Regime to
protect women. This Part further discusses how gender-specific
legislation or gender-sensitive regulatory language can serve to
protect women, drawing upon the Violence Against Women
Acts 26 and country-specific immigration legislation and regula-
26. The immigration provisions of the Violence Against Women Acts of
1994 and 2000 amended the immigration laws to allow battered spouses to
self-petition for permanent residency without reliance on the abusive spouse,
created new waivers for victims of domestic violence who had failed to comply
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tions aimed at ameliorating the harshness caused by politically
motivated application of "neutral" immigration laws.2 7
I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK: A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE REFUGEE
PROTECTION REGIME IN THE UNITED STATES
From its inception, the refugee protection regime has em-
bodied a mix of humanitarian and political goals woven into an
existing immigration regulation scheme aimed largely at pro-
tecting against a mass influx of particular immigrants. 28 The
"refusal to embrace internal refugees, an unwillingness to
make legally binding commitments to refugee relief, the provi-
sion to refugee immigrants of less than full rights, and dis-
crimination in refugee definition" all combined "to limit the
scope of the altruistic humanitarian exception to existing im-
migration norms."29 As noted by James C. Hathaway, even dur-
ing the most humanitarian phase of refugee law, starting with
the first international legal standards governing the protection
of refugees post-World War I through 1938, the overarching
goal was to protect European refugees. 30
with statutory requirements for permanent residency, and relaxed the statu-
tory requirements for relief from removal for battered spouses. Violence
Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40,701, 108 Stat. 1953,
1953-55 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (1994)); Violence Against Women Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, §§ 1501-13, 114 Stat. 1464, 1518-37 (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 7101 (2000)).
27. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of statu-
tory amendments that offer asylum to those fleeing China's one-couple-one-
child policies as well as special provisions for Cubans and Nicaraguans.
28. As articulated by James C. Hathaway:
If conceived of in humanitarian terms, refugee law would be a politi-
cally neutral response to the needs of suffering persons who have in
some way been forced to leave their homes. The law would not focus
on the 'how' or 'why' of the need for protection, but rather would in-
quire only into the extent of the denial of physical security or liberty
leading to and consequent upon departure.
James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee
Law, 31 HARv. INT'L L.J. 129, 130-31 (1990). But see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY,
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 147 (3d ed. 2002) (characterizing
as "cynical" Hathaway's critique of the motivations behind international refu-
gee policy).
29. Id. at 139.
30. Id. at 134. Because the belief was that national sovereignty could best
be assured through cultural and political similarities, states used immigration
control as a means of excluding those whose backgrounds differentiated them
from the national norm and who, therefore, might threaten the unity of the
nation-state. Id. at 135. Furthermore, immigration law became increasingly
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In 1938, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees
assumed international responsibility for refugees and the crite-
ria for refugee status shifted from statelessness or displace-
ment to particularized motive for flight. Only those refugees
whose flight was caused by their political opinions, religion, or
race were assisted. This new human rights framework for refu-
gee law reflected the need to prioritize among the massive
number of refugees fleeing their home countries as a result of
World War II, as well as the broader international realization
that citizens needed protection from the abuse of national au-
thority to avoid Nazi-type atrocities in the future. 3 1 According
to James C. Hathaway, the two primary trends in the refugee
protection regime before 1950 were the rejection of a humani-
tarian basis for refugee law in favor of a narrower human
rights focus and the acceptance of a human rights definition in
terms familiar to the political ideologies of the more powerful
nations.32
The Refugee Protection Regime that exists today is based
upon the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention),33 as amended by the
1967 United Nations Protocol on Refugees (U.N. Protocol).34
linked with promoting economic stability in the receiving state rather than
with addressing the needs of refugees. Id. at 132-34.
31. Id. at 141 (noting that refugee law has also suffered from the same
"conceptual narrowness of human rights" during this period). According to
Hathaway, refugee law during this period embodied a preoccupation with pro-
tecting those whose political or civil rights were endangered while excluding
others whose human dignity was compromised in a different way. Id. at 141-
42. Another commentator, Daniel J. Steinbock, has also noted the tremendous
impact of the World War II Nazi experience on the genesis of the Refugee
Convention. Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 733, 766 (1998). According to Steinbock, the drafters of the Refugee
Convention were "to a great extent legislating about the past." Id.
32. Hathaway, supra note 28, at 143.
33. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6260, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
34. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. Pursuant to the Refugee Convention, the United
States is obligated not to return a person to a country in which her life or free-
dom would be threatened. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, su-
pra note 33, 189 U.N.T.S. at 146-48. However, customary international law
has arguably broadened the concept of nonrefoulement by including within the
definition of "refugee" displaced persons who do not enjoy the protection of
their home country. Sadruddin Aga Khan, Lectures on Legal Problems Relat-
ing to Refugees and Displaced Persons Delivered at the Hague Academy of In-
ternational Law, in INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW: A READER 239-44 (B.S.
Chimni ed., 2000): Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Nonrefoulement and the NTw A.lyum
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Pursuant to Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, a refugee
was defined universally for the first time as any person who,
[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that coun-
try; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.35
The U.N. Protocol broadened the refugee definition by re-
moving restrictions as to the timing and location of the perse-
cution. 36 The U.N. Protocol left intact, however, the substantive
definition of refugee that advantaged Europeans fleeing com-
munist regimes. 37 While clearly utilizing a human rights
Seekers, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980'S, at 103,
105-09 (David A. Martin ed., 1988).
35. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 33, 189
U.N.T.S. at 152. The resounding silence in the legislative history provides lit-
tle guidance in determining the drafters' intent in adding "membership in a
particular social group" to the pre-existing categories defined by race, religion
or political opinion. As documented by Maryellen Fullerton, the social group
addition was introduced by the Swedish representative. Maryellen Fullerton,
A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due to Member-
ship in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 505, 509 (1993) (cit-
ing U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3, at 14 (1951)). The representative stated that
"experience ha[s) shown that certain refugees ha[ve] been persecuted because
they belonged to particular social groups. The draft [c]onvention [makes] no
provision for such cases, and one designed to cover them should be accordingly
included." Id. Without further discussion, the conference adopted the amend-
ment by a vote of fourteen to zero with eight abstentions. Id. at 509-10. Some
scholars have characterized the addition as an afterthought intended to pro-
tect against persecution based on unforeseen reasons. See, e.g., ATLE GRAHL-
MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (1966). Oth-
ers have rejected such an interpretation, concluding that the drafters were fo-
cused on historical harm, and therefore, intended the refugee definition to en-
compass only known types of harm. See, e.g., Steinbock, supra note 31, at 767.
36. In addition to limiting the term "refugee" to include only those fleeing
events that occurred prior to January 1, 1951, the Refugee Convention allowed
states to choose between two methods of defining "events occurring before 1
January 1951." See Fullerton, supra note 35, at 508-09 n.16 (citation omitted).
The term was "to mean either (a) 'events occurring in Europe before 1 January
1951'; or (b) 'events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951."'
Id. (citation omitted).
37. See Hathaway, supra note 28, at 162 (noting that "most Third World
refugees remain de facto excluded, as their flight is more often prompted by
natural disaster, war, or broadly-based political and economic turmoil than by
'persecution,' at least as that term is understood in the European context").
However, the focus on individual rather than social conception of refugee simi-
larly excludes those fleeing widespread violence in the West. See KAREN
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framework, what emerged from the Refugee Convention and
the U.N. Protocol was a highly politicized definition of refu-
gee. 38
A. WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL
In 1967, the United States ratified the U.N. Protocol,
thereby agreeing to adhere to the international refugee protec-
tion standards. Congress, however, did not formally implement
its obligations pursuant to the U.N. Protocol until 1980 when it
enacted the Refugee Act.39 At that time, Congress set forth two
MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 47 (2d ed. 2002) (citing conflicts in Bosnia, the
Chechnya region of Russia, and the former Soviet republics of Armenia and
Azerbaijan as examples).
38. Id. at 145-51 (noting that the refugee definition includes only those
who have been disenfranchised by their government because of their race, re-
ligion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion). These grounds all represent areas in which the Eastern Bloc countries
were vulnerable. Id. at 150. In contrast, denial of basic socioeconomic rights-
an area in which the Western countries were weaker-was excluded from the
refugee definition. See Patrick Matlou, Upsetting the Cart: Forced Migration
and Gender Issues, the African Experience, in ENGENDERING FORCED
MIGRATION 128, 139 (Doreen Indra ed., 1999) (noting that almost all African
refugees before 1980 remained in Africa as Western countries were reluctant
to accept them). Even after quotas for African refugees were set by the United
States starting in 1980 (with Canada and Australia following suit during the
following four years), racism and spurious stereotypes of African refugees as
rural, uneducated, and unskilled have "conspire[d] to keep Western resettle-
ment miniscule." Id.
39. Prior to 1980, the United States admitted certain refugees and others
in need of protection on an ad hoc basis, through either special legislation or
discretionary parole power. See generally Deborah E. Anker & Michael J. Pos-
ner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1981) (outlining the history of American refugee law
from the post-World War II period until the passage of the Refugee Act of
1980). The United States utilized this ad hoc admission practice because
American immigration law contained a "national origins" quota system and
lacked any permanent refugee admission system until 1965, undermining its
ability to provide refuge to persons of certain nationalities. Id. The Displaced
Persons Act of 1948, Congress's first post-World War II refugee legislation,
protected only certain displaced, forced laborers from states conquered by
Germany and certain individuals who qualified under United Nations refugee
standards, particularly those who fled Nazi, Fascist, or Soviet persecution. Id.
at 13. At other times, such as in response to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution,
the Attorney General utilized his parole authority pursuant to Immigration
and Nationality Act § 212(d)(5) to admit refugee groups. See id. at 13-16; Full-
erton, supra note 35, at 512-13 n.40. The Refugee Act of 1980 created, for the
first time, a legal framework for the admission of refugees to the United States
that was hailed as being "coherent, comprehensive and practical." Anker &
Posner, supra, at 11.
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different forms of relief for refugees at or within the borders of
the United States: withholding of removal and asylum. 40 To
qualify for withholding of removal, a person must show that, if
removed from the United States, her life or freedom would be
threatened on account of her race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion.41 The
U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the applicable standard of
proof to be "more likely than not," meaning the risk of persecu-
tion must exceed fifty percent. 42 In keeping with the U.N. Pro-
tocol, Congress excluded various groups from protection, in-
cluding criminals, those dangerous to national security, and
those who have either persecuted others, engaged in genocide,
or assisted in Nazi persecution. 43
B. ASYLUM
Congress's enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980 also cre-
ated a more beneficial discretionary form of relief entitled "asy-
lum." 44 To qualify for asylum, a person must show that she is a
refugee. 45 Congress defined "refugee" as a person who has been
persecuted in the past or who has a "well-founded fear of perse-
cution" on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion. In addition, a
refugee must be outside of her country of nationality and be ei-
ther unwilling or unable to return to that country.46 In sharp
contrast with the mandatory nature of withholding of removal,
however, asylum is discretionary.47 Thus, once a person demon-
strates statutory eligibility, she must further show that asylum
is warranted as a matter of discretion. 48 Significantly, a grant
40. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 107 (1980) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2000)); see also Immigration and Nation-
ality Act § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2004).
41. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3)(A).
42. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424 (1984).
43. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a). Over the years since
enactment of the Refugee Act, Congress has broadened the criminal exclusion-
ary grounds, and the Attorney General has interpreted the exclusion grounds
to cover a growing number of crimes. See infra notes 258-82 and accompany-
ing text.
44. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 208.
45. Id. § 208(b).
46. See id. § 101(a)(42).
47. See id. § 208(b)(1).
48. Id. There are many more bars to attaining asylum than withholding of
removal. For example, in addition to incorporating all of the statutory bars
that apply to withholding of removal, the statutory asylum provision contains
2004]
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of asylum leads to familial reunification and the possibility for
permanency in the United States. 49
Asylum law has been aptly characterized as "intended to
act as a 'bridge between morality and law'.., the process that
keeps migration exclusion morally defensible while protecting
the global gatekeeping operation as a whole."5 0 Asylum law in
the United States has proven to be governed by extremely po-
litical processes, with deterrence and other domestic concerns
playing an increasingly strong role.51 Indeed, the history of asy-
lum policy in the United States is replete with examples of dif-
fering interpretations that advance broader political or foreign
policy goals. For example, following the massacre at Tianan-
exceptions for persons who have engaged in, are suspected of engaging in, or
planning to engage in terrorist activities (including espousing terrorist views).
Id. § 208(b)(2). There is also a one-year time limit in which a person must seek
asylum, id. § 208(a)(2)(B); a bar against anyone who has firmly resettled in
another country prior to arrival in the United States, id. § 208(b)(2)(A)(vi); a
bar against anyone who can be returned to a safe third country, id.
§ 208(a)(2)(A); and a bar against anyone who has previously sought asylum
and been denied, id. § 208(a)(2)(C). Finally, for asylum purposes, any aggra-
vated felony is automatically considered a particularly serious crime and
therefore, a bar to asylum. Id. § 208(b)(2)(B)(i).
49. See id. § 208(b)(3) (allowing for the asylee's spouse and children under
twenty-one years old to be afforded derivative asylum status); see also id.
§ 209(b) (allowing for asylees to "adjust their status" to that of permanent resi-
dents after one year). However, Congress has capped the number of asylees
that can become lawful permanent residents per year, resulting in huge back-
logs and waits of up to ten years for permanent residency. In a recent ruling in
a class action litigation brought by 150,000 such asylees, a federal court char-
acterized the INS's handling of pending asylee permanent residency applica-
tions as "nothing short of a national embarrassment" and ordered the govern-
ment to adjust the status of nearly 22,000 waiting asylees. Ngwanyia v.
Ashcroft, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1087 (D. Minn. 2004).
50. Jacqueline Bhabha, Internationalist Gatekeepers?: The Tension Be-
tween Asylum Advocacy and Human Rights, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 155, 161
(2002) (citation omitted). According to Jacqueline Bhabha, by participating in
a polarized global migration regime, asylum advocates produce benefits for a
"somewhat arbitrarily selected minority of forced migrants" while at the same
time "accord[ing] a critical legitimacy to the filtering system" that sifts out
"worthy from unworthy forced migrants." Id. at 160-62.
51. See Steinbock, supra note 31, at 739-41 (noting that increasing hostil-
ity towards refugees has led governments to adopt a broad spectrum of proce-
dural devices and substantive doctrines aimed at restricting refugee admis-
sions). According to Steinbock, "[olne obvious and appealing option for
countries seeking to limit the number of asylees ... is to contract the scope of
the substantive law, especially that of the refugee definition itself." Id. at 740.
In the absence of supranational harmonization, Steinbock also notes the risk
that individual countries may engage in a race to the bottom in order to avoid
luring would-be asylum seekers through a perception that one country em-
ploys a more generous refugee definition than others. Id. at 741.
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men Square, Congress amended the definition of "refugee"
within immigration law to include those fleeing forced steriliza-
tion in China. 52 Similarly, Congress has amended immigration
law to offer special protections to Cubans, Nicaraguans, and
Eastern Europeans. 53 While U.S. immigration policy has his-
torically discriminated against Haitians, 54 Congress passed leg-
islation allowing permanent residency for Haitians who had
awaited asylum protection in the United States for many
years. 55
Perhaps counter-intuitively, the standard of proof for asy-
lum is significantly lower than that which is required for with-
holding of removal. In determining whether an individual is
eligible for withholding of removal, adjudicators use a "more
likely than not" standard, whereas a grant of asylum requires
past persecution or a "well founded fear" of persecution. The
U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that a "well founded fear" of
persecution can exist if there is a one in ten chance that the
feared event will happen.56 Stated differently, if a reasonable
person in the applicant's situation would fear persecution, that
52. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42). The Immigration and
Nationality Act specifies that
a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo in-
voluntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or re-
fusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive
population control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted
on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well founded
fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or sub-ject to persecution for such failure, refusal or resistance shall be
deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of po-
litical opinion.
Id.
53. See, e.g., Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-100, §§ 201-04, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193-201 (1997) (allowing for
permanent residency for certain Cubans and Nicaraguans and relaxing the
statutory requirements for various forms of relief from removal for certain
Central Americans and Eastern Europeans).
54. Compare Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat.
1161 (1966), conditionally repealed by Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 606, 110 Stat.
3009, 3695 (1996) (allowing Marielito Cubans to stay in the United States),
with Agreement on Migrants-Interdiction, Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-Haiti, 33
U.S.T. 3559 (authorizing the Coast Guard to intercept Haitian vessels on the
high seas, ascertain if they contained undocumented aliens, and, if so, return
them to Haiti).
55. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998 § 902, 8
U.S.C § 1255 (2000) (providing for permanent residency for Haitian asylum
seekers who had been present in the United States since 1995).
56. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987).
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fear is well-founded.57 Finally, the persecution suffered or
feared must exist nationwide58 and be inflicted either directly
by the government, or by forces that the government is unwill-
ing or unable to control.5 9
As part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),60 the United States over-
hauled its refugee protection regime. Before 1996, detention of
asylum seekers was the exception rather than the norm. Pur-
suant to the IIRIRA, however, any arriving alien who does not
possess valid immigration documents is subjected to a new pro-
cedure entitled "expedited removal."61 Expedited removal re-
sults in the immediate return of an "arriving alien" to her home
country,62 unless she expresses a fear of persecution.63 Upon
expression of such a fear, the arriving alien is then arrested
and transferred to a detention facility to await a "credible fear"
interview by an asylum officer. 64 If the officer finds a credible
fear of persecution, the arriving alien is permitted to seek asy-
57. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court clarified further that the standard en-
compasses both objective and subjective components: the person must be sub-
jectively fearful and that fear must be objectively reasonable. Id. at 440.
58. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(ii) (2002).
59. The United States has long recognized that the persecution may be
inflicted by nonstate agents in situations where the state has shown that it is
"unwilling or unable to control" those actions. For example, in In re 0-
Z-, the Board granted asylum based on persecution by anti-Semitic nation-
alist groups where the Ukranian government refused to respond to the appli-
cant's complaints, notwithstanding the government's official policy condemn-
ing anti-Semitism. Interim Dec. No. 3346, at 5 (B.I.A. 1998); see also In re
Villalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. 142, 147 (B.I.A. 1990) (granting asylum based on per-
secution by Salvadoran death squads). The INS has also acknowledged that
persecution may be inflicted by a nonstate actor for purposes of asylum law. 8
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE BASIC LAW MANUAL: U.S. LAW AND INS
REFUGEE ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS 27 (Supp. 1995) [hereinafter BASIC LAW
MANUAL].
60. The IIRIRA was enacted as Division C of the Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 1997. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
61. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208; 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b).
62. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b).
63. Id. § 235.3(b)(4).
64. Id. § 235.3(b)(4), (c). In order to establish a "credible fear" of persecu-
tion, a substantially lower threshold is required than for the "well founded
fear" standard required for asylum protection. See Immigration and National-
ity Act § 235(b)(1)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (1999). A "credible fear of
persecution" is defined as "a significant possibility, taking into account the
credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien's claim
and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish
eligibility for asylum." Id.
2004] GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE ABROAD 89
lum before an immigration judge during removal proceedings.6 5
While not mandated by law, the vast majority of arriving aliens
that pursue asylum remain in detention throughout the pro-
ceedings. 66
Because most refugees that flee their countries in search of
safety do not arrive in the United States with valid immigra-
tion documents, expedited removal has a direct impact on
them. If an asylum officer does not find a credible fear of perse-
cution, an arriving alien may request review by an immigration
judge, but these reviews are limited to the record of the initial
interview. If the judge agrees with the officer, the person is re-
moved quickly from the United States.6 7 Significantly, those
who are subject to expedited removal and do not express a fear
of persecution or torture are immediately removed from the
United States. 68 Thus, the IIRIRA created a system in which
65. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4)(ii).
66. Once an applicant establishes a credible fear of persecution and is re-
ferred to an immigration judge, she is no longer in expedited removal proceed-
ings and is eligible to apply for parole from detention. Karen Musalo et al., The
Expedited Removal Study Releases It's Third Report, 77 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1189, 1190 (2000). However, the reality is that parole is now the
exception and detention is the rule. See Refugees Behind Bars: The Imprison-
ment of Asylum Seekers in the Wake of the 1996 Immigration Act, HUM. RTS.
FIRST, Aug. 1999 (noting that immigration detention costs would exceed $550
million annually by 2001). The report criticizes the INS for implementing its
parole guidelines in an "ineffective and inconsistent manner" and notes the
great disparity in reported figures as to the national parole rate. Id. (citing
Patrick J. McDonnell, Asylum-Seekers Held Long Periods Despite Clean Re-
cords, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998, at Bi ("The INS only grants temporary re-
lease to about 10% of the asylum applicants, a spokesman said.")); Elizabeth
Llorente, Immigration Detention: A Rapidly Growing Business, THE BERGEN
REC., Apr. 11, 1999, at All (referring to nation's 40% parole rate). In addition,
statistics received from the INS by Arthur Helton indicated that between
January 1997 and January 1998, only 57, or 26.5%, of the 215 asylum seekers
who met the credible fear standard were granted parole. Arthur C. Helton, A
Rational Release Policy for Refugees: Reinvigorating the APSO Program, 75
INTERPRETER RELEASES 685, 689 (1998).
67. The expedited removal system has been widely criticized. See, e.g.,
Musalo et al., supra note 66, at 1189; Karen Musalo et al., The Expedited Re-
moval Study: Report on the First Three Years of Implementation of Expedited
Removal (May 2000), 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1 (Special Is-
sue 2001) [hereinafter The Expedited Removal Study]; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST,
Is THIS AMERICA? THE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS TO ASYLUM SEEKERS IN
AMERICA, at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/refugees/reports/due-process/
due.process.htm (2000).
68. Aside from being physically ejected from the country, the order of re-
moval gives rise to significant legal hurdles if the noncitizen seeks to return to
the United States. For example, an order of removal automatically bars one
from returning to the United States for five years. Immigration and National-
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low-level officers at the ports of entry are given great discretion
while courts have very circumscribed powers of review.69
C. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
Until 1994, asylum and withholding of removal were the
only forms of relief available in the United States for those
fearing persecution in their home countries.7 0 In 1994, however,
the United States ratified the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.7 1 The drafting of the Torture Con-
vention occurred from 1977 through 1984.72 The Torture Con-
ity Act § 212(a)(9)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2000). For those with busi-
ness or family-based needs to return frequently to the United States, this has
a severe impact. See Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum
Rule: Improved But Still Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2001).
69. Pursuant to expedited removal, immigration inspectors at the borders
and airports "are authorized to issue removal orders that can be finalized after
cursory review by a supervisor." LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
REFUGEE WOMEN AT RISK: UNFAIR U.S. LAWS HURT ASYLUM SEEKERS 4
(2002). This expedited removal order can then be executed immediately, with
no appeal to an immigration judge or any court review. See id.
70. The focus here is on refugee law as incorporated into U.S. domestic
law. Outside of the refugee context, the immigration laws contain additional
forms of humanitarian relief for those with extensive ties to the United States.
For example, the Attorney General may cancel removal of an alien who has
resided in the United States for at least ten years and who can demonstrate,
among other things, that their removal would result in exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship to a spouse, child, or parent who is a United States
citizen or lawful permanent resident. Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 240A(b)(1)(A)-(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1)(A)-(D) (2000).
71. See supra note 9.
72. J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT 31 (1988). From 1977 to 1984, several bodies within the United
Nations were involved in the drafting process: the General Assembly, the
Commission on Human Rights, and a number of working groups convened by
the Commission on Human Rights. Id. Sweden played a pivotal role in the
drafting process and authored the first draft of the Torture Convention in
January 1978. Id. The Swedish draft was then redrafted many times by the
"Working Group," an assemblage open to active participation by all state
members of the Commission on Human Rights as well as observation by non-
member states and nongovernmental organizations. Id. at 32. In actuality,
about half of the states that attended the Working Group meetings were from
the West (Sweden, Australia, France, the United Kingdom and the United
States being the most frequent participants). Id. The most involved non-
Western states included Argentina, Brazil, and the Soviet Union. Id. India,
Senegal, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Byelorussia, the German Democratic Republic,
and the Ukraine were also active in several sessions. Id. Switzerland, a non-
member of the United Nations, participated through its observer delegation.
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vention drew in large part upon a number of other human
rights agreements that prohibit torture, 73 and followed the ear-
lier Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly on December 9, 1975.74 The Torture Conven-
tion, however, contained one entirely new provision: Article 3
required signatory states to agree not to expel, to return (re-
fouler), or to extradite a person to another state where there
are substantial grounds for believing that she would be in dan-
ger of being tortured. 75 Under the Torture Convention, torture
is defined as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or men-
tal, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtain-
ing from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person,
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
Id. Nongovernmental organizations, such as Amnesty International and the
International Commission of Jurists, participated in the process as well. Id.
Decisions by the group could only be made by consensus. Id.
73. Id. at 114 (discussing "the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the humanitarian rules which
apply to armed conflicts and the two Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the
European, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of 1950 [(ECHR)], the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights of 1966 [(ICCPR)], the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969
and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights of 1981"). Most of the
above-referenced instruments also prohibit cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment. Id. In contrast with the Torture Convention, both
the ECHR and the ICCPR forbid all torture, without regard to the role of the
state. CHRIS INGELSE, THE UN COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE: AN
ASSESSMENT 291 (2001). Compare the explicit reference to the state in the
Torture Convention's Article 1 torture definition with the Human Rights
Committee general comment 20a interpretation of ICCPR Article 7:
The aim of the provisions of article 7 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights is to protect both the dignity and the physi-
cal and mental integrity of the individual. It is the duty of the State
Party to afford everyone protection through legislative and other
measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by article
7, whether inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside
their official capacity or in a private capacity.
Id. at 225 (quoting U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 30 (1994)).
74. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 72, at 33.
75. Torture Convention, supra note 9; BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note
72, at 125 (noting that Article 3 is "generally seen as providing significant ad-
ditional protection in comparison with previous human rights instruments").
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capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, in-
herent in or incident to lawful sanctions.
76
The United States' implementation of Article 3 offers pro-
tection that is at once broader and narrower than that afforded
by its implementation of the Refugee Convention provisions.
Most significantly, although Article 3 of the Torture Conven-
tion was based in part on Article 33 of the Refugee Conven-
tion,77 the Torture Convention-based relief is broader because it
does not require that torture be inflicted on account of any
specified protected ground.78 The Refugee Convention however,
as interpreted in the United States and in many other signa-
tory states, protects against persecution inflicted by either the
government or "forces the government is unwilling or unable to
control."79 In contrast, the text of the Torture Convention re-
quires that the government inflict the torture, or that it be in-
flicted with governmental "acquiescence."8 0 Finally, in compari-
76. Torture Convention, supra note 9.
77. In addition to Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, the case law of the
European Commission of Human Rights interpreting Article 3 of the ECHR
provided inspiration for Article 3 of the Torture Convention. BURGERS &
DANELIUS, supra note 72, at 125. While the actual language of Article 3 of the
ECHR prohibits torture and is silent as to refoulement or extradition, the
commission has interpreted the bar on torture to include a bar on returning a
person to a country where she might face torture. Id.; see also infra notes 325-
32 and accompanying text.
78. The lack of either a "nexus" or "statutorily-protected ground" require-
ment under the Torture Convention is particularly significant in gender-based
claims because of the difficulty that these requirements have posed for women
in U.S. asylum adjudication. See infra notes 101-63 and accompanying text
for a discussion of these requirements.
79. See supra note 59. The United Nations High Commissioner on Refu-
gees (UNHCR) also recognizes that persecution could be inflicted by nonstate
actors if persecutory acts are "knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the
authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer protection." OFFICE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 65 (rev. ed. 1992). Other state
signatories to the Refugee Convention that interpret it to include persecution
by nonstate actors include: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United King-
dom, Belgium, and Denmark. See Volker Tiirk, Non-State Agents of Persecu-
tion, in SWITZERLAND AND THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES 95,
98 n.8 (Vincent Chetail & Vera Gowlland-Debbas eds., 2002). A number of
other signatory states-including the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden-
have changed their jurisprudence to extend refugee protection to those perse-
cuted by nonstate actors. Id. Protection from persecution by nonstate actors is
also explicitly provided for in the 1969 Organization of African Unity Conven-
tion Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the
1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. Id.
80. The Board and Attorney General John Ashcroft have interpreted "gov-
ernment acquiescence" as requiring knowledge and consent. See infra notes
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son with the Refugee Convention's "well-founded fear" re-
quirement,8 ' the standard of proof as set forth in the Torture
Convention requires "substantial grounds for believing that one
would be in danger of torture."8 2 As implemented in the United
States, however, the standard of proof under the Torture Con-
vention has been elevated to the "more likely than not" stan-
dard.83
Although the United States ratified the Torture Conven-
tion in 1994, it did so with a declaration that Article 3 (among
others) was not self-executing.8 4 It was not until 1998 that the
Senate enacted implementing legislation.8 5 In codifying the
United States' obligations under Article 3, Congress deviated
333-52 and accompanying text (discussing how "governmental acquiescence"
has been interpreted by the Committee Against Torture and other signatory
states). This stringent interpretation has greatly limited protection in cases
involving gender-based violence or other torture inflicted by nongovernmental
actors.
81. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing how the
U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the "well-founded fear" standard as being
substantially lower than the "more likely than not" standard). According to the
U.S. Supreme Court, while the "more likely than not" standard requires a
greater than 50% likelihood, an applicant can have a "well-founded fear" of an
event occurring if there is a one in ten possibility. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S: 421, 431 (1987).
82. See Torture Convention, supra note 9.
83. The United States' equation of the Torture Convention's "substantial
likelihood of torture" standard with the statutory "more likely than not" stan-
dard utilized for Refugee Convention-based withholding claims has been
widely criticized and is out of sync with other signatory states and the Com-
mittee against Torture. See infra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
84. The United States takes this position with regard to all human rights
instruments that it signs. See Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification
of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 347 (2000) (assert-
ing that "[o]n the few occasions when the US government has ratified a human
rights treaty, it has done so in a way designed to preclude the treaty from hav-
ing any domestic effect"). While beyond the scope of this Article, scholars have
widely criticized the United States' position. See, e.g., DEBORAH E. ANKER,
LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 466 n.11 (3d ed. 1999) (surveying ap-
plicable scholarship and treatises and clarifying that, "[t]he question of
whether the United States is bound by the treaty is distinct from that of
whether the treaty is self-executing or requires implementation to create spe-
cific remedies in domestic fora"); Kristen Rosati, The United Nations Conven-
tion Against Torture: A Self-Executing Treaty That Prevents the Removal of
Persons Ineligible for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 26 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POLY 533 (1998).
85. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2822 (1998). Regulations were promulgated
the following year. See Implementation of Torture Convention in Extradition
Cases, 22 C.F.R. §§ 95.1-.4 (2004).
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from the text of the Torture Convention. Perhaps most signifi-
cantly, notwithstanding the Convention's absolute prohibition
against torture under any circumstances, Congress excluded
persons with criminal histories from obtaining full protection
under Article 3.86 For those with criminal records, Congress
created a lesser form of relief entitled "deferral of removal."87
This two-tiered approach to relief from removal when torture is
at issue allows the United States to afford greater or lesser pro-
tection to torture victims it deems more or less desirable.88
While the standard of proof is identical for both withhold-
ing and deferral under the Torture Convention-based statutory
provisions, the United States can easily withdraw "deferral of
removal" protections if conditions or circumstances improve in
the home country.8 9 Finally, as implemented in the United
States, neither Torture Convention-based withholding nor de-
ferral of removal allow for the torture victim to reunite with
family or obtain permanent safety. 90
86. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 § 2242(c).
87. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-.18, .22 (2004).
88. The United States is not alone in undermining the intent of the Tor-
ture Convention with regard to "criminal aliens." For example, pursuant to
Canada's Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 2002, those convicted of a
"serious crime" or involved in "organized crime" or those who pose a threat to
national security are entirely ineligible for Torture Convention protection.
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, ch. 27, 2001 S.C. 16-20 (Can.); see
also HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM, DEP'T OF CAN. HERITAGE, CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT
OR PUNISHMENT 2 (2002) (noting that the Canadian Centre for Victims of Tor-
ture expressed serious concerns regarding Canada's compliance with Article 3
of the Torture Convention, "since a person recognized as a Convention refugee,
but who poses a danger to public security or national security, could be de-
ported to a country where he/she will likely be subjected to torture or death"),
available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/pdp-hrp/docs/cat/2002/cat2000e.pdf.
89. 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(d).
90. While an in-depth discussion of the need for family reunification for
victims of torture is beyond the scope of this Article, this type of protection hi-
erarchy arbitrarily denies fundamental rights to those in need of safety in con-
travention of both international human rights norms and the family reunifica-
tion policy goals underlying United States immigration policy. While
acknowledging that it would be premature to argue "that a general norm
against family separation" has reached the level of "customary international
law," commentators have argued that "such a norm is beginning to evolve in
fragmentary ways." Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Vio-
lation of International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 213, 230 (2003) (finding
that "[s]ufficient consensus exists against particular types of family separa-
tion.., to constitute customary international law"). For examples of provi-
sions of the Immigration and Nationality Act stressing the importance of fam-
ily unity in guiding U.S. immigration policy, see Immigration and Natinnolity
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II. WOMEN FLEEING GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE:
INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF A WOMEN'S HUMAN
RIGHTS ISSUE
"Refugeeness" has been described as "an experience char-
acterized by flight, force, fear, struggle for control over basic life
issues, and especially ambiguity."91 This ambiguity is com-
pounded for women seeking asylum protection in the United
States. While the disassociative nature of the refugee experi-
ence is not unique to women, cultural norms may make it even
more difficult for women to comply with the rigid standards of
proof and causation all too often employed in the refugee adju-
dication context. 92 Women and children constitute 80% of the
estimated twelve million refugees, 93 but the majority of appli-
cants for asylum in the United States are men.94 The dispropor-
tionately small number of women seeking safety in the United
States is attributable, in large part, to their severe poverty and
lack of mobility.95
Act § 201(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2004), which exempts from quotas "immediate
relatives" and children born to lawful permanent residents temporarily
abroad; Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3)
(2000), which gives preferences to certain immigrants with slightly less com-
pelling family relationships to U.S. citizens or to lawful permanent residents;
and Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) (2000),
which gives preference to spouses and children accompanying or, following to
join most classes of immigrants. See also LEGOMSKY, supra note 28, at 147
("[O]ne central value that United States immigration laws have long pro-
moted, albeit to varying degrees, is family unity."); U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION LAWS AND ISSUES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Michael Le-
May & Elliott Robert Barkan eds., 1999).
91. Lucia Ann McSpadden, Negotiating Masculinity in the Reconstruction
of Social Place, in ENGENDERING FORCED MIGRATION, supra note 38, at 242,
244.
92. For this reason, standards of causation in the refugee context should
instead take into account "the complex combinations of circumstances which
may give rise to the risk of being persecuted, the prevalence of evidentiary
gaps, and the difficulty of eliciting evidence across linguistic and cultural di-
vides." Rodger Haines, Gender-Related Persecution 19, at http://www.unhcr.
org (Aug. 10, 2001) (draft).
93. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE:
PROTECTING REFUGEE WOMEN AND GIRLS REMAINS A SIGNIFICANT
CHALLENGE 1 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03663.pdf.
94. Jeffrey S. Chase, Immigration Issues: A View from the Bench, in
WOMEN IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 134 (Philippa Strum & Danielle
Tarantolo eds., 2002).
95. See Anker et al., supra note 24, at 716-17. In remarks addressing the
differential migration patterns of women and children, Jacqueline Bhabha at-
tributed the under-representation of women asylum seekers to a combination
of factors including: reduced access to formal and informal structures that fa-
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The combination of "refugeeness" and gender may also ac-
count for the finding in recent studies that the expedited re-
moval system that Congress implemented in 1996 has had a
disparate impact on women asylum seekers. 96 Women are more
frequently removed pursuant to expedited removal (as opposed
to regular immigration removal procedures) than men.97 The
expedited removal process also presents particular obstacles to
women fleeing persecution or torture and places them in grave
danger of being returned to their persecutors. For example,
women who have fled gender-based harm such as rape, domes-
tic violence, honor killings, forced sterilization, female genital
mutilation, or forced marriage may feel a great sense of shame
and be hesitant to disclose their experiences to an immigration
officer. 98 In addition, neither women nor immigration officers
may know that gender-based harm can be a basis for protec-
tion.99
Indeed, based on the tumultuous history of U.S. asylum ju-
risprudence involving gender-based persecution, it remains un-
clear to what extent women fleeing gender-based harm will be
protected through asylum law. 100 Although the Refugee Con-
cilitate migration, dependent family status, inadequate resources, personal
history, and social positioning which "militate against a self-perception as an
autonomous asylum seeker." Posting of Jacqueline Bhabha, Executive Direc-
tor, University Committee on Human Rights Studies, Harvard University, to
immprof@listserv.unc.edu (Feb. 24, 2004, 17:33 EST) (copy on file with au-
thor).
96. For explanation of expedited removal, see supra notes 61-69 and ac-
companying text.
97. Musalo et al., supra note 66, at 1192. Explanations for this disparity
include: (1) women are more likely to present themselves at ports of entry
without proper travel documents; (2) a high proportion of male asylum appli-
cants may already be present in the United States and thus exempt from the
expedited removal system for arriving aliens; and (3) officials may apply expe-
dited removal in a manner that disfavors women. The Expedited Removal
Study, supra note 67, at 50-51.
98. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 69, at 6. In practice,
many asylum-seekers are also subjected to shackling and strip searches (in-
cluding body cavity searches) as part of expedited removal. Id. at 7. For
women who have been raped, this is particularly traumatic. Id. INS policy and
written guidelines specify that handcuffing and shackling are not required,
and specify that restraints should not normally be used on women. Id.
99. Id. at 8.
100. The treatment of gender asylum claims in the United States has re-
cently been described as being "in flux, with developments tending toward rec-
ognition of these claims being followed by those which seem to limit or even
eliminate such recognition." Karen Musalo & Stephen Knight, Asylum for Vic-
tims of Gender Violence: An Overview of the Law, and an Analysis of 45 Un-
published Decisions, IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS, Dec. 2003, at 1.
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vention does not set forth gender as a statutorily protected
ground, the Board and the courts have developed a substantial
body of jurisprudence interpreting "persecution,"101 "member-
ship in a particular social group,"'1 2 and the "nexus"'1 3 re-
quirement within the context of gender-based claims to asylum.
While the Board and at least one circuit court have stated that
a social group could be defined based upon the shared sex of its
members, there have been no precedential decisions granting
asylum protection to a woman who feared persecution based
solely on her gender. Rather, the Board and the courts have
charted an uneven path in gender-based asylum claims, often
requiring women to articulate exceedingly narrow social groups
consisting of gender in addition to other shared characteris-
101. "Persecution" was intentionally not defined by the drafters of the
Refugee Convention so that it could be interpreted in accordance with evolving
standards. ANKER, supra note 84, at 171. At a minimum, it has been defined
to include "threat[s] to life or freedom" and should embrace other serious vio-
lations of human rights. Id. According to the INS Basic Law Manual, "[o]ne
must determine whether the conduct alleged to be persecution violates a basic
human right, protected under international law." IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE BASIC LAW MANUAL:
U.S. LAW AND INS REFUGEE/ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS 24 (rev. ed. 1994) (em-
phasis omitted). Prior to the issuance of the U.S. Gender Guidelines in 1995,
sexual violence and other forms of gender-based harm were often character-
ized as personal rather than persecutory. See infra note 105 and accompany-
ing text (discussing cases distinguishing persecution and "private" harm). As
discussed below, the U.S. Gender Guidelines recognized that "women's rights
are human rights" and urged adjudicators not to mischaracterize claims as
"purely personal" based solely on the appearance of sexual violence. Memo-
randum from Phyllis Coven, Office of Int'l Affairs, Dep't of Justice, to INS Asy-
lum Office/rs & HQASM Coordinators 2, 9 (May 26, 1995) [hereinafter U.S.
Gender Guidelines], available at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/guide
lines/us.pdf; see also infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
102. Because gender is not a protected category under the refugee defini-
tion, gender-based asylum claims are most frequently presented as involving
persecution on account of membership in a particular social group. As dis-
cussed above, the social group category is the most open-ended of the protected
groupings set forth under the Refugee Convention. See supra note 35. In the
United States, the Board has utilized an "immutability" test to determine the
cognizability of proposed social groups: the members must be joined by a
shared characteristic that is either immutable or so fundamental to their iden-
tities that they should not be required to change it. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
103. Even in instances in which social groups based in part on gender are
recognized, the applicant must still show that she was persecuted on account
of her membership in that social group. As illustrated in the discussion of In re
R- A- , 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated, (Att'y Gen. 2001), this
nexus requirement has often been interpreted in such a way as to be insur-
mountable in gender-based claims. See infra notes 132-63 and accompanying
text.
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tics. 104
For many years, women were denied asylum based on per-
ceptions of gender-based harm as "personal" and outside of the
realm of refugee protection.105 However, the international
reconceptualization of human rights and refugee law as inclu-
sive of women's human rights issues impacted the development
104. For examples of immigration judges' decisions granting asylum in gen-
der-based cases, see In re A- N- , No. A73-603-840 (EOIR Immigr. Ct.
Dec. 22, 2000) (finding that the Jordanian applicant had been persecuted, and
feared future persecution, on account of her membership in a particular social
group of "married, educated, career-oriented" women), quoted in 78
INTERPRETER RELEASES 409 (2001); In re [name not provided), No. A76-512-
001 (EOIR Immigr. Ct. Oct. 18, 2000) (recognizing a cognizable social group
comprised of unmarried Chinese women subjected to, and opposed to, the feu-
dal practice of arranged marriages), cited in 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1634
(2000); In re M- K- , No. A72-374-558 (EOIR Immigr. Ct. Aug. 9, 1995)
(holding that the applicant was a member of two distinct subgroups of women:
those "forced to undergo female genital mutilation" and "those who have been
punished with physical spousal abuse for attempting to assert their auton-
omy"), quoted in 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1188 (1995); In re A- & Z-,
Nos. A72-190-893/A72-793-219 (EOIR Immigr. Ct. Dec. 20, 1994) (finding that
applicant suffered from spousal abuse and defining the social group as one
that "consists of women who espouse Western values and who are unwilling to
live their lives at the mercy of their husbands, their society, their govern-
ment"), quoted in 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 521 (1995). For further discus-
sion, see Knight, supra note 12, at 689, 695 (surveying gender-based asylum
decisions since the Attorney General vacated the In re R- A- decision
and concluding that, although the United States is making progress in recog-
nizing that asylum law should protect against violations of women's human
rights, its "aggressive approach has prevented the development of positive fed-
eral court precedent").
105. For example, the Fifth Circuit denied asylum to a woman who was
raped by armed men during an attack on her uncle's farm cooperative. Cam-
pos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1987). A woman who accom-
panied the men shouted political slogans during the rape. Id. Notwithstanding
the clear political context to the rape, the court reasoned that the rape was
carried out for personal reasons and therefore was not persecution on account
of a protected ground. Id. at 291. In Fatin v. INS, the Third Circuit became the
first court to recognize that gender could be the defining characteristic of a
cognizable social group for asylum purposes. 12 F.3d 1233, 1240-41 (3d
Cir.1993). However, the court denied asylum finding that the Iranian female
applicant's fear of having to conform with the mandatory dress code or be sub-
ject to public lashing, stoning, and imprisonment did not constitute persecu-
tion. Id. at 1242. Similarly, in Fisher v. INS, the Ninth Circuit held that gen-
erally harsh conditions imposed by law on all women in Iran could not
constitute persecution for asylum purposes. 61 F.3d 1366, 1377 (9th Cir. 1995)
(en banc). In Pitcherskaia v. INS, the court reversed the immigration judge's
finding that the Russian government's practice of subjecting suspected lesbi-
ans to electric shock "therapy" did not constitute persecution because it was
inflicted with a benign intent to "cure." 118 F.3d 641, 646 (9th Cir. 1997).
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of gender-based asylum jurisprudence in the United States.106
For example, in 1993, the World Conference on Human Rights
led to the adoption of the Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action (Declaration) by the United Nations General Assem-
bly. The Declaration explicitly recognized women's human
rights as "an inalienable, integral, and indivisible part of uni-
versal human rights."10 7 Specifically, the Declaration identified
gender-specific abuses that constitute human rights violations
and that must be eliminated, "including those resulting from
cultural prejudice, such as violence, sexual harassment, and
sexual exploitation."10 8 A few months later, in December 1993,
the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women and recognized vio-
lence against women as an important human rights issue.109
In 1993, Canada broke ground by becoming the first state
party to the Refugee Convention to issue gender guidelines for
interpreting gender-based asylum claims (Canadian Guide-
lines).110 The Canadian Guidelines address both substantive
and procedural hurdles to assessing gender-based claims to
106. There were discreet efforts to recognize gender-based harm as early as
1984. For example, in that year, the European Parliament and the Dutch
Refugee Council passed resolutions that suggested that sex-based persecution
fits under the particular social group category. Lisa Gilad, The Problem of
Gender-Related Persecution: A Challenge of International Protection, in
ENGENDERING FORCED MIGRATION, supra note 38, at 334, 335. In 1985, the
UNHCR recommended that women might be considered members of a social
group if they violate their country's social mores. Id. In 1987, the Canadian
Immigrant Appeals Board recognized a gender-based claim and found that
sexual assault constituted persecution. Id. In 1989, Canada's Immigrant and
Refugee Board was created and incorporated many women members inter-
ested in establishing protection mechanisms for women refugees. Id.
107. See Elizabeth F. Defeis, Women's Human Rights: The Twenty-First
Century, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1748, 1749 (1995). Defeis describes the Decla-
ration as a "watershed in the protection of human rights of women [that] sig-
nal[s] the end of the historic disregard of women's human rights." Id.
108. Id.
109. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res.
48/104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/49
(1993); see also Defeis, supra note 107, at 1749-50.
110. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD. (CAN.), GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE
CHAIRPERSON PURSUANT TO SECTION 65(3) OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT: WOMEN
REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER RELATED PERSECUTION (1993), re-
printed in 5 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 278 (1993) [hereinafter CANADIAN
GUIDELINES]. The Canadian Guidelines were the result of the Immigrant and
Refugee Board working group on refugee women, formed in 1990. See Gilad,
supra note 106, at 335-36.
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persecution.' While the United States' reluctance to recognize
women as a social group has often been premised on the broad-
based nature and size of such a group, the Canadian Guidelines
explicitly state that "the fact that the particular social group
consists of large numbers of the female population in the coun-
try concerned is irrelevant-race, religion, nationality and po-
litical opinion are also characteristics that are shared by large
numbers of people." 112
As a result of the criminal prosecutions based on the wide-
spread use of rape as a tool of war during ethnic cleansing in
Bosnia, rape became more widely viewed as a crime against
humanity, as well as a violation of basic human rights. 113 Simi-
larly, in 1995, Amnesty International formally recognized rape
as persecution. 14 With the cross-fertilization between human
rights and refugee law, that same year the Board issued its
first precedential decision granting asylum in a case involving
politically motivated rape.115
In 1995, the United States followed Canada and adopted
111. CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 110. The Canadian Guidelines
specify that
[a]lthough gender is not specifically enumerated as one of the grounds
for establishing Convention refugee status, the definition of Conven-
tion refugee may properly be interpreted as providing protection to
women who demonstrate a well-founded fear of gender-related perse-
cution by reason of any one, or a combination of, the enumerated
grounds.
Id. at 280. Specifically with regards to gender-based particular social groups,
the Canadian Guidelines incorporate the UNHCR position that "[s]tates...
are free to adopt the interpretation that women asylum-seekers who face
harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed the social mores
of the society in which they live may be considered as a 'particular social
group' within the meaning of the [Refugee Convention]." Id. at 283.
112. Id. at 283.
113. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), amended by U.N. Doc. SJRES/1166
(1998), amended by U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000), amended by U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1411 (2002), amended by U.N. Doc. SIRES/1431 (2002), amended by
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1481 (2003), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/
index.htm.
114. AMNESTY INT'L USA, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT: 1996, at 64
(1996).
115. In re D- V- , Interim Dec. No. 3252 (B.I.A. 1993) (granting asy-
lum to a Haitian woman who was raped by military personnel after a coup on
account of her support for the former government). While In re D- V-
had been decided two years earlier, it was not until 1995 that the Board des-
ignated the decision as precedential. See In re D- V- , 21 I. & N. Dec. 77
(B.I.A. 1995). In order for a decision of the Board to be precedential, all Board
members must unanimously vote to so designate it.
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Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Women's Asy-
lum Claims (U.S. Gender Guidelines). 116 While the U.S. Gender
Guidelines are not binding, they are required reading for asy-
lum officers and were widely hailed as a major step forward in
bringing the United States into conformity with the growing in-
ternational consensus on gender-based refugee issues. The U.S.
Gender Guidelines critique various gender-based asylum deci-
sions by the Board and the circuit courts and offer guidance
ranging from the need for heightened sensitivity during inter-
views to the preference for female interpreters in gender-based
cases to greater understanding of why women may be reluctant
to disclose gender-based violence such as rape.117
By early 1996, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
violence against women issued a report on intrafamilial vio-
lence against women. 118 The report characterized domestic vio-
lence as a violation of human rights and recommended that
states extend their refugee and asylum laws "to include gender-
based claims of persecution, including domestic violence."'1 9 In-
ternational tribunals already had a history of granting asylum
or refugee status to women based on membership in particular
gender-based social groups.120
Finally, in 1996, after an intensive public advocacy and
media campaign that put pressure on the Board, it ruled in a
precedential decision, In re Kasinga, that female genital cutting
116. U.S. Gender Guidelines, supra note 101.
117. In addition, the U.S. Gender Guidelines cite the Third Circuit's analy-
sis in Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993), recognizing that women can
constitute a particular social group for asylum purposes. U.S. Gender Guide-
lines, supra note 101, at 10.
118. Audrey Macklin, A Comparative Analysis of the Canadian, US and
Australian Directives on Gender Persecution and Refugee Status, in
ENGENDERING FORCED MIGRATION, supra note 38, at 272, 304.
119. Id. (quoting United Nations Economic and Social Council 1996: 40).
120. See, e.g., N93/00656 (Refugee Review Tribunal, Aug. 3, 1994) (Austl.)
(granting refugee protection to a woman fleeing domestic violence on account
of her membership in a gender-based social group), available at http://www
.austlii.edu.au/cgi-binldisp.pl/au/cases/cthrrt/N9300656.html; V95-02904 (Im-
migration and Refugee Board, Nov. 26, 1997) (Can.) (granting refugee protec-
tion on the basis of membership in a gender-based social group); Refugee Ap-
peal No. 2039/93, 53 (Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Feb. 12, 1996) (N.Z.)
(granting refugee protection and recognizing that women who face harsh or
inhuman treatment due to their transgression of societal social mores may
constitute a social group under the Refugee Convention), available at
http://www.refugee.org.nz/rsaatext/docs/2039.93.htm; R v. Immigration Ap-
peal Tribunal, 2 All E.R. 545 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.) (finding that women subject to
state-tolerated domestic violence constitute a particular social group).
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could constitute persecution for asylum purposes. 121 The Board
further recognized a cognizable social group defined by youth,
tribal identity, and opposition to female genital cutting.122 The
female genital cutting at issue was practiced on young women
of the tribe against their will to overcome their sexual charac-
teristics, thereby enabling a woman to successfully demon-
strate the required nexus between the persecution and the cog-
nizable social group.123 By applying a traditional asylum law
analysis to Kasinga's claim, the Board also sent a strong mes-
sage that gender-based claims fell squarely within the parame-
ters of the Refugee Convention. 124 Interestingly, while oppo-
nents feared that the decision would lead to an influx of women
seeking asylum based on female genital mutilation, this has
not occurred. 125
The In re Kasinga decision was widely praised and is often
referred to as the high point for gender-based asylum jurispru-
dence in the United States. 126 The Board's willingness in In re
Kasinga to establish precedent affording protection against a
form of gender-specific harm reflected the substantial inroads
that had been made by that point in both human rights and
refugee laws to address violations of women's human rights.
The decision, however, has also been criticized for failing to go
far enough. Specifically, critics noted that the Board framed the
social group in an unnecessarily narrow fashion, with opposi-
121. In re Kasinga, Interim Dec. No. 3278, at 12 (B.I.A. 1996). In reaching
this conclusion, the Board clarified that punitive intent is not required for an
act to constitute persecution. Id.
122. The social group recognized in the In re Kasinga case was "young
women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe who have not yet had [female genital
mutilation], as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice." Id. at 2-
3.
123. See id.
124. Because the INS greatly feared opening a floodgate of claims from
women who risked being subjected to female genital mutilation, it argued, un-
successfully, for the Board's adoption of an entirely new "shock the conscience
standard" to be applied in cases involving female genital mutilation. See id. at
21 (Filppu, Bd. Mem., concurring).
125. Chase, supra note 94, at 134.
126. See, e.g., Isabelle R. Gunning, Global Feminism at the Local Level:
Criminal and Asylum Laws Regarding Female Genital Surgeries, 3 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 45, 55 (1999) (describing In re Kasinga as a 'landmark case in
terms of progress in American asylum law towards the recognition of gender-
based asylum claims"); Karen Musalo, Ruminations on In re Kasinga: The De-
cision's Legacy, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 357, 360 (1997) (describing
the In re Kasinga decision as groundbreaking within gender-based asylum ju-
risprudence).
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tion to female genital cutting being superfluous and creating a
risk that asylum jurisprudence involving gender-based claims
would continue to be inconsistent. 127 Commentators also
warned that, absent regulatory guidance, it remained unclear
the extent to which In re Kasinga would affect adjudication of
asylum claims based on other forms of gender-specific persecu-
tion.128
Indeed, the Board trails behind its international counter-
parts in that it has been much less willing to protect against
less "foreign" forms of gender-based persecution such as domes-
tic violence.1 29 As explained by Professor Joan Fitzpatrick, "in
the realm of U.S. refugee law one expects a high level of con-
sciousness of international obligation and a close congruence
between domestic law and international norms."1 30 These in-
ternational norms are especially relevant in assessing asylum
law because, unlike other areas of domestic law, asylum law is
an area in which the United States has historically looked to
and relied upon international law. 131 Unfortunately, notwith-
127. See, e.g., Jacqueline Bhabha, Embodied Rights: Gender Persecution,
State Sovereignty, and Refugees, 9 PUB. CULTURE 3, 30 (1996) (characterizing
the Board's decision in In re Kasinga as a "narrow ruling"); Arthur C. Helton
& Alison Nicoll, Female Genital Mutilation as Ground for Asylum in the
United States: The Recent Case of In re Fauziya Kasinga and Prospects for
More Gender Sensitive Approaches, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 375, 375, 378
(1997) (arguing that U.S. asylum laws "fail to offer women the same level of
protection it offers male asylum seekers" and, while commending the specific
result in In re Kasinga, criticizing the lack of guidance for future cases); Linda
Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards' Fathers and Good Victims: Discarding
Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 557, 591 (2000). Linda Kelly notes that
[t]here seems to be no acceptable explanation for the [Board's] failure
to simply define Kasinga's social group as "women." Kasinga had al-
ready established the prong of "well-founded fear" by choosing to flee
rather than undergo [female genital mutilation]. To require her to
show an opposition to the practice within the social group criteria was
unnecessary.
Kelly, supra, at 591.
128. Helton & Nicoll, supra note 127, at 378; Randall, supra note 24, at 295
(hailing the In re Kasinga decision as a breakthrough in explicitly recognizing
gender as a component of a social group but criticizing the reasoning as "suf-
fer[ing] from the same restricted and compartmentalized approach to gender
seen in Canadian case law").
129. See infra notes 283-98 and accompanying text for a comparative dis-
cussion of female genital cutting and domestic violence claims and the greater
protection offered against "foreign" harms.
130. Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law,
15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1997).
131. According to noted refugee scholar Deborah Anker, "[o]ne of the most
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standing the growing international movement toward recogniz-
ing domestic violence as a human rights abuse, the protracted
battle surrounding one Guatemalan woman's claim to asylum
based on atrocious domestic violence has cast doubt on whether
the gender neutral definition of "refugee" will be interpreted in
the United States in such a way as to protect women.
A. INRE R-A- AND ASYLUM LAW'S SWINGING PENDULUM
OF PROTECTION FOR WOMEN FLEEING GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE
In In re R- A- , the Board was confronted with a
Guatemalan woman who sought asylum in the United States
after fleeing a long history of horrific domestic violence inflicted
by her husband in a country where the government had failed
to offer protection. 132 The immigration judge granted asylum in
1996, finding that the domestic violence constituted persecution
and that it occurred on account of her membership in a particu-
lar social group, which was made up of Guatemalan women
who were intimately involved with male Guatemalan partners
who believed that women should live under male domination. 133
In a precedential decision in 1999, a divided Board reversed the
immigration judge and held as an initial matter that R- A-
- had failed to show membership in a cognizable social
group. 34 Rather than relying upon its past jurisprudence re-
noteworthy developments in U.S. asylum law has been the weight given by
U.S. authorities-including the INS, the Board, and the federal courts-to the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees interpretation of the refugee
definition contained in its Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determin-
ing Refugee Status." ANKER, supra note 84, at 10. According to the INS Basic
Law Manual, "where the Board has not addressed specific issues.., reference
to international law may assist in determining whether an alien meets the...
definition of refugee." Id. at 10 (citation omitted).
132. In re R- A- , 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated, (Att'y
Gen. 2001). The domestic violence at issue included serious abuse on almost a
daily basis for over a decade. DHS's Position, supra note 15, at 7, 8. The physi-
cal abuse included: near daily rape and sodomy, dislocating her jawbone,
dragging by her hair, almost pushing out one of her eyes, using her head to
break windows and mirrors, kicking her in the genitals and whipping her with
pistols and electrical cords. Id. at 9-10, 17. In addition to the severe physical
abuse, R- A- 's husband also routinely threatened to find her and kill or
severely mutilate her if she attempted to leave him. Id. at 10-11. In fact, on
each of the several occasions that she ran away from her husband, he found
her and forced her to return home. Id. at 10-11, 42. On five separate occa-
sions, she reported the abuse to the police, who failed to take any protective
actions. Id. at 12.
133. InreR-A- ,22I.&N.Dec.at9ll.
134. Id. at 920.
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quiring that members of a particular social group be united by
a fundamental or immutable characteristic, 135 the Board ele-
vated the social group requirement to include analysis of addi-
tional factors, including how members of the group are per-
ceived by the potential persecutor, by the asylum seeker, and
by the larger society. Applying this new standard to R- A-
-'s social group claim, the Board held that she failed to show
that being an abused woman is an important societal attribute
in Guatemala or that Guatemalan society perceives abused
women as a social group. 136
The Board's refusal to recognize the gender-based social
group asserted in In re R- A- was clearly at odds with
the substantial inroads that had been made in addressing the
gender bias inherent in international and refugee law. For ex-
ample, there has been increasing recognition that, "[a]lthough
international law is gender neutral in theory, in practice it in-
teracts with gender-based domestic laws and social structures
that partially relegate women and men to separate spheres of
existence."'1 7 For this reason, "the process of becoming, and be-
ing recognized, as a refugee is gendered."'138 The gendered na-
ture of refugee law has sparked calls to amend the Refugee
Convention to add gender as a sixth protected ground. 139 In
much the same way that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act pro-
hibits discrimination on account of specified grounds including
sex, it has been argued that the Refugee Convention should
prohibit persecution based on sex.' 40 Others, however, have
135. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985). Because the case arose
in the Ninth Circuit, the Board had the option to look at whether the proposed
social group was homogeneous or whether members of the group were united
by a voluntary associational relationship. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d.
1571, 1576-77 (9th Cir. 1986).
136. In re R-A----, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 919.
137. Heaven Crawley, Women and Refugee Status: Beyond the Pub-
lic/Private Dichotomy in UK Asylum Policy, in ENGENDERING FORCED
MIGRATION, supra note 38, at 308, 310.
138. Id. at 309 (emphasis omitted).
139. See, e.g., Linda Cipriani, Gender and Persecution: Protecting Women
Under International Refugee Law, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 511, 538 (1993); Jenny-
Brooke Condon, Asylum Law's Gender Paradox, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 207,
248-55 (2002); Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum
Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 625, 674 (1993); Gregory A. Kelson,
Gender-Based Persecution and Political Asylum: The International Debate for
Equality Begins, 6 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 181, 211 (1997); Daliah Setareh,
Women Escaping Genital Mutilation-Seeking Asylum in the United States, 6
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 123, 156 (1995).
140. See Randall, supra note 24, at 301-05 (marshalling the arguments for
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warned that amending the Refugee Convention is both highly
unrealistic and potentially more damaging to the state of
women's human rights. 141 These commentators fear that sepa-
rating gender may reinforce the notion that gender-based
claims cannot be adjudicated through the traditional analytical
framework of asylum law, thereby reinforcing notions of differ-
ence that have historically harmed women.
In lieu of amending the Refugee Convention itself, a grow-
ing number of countries have attempted to compensate for the
gender bias that stems from the male-based interpretation of
asylum law. These countries have either amended their domes-
tic immigration legislation or promulgated guidelines to ensure
that gender alone can be a defining characteristic for social
group membership. 142 Rather than follow the international de-
and against amending the definition of refugee to explicitly include gender as
a protected ground and citing Mattie Stevens for the proposition that "[t]he
addition of 'gender' as a refugee category is a moral and political imperative");
see also supra note 139 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Macklin, supra note 24, at 256-63 (favoring a reinterpreta-
tion of existing refugee law to include gender-based claims rather than legisla-
tive efforts to amend the law to include gender as a sixth protected ground).
Audrey Macklin persuasively articulates the inherent risks in re-opening the
refugee definition as well as the advantage to analyzing the social construction
of the apparently natural category of "woman." See id.
142. See, e.g., Refugee Act, 1996 (June 26, 1996) (Ir.), available at http://
www.irishstatutebook.ie/front.html. The Refugee Act specifies that member-
ship of a social group includes, "membership of a group of persons whose defin-
ing characteristic is their belonging to the female or the male sex." Id. § 1(1).
Under section 5 of the Act, a person's freedom shall be regarded as threatened
if, inter alia, "the person is likely to be subject to serious assault (including
that of a sexual nature)." Id. § 5(2). Norway's guidelines, implemented in 1998,
recognize gender-based persecution as a valid basis for seeking asylum. Ac-
cording to Rune Steen of the Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers, the
guidelines specifically delineate gender-based persecution,
exemplified as situations in which women through their actions,
omissions and statements violate written and unwritten social rules
that affect women particularly, regarding dressing, the right to em-
ployment, etc. If violations of these rules are punished with sanctions
that can be seen as persecution in accordance with the 1951 Conven-
tion, asylum should.be granted.
Rune Steen, Norway, NETWORK ON WOMEN FLEEING GENDER-RELATED
PERSECUTION NEWSLETTER: ISSUE 1, May 29, 2000, at http://www.web.netl
-ccr/newsgend.htm#norway.
Australia's Guidelines on Gender Issues for Decision Makers states that
"[w]hile 'gender' of itself is not a Convention ground, it may be a significant
factor in recognising a particular social group or an identifying characteristic
of such a group." DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL
AFFAIRS, GUIDELINES ON GENDER ISSUES FOR DECISION MAKERS, at 22 (July
1996) (Austl.), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrslaw/guidelines/
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velopments in this area, the Board in In re R- A- re-
treated from the promise of In re Kasinga and erected new bar-
riers for women with gender-based asylum claims.
In addition to its refusal to recognize a social group made
up of battered Guatemalan women, the Board also held that
R- A- had not established the required nexus between
the domestic violence inflicted upon her and her membership in
the gender-based social group.143 According to the majority, the
fact that her husband did not abuse other women undermined
her claim that he abused her because of her sex.144 The Board's
refusal to recognize the connection between gender and domes-
tic violence is again inconsistent with international recognition
that gender-based harm is typically the result of cultural or
customary practices at times inflicted by family or commu-
nity.145 It is also at odds with the growing understanding that
traditionally "private" harms, such as rape and domestic vio-
aust.pdf. It continues, "[t]he Refugee Review Tribunal has found that whilst
being a broad category, women nonetheless have both immutable characteris-
tics and shared common characteristics which make them cognisable as a
group and which may attract persecution." Id.
Similarly, the United Kingdom's Asylum Gender Guidelines state that
"[p]articular social groups can be identified by reference to innate or un-
changeable characteristics or characteristics that a woman should not be ex-
pected to change. Examples of such characteristics are gender, age, race, mari-
tal status, family and kinship ties, sexual orientation, economic status and
tribal or clan affiliation." Immigration Appellate Authority, Asylum Gender
Guidelines, at 39 (Nov. 2000) (U.K.), available at http://www.iaa.gov.uk
gender.pdf.
South Africa's post-Apartheid Refugee Act of 1998 defines social group as
"includ[ing] among others, a group of persons of particular gender, sexual ori-
entation, disability, class or caste." Ch. 1 of Refugees Act of 1998 (S. Afr.),
available at http://www.lhr.org.2a/refugee/policy/actl30.pdf.
143. In re R- A- , 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 923 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated,
(Att'y Gen. 2001).
144. Id. at 920.
145. See ANKER, supra note 84, at 388-94 (explaining that an increasing
number of states have recognized a link between certain varieties of abuse and
a gender-based motive); Anker et al., supra note 24 (stating that international
law recognizes domestic violence as gender-specific abuse, which is most often
committed by "non-state actors"); Pamela Goldberg, Anyplace But Home: Asy-
lum in the United States for Women Fleeing Intimate Violence, 26 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 565 (1993) (asserting that U.S. law must catch up to international
law in recognizing that human rights violations can take place when commit-
ted by private individuals); Jacqueline Greatbatch, The Gender Difference:
Feminist Critiques of Refugee Discourse, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 518 (1989) (ar-
guing that more research is needed into laws and customs relating to oppres-
sion based on gender); Kelly, supra note 139, at 625-26 (contending that
"[w]omen as a group are often the first victims of political, economic and social
repression... in part because of laws and social mores").
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lence, must be viewed as human rights abuses worthy of pro-
tection under international human rights and refugee law. 146
Not surprisingly, the decision in In re R- A- was
widely criticized both in the United States and internationally,
ultimately leading former Attorney General Janet Reno to va-
cate it.147 Because of the need for coherent guidance in adjudi-
cating gender-based asylum claims, including those based upon
domestic violence, the Department of Justice issued proposed
regulations for domestic violence-based asylum claims and so-
cial group analysis. 148 However, in the more than three years
since the Bush administration was installed, the proposed
regulations have not been finalized, leaving In re
R- A- in a state of limbo and creating a dangerous vac-
uum with respect to all gender-based asylum claims.
Although never promulgated as a final rule, the proposed
rule and, to a greater extent, the accompanying INS commen-
tary, blunted the harshness of In re R- A- by making it
clear that gender-based asylum claims are appropriately ana-
lyzed through the existing legal framework without additional
requirements. 149 To the extent that the proposed regulations
reflect the DHS's interpretation of how claims alleging persecu-
146. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
147. SeeInreR- A- ,22I.&N. Dec. at906.
148. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed
Dec 7, 2000). Attorney General Reno specified that the In re R- A- case
was to be redecided by the Board after promulgation of the final domestic vio-
lence asylum regulations. See id. at 79,596.
149. For example, whereas the Board in In re R- A- stated that the
abusive spouse's failure to abuse other women undercut the required nexus to
a protected ground, the proposed rules clarify that "[e]vidence that the perse-
cutor seeks to act against other individuals who share the applicant's pro-
tected characteristic is relevant and may be considered but shall not be re-
quired." Id. at 76,598. Furthermore, the proposed regulations clarify that the
additional factors set forth in In re R- A- , such as demonstrating that
membership reflects an important societal attribute, are factors to be consid-
ered but are not required to establish a social group. See section 208.15(c)(3) of
the proposed rule for a list of factors that may be considered but are not neces-
sarily determinative including whether:
(i) The members of the group are closely affiliated with each other; (ii)
The members are driven by a common motive or interest; (iii) A vol-
untary associational relationship exists among the members; (iv) The
group is recognized to be a societal faction or is otherwise a recog-
nized segment of the population in the country in question; (v) Mem-
bers view themselves as members of the group; and (vi) The society in
which the group exists distinguishes members of the group for differ-
ent treatment or status than is accorded to other members of the soci-
ety.
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tion on account of membership in a particular social group
should be analyzed, they provide important guidance. However,
the proposed rule was also widely criticized for not going far
enough. Specifically, the very inclusion of the "R A- fac-
tors" in the proposed rule drew widespread criticism and con-
cern. 150 As scholars and commentators noted, rather than sim-
ply seizing the opportunity to state that gender alone could be
the shared characteristic that defines a social group, the pro-
posed rule codified additional factors for consideration. The re-
sult of this may be to perpetuate the long-standing confusion
surrounding adjudication of gender-based asylum claims.151
Moreover, rather than recognizing gender as a basis for perse-
cution, the proposed rule reinforces the notion that women's
claims should be squeezed into the social group category. 152
The UNHCR has also released guidelines for interpreting
membership in a particular social group in the context of the
Refugee Convention. 15 3 As stressed by the UNHCR, member-
150. Commentators note that affiliation, common motive, and voluntary
association are factors derived solely from the Ninth Circuit's decision in San-
chez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986). These "cohesion" factors
are inconsistent with the Board's longstanding application of an "immutabil-
ity" test to determine the viability of a proposed social group. See In re Acosta,
I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985). Furthermore, in Hernandez-Montiel, the Ninth
Circuit revised its approach to social group claims by rejecting the "cohesion"
requirement in favor of the Board's "immutability" approach. Hernandez-
Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000). In light of the disfavored status
of the "cohesion" test, its resurrection in the proposed regulations were widely
criticized. See Musalo & Knight, supra note 100, at 6; see also Condon, supra
note 139, at 212 (commenting that, "rather than refining the interpretation of
'social group,' the rule confounds its meaning by providing discretionary fac-
tors for judges to consider even when women establish persecution on account
of the immutable trait of gender").
151. See, e.g., Condon, supra note 139, at 246 (stating that the rule's incor-
poration of the In re R- A- factors would allow an adjudicator to go be-
yond the well-established "immutability" test and reach the same result as the
Board did in In re R- A- ); Christina Glezakos, Domestic Violence and
Asylum: Is the Department of Justice Providing Adequate Guidance for Adju-
dicators?, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 539, 564 (2003) (noting that "[s]ome com-
mentators have expressed fear that the inclusion of the list of factors...
might lead adjudicators to rely exclusively on the factors enumerated as de-
terminative"); Musalo & Knight, supra note 100, at 6.
152. Melanie Randall has argued that attempting to fit women's claims
into the particular social group category "has created an often mechanistic and
reductive classification problem because, in the absence of gender as an ex-
press ground of persecution[,] ... [gender] Guidelines encourage the creation
of artificial and ossified sub-categories of women who are recognized as sub-
jected to persecution." Randall, supra note 24, at 290.
153. UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: ' Membership of a
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ship of a particular social group "should be read in an evolu-
tionary manner, open to the diverse and changing nature of
groups in various societies and evolving international human
rights norms."154 In an attempt to reconcile conflicting interpre-
tations of what is meant by membership in a particular social
group, the UNHCR set forth that
a particular social group is a group of persons who share a common
characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are
perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be one
which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to
identity, conscience or the exercise of one's human rights.155
Furthermore, in what has been characterized as a "bifur-
cated approach" to nexus under asylum law, the UNHCR ad-
vised that nexus can be established through a showing of either
serious harm or failure of state protection. 156 For example, in
the context of domestic violence, a woman would need to show
either that her husband abused her on account of a Refugee
Convention-protected ground, or that the state failed to protect
her on account of a Refugee Convention-protected ground, but
not both. 157
Recent events suggest that political pressure to bring the
United States into conformity with international human rights
and refugee law norms may once again push the door open, to
an uncertain extent, for women fleeing gender-based violence.
In February 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced
his intent to recertify the In re R- A- decision to himself,
leading to widespread fear that he would reinstate the original
decision and revamp the proposed rule to the detriment of
women fleeing gender-based harm.158 After another massive
public awareness and advocacy campaign designed to put pres-
sure on the DHS and the Attorney General's office (including a
letter signed by forty-eight Congresspeople urging protection
Particular Social Group" Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Con-
vention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc.
HCR/GIP/02/02 (2002).
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id. at 3-4.
156. Id. at 5-6.
157. Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum
Claims: A Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV.
777, 778 (2003). Karen Musalo has argued that this bifurcated approach to
nexus in asylum law has the potential to bring the United States into confor-
mity with the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Id.
158. See In re R- A- , No. A-73-753-922 (Att'y Gen. Feb. 21, 2003)
(Order No. 2661-2003).
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from gender-based violence by nonstate actors), 159 the DHS
dramatically revised its position, now calling on Ashcroft to
grant asylum to R- A- 160 The DHS has indicated its
willingness to recognize domestic violence as persecution and to
categorize women who are victims of such violence, in limited
circumstances, as a particular social group. 161 The DHS has
also stated its intent to engage in rulemaking to establish
guidelines for such gender-based claims to asylum. 162
While the DHS's position in In re R- A- appears to
represent a step forward in the adjudication of gender-based
claims of persecution under U.S. asylum law, the ultimate reso-
lution of In re R- A- and its impact remain uncertain.
163
The fact that the door to a previously denied or restricted cate-
gory of relief may be opened does not address or diminish the
need for relief under the Torture Convention for women fleeing
torture. To the contrary, the fluctuations in interpretation of
asylum law, its discretionary and malleable nature, and the
caution with which the United States approaches gender-based
social groups, all illustrate the need to safeguard a gender-
inclusive interpretation of Article 3 of the Torture Convention.
159. Letter from Congress to Ashcroft, Attorney General (Feb. 27, 2003) (on
file with author).
160. See DHS's Position, supra note 15, at 43.
161. Id. at 18-31. DHS urges the Attorney General to remand the case to
the Board with instructions to summarily grant asylum to the respondent,
without issuing an opinion. Id. at 3. DHS states that it will finalize the gender
asylum regulations promptly to provide guidance for domestic-violence based
asylum adjudication. Id. In the event that the Attorney General issues a sub-
stantive decision in the pending matter, DHS urges that asylum be based on a
social group defined as "married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave
the relationship." Id. at 15.
162. While the specific nature of those regulations is as yet unknown, it is
reasonable to believe that it may be similar to the proposed gender asylum
regulations issued by the Reno administration. See supra notes 147-52 and
accompanying text.
163. For example, "[t]he... [DHS] argues that, under some limited circum-
stances, a victim of domestic violence can establish eligibility for asylum on
this basis, and that the applicant in this case has established such eligibility."
DHS's Position, supra note 15, at 2 (emphasis added). The DHS cautions that
such a decision be narrowly tailored and limited as much as possible
to the particular facts of this case .... A decision which permits too
expansive a reading of the term "particular social group" could have a
significant adverse operational impact .... It is essential that the
compelling factors present in this case not hinder the law interpreting
the term "particular social group" from developing in a coherent and
controlled manner.
Id. at 4. In addition, the ultimate disposition in In re R- A- rests with
the Attorney General.
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III. THE TORTURE CONVENTION: A FRAYING SAFETY
NET FOR WOMEN WHO HAVE FALLEN THROUGH THE
CRACKS OF THE REFUGEE CONVENTION
At the outset, practitioners and scholars embraced the po-
tential increased protection offered by Article 3 of the Torture
Convention. 6 4 Because of the Board's historical reluctance to
recognize gender-based social groups and the difficulty in es-
tablishing a nexus between gender-based violence and a pro-
tected ground under asylum law, Article 3 held potential to
provide alternative protection to women fleeing gender-based
violence. Indeed, this optimism appeared warranted based on
initial decisions interpreting Torture Convention-based statu-
tory provisions. As in In re D - K-, judges confronted with
credible accounts of women fleeing domestic violence were able
to offer protection under the Torture Convention and sidestep
altogether the thorny issues of social group membership and
nexus.
Unfortunately, the opportunity presented by Article 3 to
protect women has already been diminished. While the Torture
Convention itself suffers from restrictive language, the ways in
which the United States has ratified and implemented its obli-
gations under Article 3 have undermined the intent of the Tor-
ture Convention and failed to broaden domestic protection for
women fleeing gender-based violence. Moreover, Attorney Gen-
eral Ashcroft and the Board have interpreted the implementing
legislation in an unduly narrow fashion. 165
While asylum law has all too often been interpreted explic-
itly to exclude protection against more "private" types of gen-
der-based harm, interpretations of the Torture Convention
have curtailed protection for women by placing its protections
largely outside of their reach and failing to take into account
the nature of their experiences. This "invisibility" for women is
due, in part, to the United States' decision to expel "criminal
164. See, e.g., Morton Sklar, New Convention Against Torture Procedures
and Standards, IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS, July 1999, at 10 (concluding that
notwithstanding the unduly narrow interpretation of various aspects of the
Torture Convention and the potential problems with adjudication by immigra-
tion judges, the Torture Convention "offers an important new remedy with
significant potential for broadening the availability of withholding of removal
protections, particularly for those ineligible for asylum").
165. See infra Parts III.B.1-.2, III.C.1 and accompanying text. Although
three U.S. circuit courts of appeals have recently issued rulings criticizing the
restrictive interpretation of Article 3 of the Torture Convention, the Board and
Attorney General interpretations remain binding in the rest of the nation.
[89:71
2004] GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE ABROAD 113
aliens" regardless of their fear of persecution or torture in their
homelands. The United States has implemented this policy on
two interrelated fronts. First, it has broadened the existing
criminal exclusionary grounds under the Refugee Convention
to such an extent that "criminal aliens" are barred from its cov-
erage. 166 Second, because the Torture Convention contains no
exclusions, the United States has interpreted the standards of
proof and terms of the Convention narrowly to avoid protecting
"criminal aliens" who turn to the Torture Convention for re-
lief.167 For women who have been denied asylum protection be-
cause of restrictive interpretations of the nexus requirement
and social group membership, the Torture Convention ap-
peared to be their last resort at finding safety. However, be-
cause the great majority of Torture Convention cases arise in
the context of "criminal aliens," women may find that their ex-
periences of gender-based harm also fall outside the scope of
what have become the narrowly-defined terms and standards of
the Torture Convention.
A. TEXT, TIMING, AND INTENT: DEFINING "TORTURE" IN AN ERA
WHEN WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WERE LARGELY
INVISIBLE
The text of the Torture Convention itself has been criti-
cized for its reliance on the public/private dichotomy and its
166. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 33, 189
U.N.T.S. at 176; see also infra note 258 and accompanying text.
167. In fact, these concerns were specifically voiced with regards to
whether the United States should ratify the Torture Convention. For example,
during the ratification debate on the United Nations Torture Convention,
Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, stated that
[t]his Convention's Committee on Torture is a farce, and it may be a
dangerous farce. One could well say in this case that the lunatics are
indeed running the asylum. I do not want those folks poking their
noses into the operation of the U.S. legal system. They have plenty to
do with the notorious injustice exemplified by the two countries I
have just mentioned [Soviet Union and Bulgaria].... However, since
this Convention is primarily symbolic, it is not necessary to engage in
a superfluous debate.
136 CONG. REC. S17,487-88 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Helms). Staunch opponents of the Torture Convention ultimately agreed to it
only because they viewed it as nothing more than a symbolic act. Senator
Helms referred to the Torture Convention as "by and large a rhetorical ges-
ture, expressing the revulsion which every decent nation has against torture."
Id. at 17,489. The thought of the Torture Convention as anything more than a
gesture was viewed as having the potential to present a "clear and present
danger to U.S. sovereignty and to the people of the United States." Id.
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narrow definition of torture to include only torture perpetrated
by the government in the public sphere dominated by men.
Given that the Torture Convention was drafted between 1977
and 1984, it is not surprising that it fails to account for the dif-
ferent ways in which women experience torture. During that
era, the predominant belief was that there needed to be re-
course for state-inflicted torture; acts by private individuals
would be dealt with through the state's criminal justice system.
Furthermore, the movement to recognize "women's human
rights" as human rights was embryonic during the years in
which the Torture Convention was drafted. 168 Therefore, the
text and intent of the Torture Convention must first be under-
stood within the context of the male-focused international hu-
man rights regime that existed at the time of drafting. The lar-
ger question is to what extent the invisibility of women's
human rights issues at the time the Torture Convention was
drafted should limit the potential for a broader and more inclu-
sive interpretation of "torture" today.
Feminist scholars have long claimed that international law
is a "thoroughly gendered system" with both the structures of
international lawmaking and the content of the rules of inter-
national law advantaging men. 169 Celina Romany has re-
marked that "[w]omen are the paradigmatic alien subjects of
international law. To be an alien is to be an other, an outsider.
Women are aliens within their states and aliens within an ex-
clusive international club of states which constitutes interna-
tional society." 170 Because men dominate all bodies of interna-
tional political power, issues traditionally of concern to men are
viewed as human rights issues, while "women's issues" are
relegated to a special, limited category. 171 Harms such as do-
168. As explained by Andrew Byrnes, "[tihe period during which the Con-
vention was being drafted also saw the beginnings of an increased feminist
engagement with the international human rights regime, a development that
flourished especially in the late 1980's and 1990's." Andrew Byrnes, The Con-
vention Against Torture, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW 183 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 2000).
169. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to Interna-
tional Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613, 621-25 (1991) (noting that women are
vastly underrepresented on United Nations Human Rights bodies and that
"all the major institutions of the international legal order are peopled by
men").
170. Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, 6 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 87 (1993).
171. See Charlotte Bunch, Feminist Visions of Human Rights in the
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mestic violence, sex discrimination, and sexual exploitation are
traditionally directed at women, and thus relegated to a sepa-
rate sphere where they are largely ignored. 172 The normative
structure of international law focuses on the "public" sphere,
traditionally dominated by men. 173 Therefore, the "traditional
canon of human rights law does not deal in categories that fit
the experiences of women."174
The women's human rights movement was in its early
stages at the time the Torture Convention was drafted. Just
five years before the Torture Convention was finalized, the
General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW). 175 The CEDAW has been widely recognized
as the first human rights instrument to encompass the princi-
ple that "discrimination against women is incompatible with
human dignity and is detrimental to the welfare of society."176
There can be no doubt that the CEDAW symbolized an essen-
tial leap forward in acknowledging the human rights issues af-
fecting women. However, because it separately addressed
women's issues outside of and apart from the existing human
rights treaties and conventions, the traditional male-oriented
structure of the human rights regime remained intact. 177
Because the mainstream human rights regime continued to
Twenty-First Century, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A
GLOBAL CHALLENGE 967, 968-69 (Kathleen E. Mahoney & Paul Mahoney eds.,
1993) (noting that "[wiomen's rights are too often seen as secondary or trivial
in relation to other human rights" and have led some to proclaim that inclu-
sion of gender claims will dilute the meaning of human rights).
172. Charlesworth et al., supra note 169, at 625.
173. Id. at 626 (arguing that the public and private spheres are accorded
asymmetrical value, with greater significance attached to the male-associated
public sphere than the female-based private sphere).
174. Id. at 628.
175. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 1980, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 34th Sess., Agenda Item 75, at 33, U.N.
Doc. A/34/180 (1979), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 33 (1980) [hereinafter CEDAW].
176. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Defeis, Equity and Equality for Women-
Ratification of International Covenants as a First Step, 3 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 363, 400 (1993).
177. See Bunch, supra note 171, at 975 (stating that "[w]hile the [CEDAW]
addresses many issues of sex discrimination, one of its shortcomings is failure
to directly address the question of violence against women"). The CEDAW has
also been criticized for its weak enforcement methods as compared with other
human rights instruments as well as the extraordinary number of reserva-
tions and understandings that states have employed to dilute its true spirit.
See id.
115
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focus on the public realm, women's issues remained relegated
to the private sphere. Even as late as 1993, the United Nations
General Assembly's adoption of the Declaration on the Elimina-
tion of Violence Against Women symbolized the way in which
women's human rights issues have remained outside of the
traditional human rights framework. 178  As Hilary
Charlesworth has noted, the Declaration recognized violence
against women as an issue of international concern, but it
stopped short of categorizing the violence as a human rights is-
sue in its operative provisions for fear of diluting the "tradi-
tional" notion of human rights. 179
The Torture Convention's reliance on traditional interna-
tional law paradigms of state responsibility to exclude private
harms is evident from its definition of torture. The Torture
Convention defines torture as harm "inflicted by or at the insti-
gation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity."'180 The incorpora-
tion of the public/private dichotomy into this definition has
been widely criticized from a gender perspective. 8 1 As has been
stated, "the description of the prohibited conduct relies on a
distinction between public and private actions that obscures in-
juries to their dignity typically sustained by women."1 8 2 Be-
cause the Torture Convention and other human rights docu-
ments existing at that time focused on discrete violations of
rights, they offer little redress in cases involving the pervasive
and structural denial of rights. 8 3
178. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, supra note
109, at 217.
179. Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM.
J. INT'L L. 379, 382-83 (1999) (stating that the prevailing belief was that hu-
man rights abuses required direct state involvement and that "extending the
concept to cover private behavior would reduce the status of the human rights
canon as a whole").
180. Torture Convention, supra note 9 (emphasis added).
181. See, e.g., Byrnes, supra note 168, at 190 (stating that "even when con-
strued reasonably broadly, [the Torture Convention] does not reach much of
the violence that is inflicted on women in society.... By largely excluding
from its scope these forms of violence ... the Convention demonstrates that
those threats of particular importance to women are not a priority of the in-
ternational community."); see also Charlesworth, supra note 179, at 382 (not-
ing that since "the definition of torture in the Convention against Torture re-
quires the involvement of a public (governmental) official. . . sexual violence
against women constitutes an abuse of human rights only if it can be con-
nected with the public realm").
182. Charlesworth et al., supra note 169, at 628.
183. Id.; see also Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Vio-
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Given the general lack of recognition of women's human
rights issues at the time of drafting-combined with a focus on
state action-a purely textual analysis of the Torture Conven-
tion suggests that its goal was not to advance women's human
rights.18 4 However, the silence surrounding women's human
rights issues permeated international law until the late 1980s
and early 1990s, and reliance on a purely textual analysis is
therefore inadequate to assess contemporary interpretations of
the Torture Convention-and more specifically, whether it
should be interpreted to protect against violations of women's
human rights today. Indeed, a purely textual approach would
be similarly inadequate in interpreting the applicability of the
Refugee Convention to types of persecution not envisioned by
the drafters.18 5 In the context of race, the same arguments have
been advanced with regards to the framers' intent when draft-
ing the U.S. Constitution.18 6
In keeping with the relative invisibility of women's human
rights issues at the time of drafting, some surmise that the
drafters of the Torture Convention were likely unaware of the
consequences that would flow from such a narrow definition of
torture that limited accountability.18 7 The drafters focused on
lence as a Human Rights Issue, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1119, 1123 (1995) (noting that
"[i]n a very real sense, gender specific abuses-even those directly attributable
to states-have until recently been 'privatized' internationally and either go
unchallenged or are left out of human rights practice altogether").
184. Andrew Byrnes does not mince words in stating that "[t]he Torture
Convention is not, and was never intended to be, a Convention on violence
against women in all its forms ... " Byrnes, supra note 168, at 207.
185. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text (discussing the political
nature of the Refugee Convention and the intent to protect those from Eastern
Europe while excluding most refugees from Third World countries); see also
Steinbock, supra note 31, at 763 (rejecting an exclusively textual approach to
interpreting the Refugee Convention as "simply inadequate to respond to the
myriad circumstances that cause asylum seekers to invoke refugee status").
According to Steinbock, "an exclusively plain meaning interpretation runs the
risk of undermining the important normative concerns embodied in the refu-
gee definition." Id. at 770. Rather, Steinbock argues that an examination of
the Refugee Convention's purposes is necessary in order to adapt it to harms
such as those directed at women that are not explicitly addressed in its text or
legislative history. Id. at 771.
186. As Reva Siegel has stated, "[t]hat which we retrospectively judge evil
was once justified as reasonable. If we reconstruct the grounds on which our
predecessors justified subordinating practices of the past, we may be in a bet-
ter position to evaluate contested practices in the present." Reva Siegel, Why
Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing
State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997).
187. INGELSE, supra note 73, at 291.
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eliminating torture carried out, or at least tolerated, by the
state, reflecting the belief that the state's legal system would
handle torture by private individuals.18 8 France had proposed
that the definition of torture focus on the intrinsic nature of the
torture without regard for who inflicts it, but its position did
not gain substantial support. 8 9 However, most states agreed
that the Torture Convention should go beyond acts committed
by public officials and also cover acts for which the state could
be considered to have some responsibility. 190
Notwithstanding the limitations of the text, the drafters'
decision to include torturous acts committed by private actors
with governmental acquiescence is important. If interpreted
broadly, the term "acquiescence" has the potential to protect
against gender-based harm. As discussed earlier, 191 advance-
ments in the women's human rights movement since 1984 and
the recognition of the ways in which gender-neutral human
rights documents have historically excluded women support the
need for a broad and more inclusive interpretation. The follow-
ing sections explore why the United States has yet to interpret
"acquiescence" and other key terms under the Torture Conven-
tion broadly, and also argue that a change of course is due if
women are to be protected.
B. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S AND BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
APPEALS' GRUDGING INTERPRETATIONS OF "ACQUIESCENCE" AND
"INTENT" UNDER THE TORTURE CONVENTION
Despite its textual limitations, the United States initially
appeared to interpret the Torture Convention to protect women
applicants who had been denied asylum for failure to establish
a nexus to one of the grounds required under the Refugee Con-
vention. For example, the Board granted Torture Convention
protection to an abused wife in In re D - K- .192 Even
though D- K- had not reported the domestic abuse to the
police, the Board took a broad view of what constituted gov-
ernmental "acquiescence."'193 Rather than focus on whether the
188. Id. at 225; see also BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 72, at 45.
189. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 72, at 45.
190. Id.
191. See supra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
192. In an unpublished opinion, the Board affirmed the immigration
judge's Torture Convention decision. In re D- K-, slip op. at 3 (B.I.A.
July 12, 2001).
193. See id. at 2-3.
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government knew of her abuse, the Board relied on the preva-
lence of domestic violence in Congo, its government's knowl-
edge of domestic violence as a societal problem, and the subse-
quent failure to remediate domestic violence in the country. 194
Similarly, the Board did not analyze whether D- K- 's
husband had a specific intent to torture when he brutally beat
and raped her.195 The Board accepted that the harm was in-
flicted intentionally and was so severe as to rise to the level of
torture. 1
96
Unfortunately, subsequent interpretations of the Torture
Convention by the Board and Attorney General have resulted
in a substantially narrower interpretation of both "acquies-
cence" and intent. The resulting decisions have effectively lim-
ited protection to women fleeing gender-based torture. Yet, re-
cent decisions by three different circuit courts critical of these
restrictive interpretations of "acquiescence" and intent have po-
tentially recast the safety net for women applicants in those ju-
risdictions.197
1. Ratcheting Up the Standard for Governmental
Acquiescence: From "Willful Blindness" to "Willful Acceptance"
Perhaps more than any other term contained in the Tor-
ture Convention, the way in which "acquiescence" is inter-
preted is critical to protecting against gender-based violence
because it arises so often in cases involving nonstate actors. To
date, the Board's interpretations of "acquiescence" have been
uneven. In the three years since the Board's decision in In re
D - K-, it has taken an increasingly formalistic and rigid
approach to "acquiescence," reminiscent of the approach to
nexus under asylum law. 198
The Board first interpreted "acquiescence" under the Tor-
ture Convention in In re S- V- . This case concerned a
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See infra notes 214-27, 252-57 and accompanying text for discussions
of Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2003) (criticizing the Board's in-
terpretation of intent), Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003) (criti-
cizing the Board's interpretation of "acquiescence"), and Khouzam v. Ashcroft,
361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004) (disagreeing with the Attorney General's interpre-
tation of "acquiescence").
198. The Board's interpretation of "acquiescence" in cases involving torture
by nonstate actors requires that the government officials "willfully accepto the
torture." In re S- V- , 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1312 (B.I.A. 2000).
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Colombian "criminal alien" who, after nearly twenty years in
the United States, feared that his inability to speak Spanish
combined with his family ties in America would put him at risk
of being kidnapped and harmed by nongovernmental guerilla,
narcotrafficking, and paramilitary groups if returned to Colom-
bia.199 S- V- argued that the Colombian government's
awareness of the torturous activity, combined with its inability
to stop it, satisfied the Torture Convention's requirement that
the torture be inflicted with governmental "acquiescence." The
Board, however, held that a greater showing was required. 200
In interpreting "acquiescence" under Article 3 for the first
time, the Board claimed to be guided by the way in which the
U.S. Senate had modified the Torture Convention's use of the
term during the ratification process. As recounted by the
Board, the Senate had explicitly clarified that "acquiescence"
required "awareness" rather than "knowledge."201 According to
the Senate, prior governmental awareness of the torturous ac-
tivity and a subsequent breach of the legal responsibility to in-
tervene and prevent it were required to demonstrate "acquies-
cence."20 2 The Board further cited to the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations for the proposition that "both actual knowl-
edge and 'willful blindness' fall within the definition of the term
'acquiescence."' 20 3 While the Senate's substitution of "aware-
ness" for "knowledge," coupled with its reference to "willful
blindness," suggests that it intended to broaden the meaning of
"acquiescence," 204 the Board ultimately interpreted the term to
require "willful[] accept[ance]" of the torture. 20 5
In subsequent decisions by both the Board and the Attor-
ney General, this "willful acceptance" language has been util-
ized to constrict Torture Convention relief in cases involving
nonstate actors. For example, in In re Y- L- ,206 the At-
199. Id. at 1310.
200. Id. at 1313-14.
201. Id. at 1311-12 (citing 136 CONG. REC. S17,486, 17,491-92 (daily ed.
Oct. 27, 1990)).
202. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7) (2000)).
203. Id. (citing S. EXEC. REP. NO. 101-30, at 9 (1990)).
204. See Board Member Rosenberg's dissenting opinion in In re S-
V- , stating that the U.S. interpretation of "acquiescence" is "arguably a
more broad and liberal one than that provided in the Convention Against Tor-
ture itself." Id. at 1318 (Rosenberg, Bd. Mem., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted).
205. Id. at 1312.
206. In re Y- L- , 23 I. & N. Dec. 270 (B.I.A. 2002).
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torney General certified and reversed three of the Board's Tor-
ture Convention decisions. All three cases involved applicants
who were barred from asylum and withholding protection due
to their criminal histories.
In re A- G- involved a drug dealer-turned-informant
who feared death in his native Jamaica at the hands of the
drug dealer he implicated.207 The immigration judge found gov-
ernmental acquiescence based on known corruption in Jamaica,
routine police abuse, and the impunity enjoyed by the major
drug traffickers.208 According to the judge, this combination of
factors made it likely that, if returned to Jamaica, A- G-
would either be tortured by drug traders or arrested and
abused at the behest of the drug traders.209 The Board sus-
tained the Torture Convention grant, finding the judge's rea-
soning to be thorough and correct. 210 Attorney General
Ashcroft, however, reversed the ruling, characterizing the
Board's "liberal" reading of "acquiescence" as "empty[ing] the
Convention's volitional requirement of all rational meaning."211
According to Attorney General Ashcroft, "acquiescence" re-
quired the government's "willful acceptance" of torturous activ-
ity.
Similarly, In re R- S- R- involved a Dominican
drug dealer who testified against his co-traffickers and feared
torture in the Dominican Republic at the behest of his co-
defendant by corrupt law enforcement agents.212 Reversing the
Board's grant of deferral of removal under Article 3, Ashcroft
again found that any torture that might occur would be done by
rogue law enforcement agents, and not "with the consent or ap-
proval of authoritative government officials acting in an official
capacity."2 13
However, in Zheng v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit rejected
207. Id. at 281.
208. Id. at 282.
209. See id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 283.
212. Id. at 283-84.
213. Id. at 285 (emphasis removed). The final consolidated case was In re
Y- L- , in which the Board had not addressed the applicant's Torture
Convention claim because it granted Refugee Convention-based withholding of
removal. Id. at 279. Nevertheless, Ashcroft reversed the Board's grant of with-
holding and proceeded to deny protection under the Torture Convention, find-
ing that even if Y- L- would be tortured in Haiti, it would not be with
the approval of the Haitian government. Id. at 280-81.
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the Board's and the Attorney General's "willful acceptance"
standard as inconsistent with the intent of both the Torture
Convention and the Senate. 214 In Zheng, the Board had relied
upon its prior holding in In re S- V- to reverse the immi-
gration judge's grant of Torture Convention protection to a vic-
tim of human trafficking who feared retribution for his testi-
mony against his smugglers if returned to his native China.
Although the record established that the Chinese government
was aware of the smuggling operations and "condone[d] or at
least [was] not willing to interfere" with the smugglers' con-
duct, the Board held that Zheng failed to prove that the Chi-
nese government was "willfully accepting of' the smugglers'
torturous activities. 215 Relying on the Senate's clarification that
"awareness," including "willful blindness," rather than "knowl-
edge," should suffice to demonstrate a public official's acquies-
cence, the Ninth Circuit held that the Board's insistence on
"willful acceptance" impermissibly undermined the Senate's in-
tent.216
The conflict over interpreting "acquiescence" has recently
widened as the Second Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit in
strongly rejecting the Board and Attorney General's utilization
of a "willful acceptance" standard. In Khouzam v. Ashcroft, the
Second Circuit expressly disapproved such a standard. 217 In
keeping with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation in Zheng, the
Second Circuit relied on the language of the Torture Conven-
tion and clear congressional intent as expressed in both the
ratification and implementation processes. 218 The court held
that "torture" required "only that government officials know of
or remain willfully blind to an act and thereafter breach their
legal responsibility to prevent it."219
214. Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003). Interpreting "acqui-
escence" to require "willful acceptance" is also inconsistent with the term's
plain meaning. As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, "acquiescence suggests pas-
sive assent because of inability or unwillingness to oppose." Id. at 1195 (citing
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000)).
215. Id. at 1191-92.
216. Id. at 1196 (stating that, "[t]o the extent that decisions such as Matter
of S---V- and In re Y- L- , A- G- , R- S- R- , require
actual knowledge and 'willful acceptance'-contrary to clear congressional in-
tent to require only awareness-we disapprove of those decisions") (alterations
omitted).
217. Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2004).
218. Id. at 170-71.
219. Id. at 171. In issuing its ruling, the circuit court rebuked the govern-
ment for attempting to avoid its ruling on an issue of public importance by
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The Second and Ninth Circuits' repudiation of the Board's
and Attorney General's restrictive interpretation of "acquies-
cence" may restore protection for women fleeing gender-based
violence within those jurisdictions. For women seeking protec-
tion in the rest of the United States, however, the Board's and
Attorney General's interpretations are still binding.220 As dis-
cussed below, the unduly harsh position adopted by the Board
and Attorney General appears to be part of a larger domestic
policy agenda aimed at removing "criminal aliens."221 However,
it is already becoming clear that such a narrow interpretation
of "acquiescence" can serve to insulate many forms of gender-
based torture from the reach of Article 3 of the Torture Conven-
tion. For example, particularly in the context of gender-based
violence, many states officially outlaw acts such as rape, bride
burning, and female genital cutting that are nevertheless
widely tolerated. 222 If "acquiescence" is construed to require
"willful acceptance," a state can immunize itself from the reach
of the Torture Convention merely by passing laws that prohibit
gender-based violence without any further inquiry into the
prevalence of the practices or meaningful enforcement of the
seeking a vacatur two weeks after oral arguments when the court expressed
doubt as to the soundness of the Attorney General's interpretation of torture.
Id. at 168.
220. For example, the Eleventh Circuit recently ruled that it was bound
under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984), to defer to the Board's decision in In re J- E- , 23'I. &
N. Dec. 291 (B.I.A. 2002), characterizing Haiti's police brutality as cruel and
inhuman treatment rather than torture prohibited by Article 3 of the Torture
Convention. Cadet v. Bulger, No. 03-14565 (11th Cir. July 20, 2004); see also
Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 392, 399 (1st Cir. 2004) (concluding that "the ra-
tionale of In re J- E- precludes this appeal").
221. See infra Part III.C.1. In addition to broadening criminal exclusions
under the Refugee Act and constricting relief under the Torture Convention,
congressional legislation has dramatically broadened the categories of remov-
able "criminal aliens," curtailed discretionary relief when there has been
criminal conduct, mandated detention, and eviscerated judicial review.
222. For example, India prohibits "bride burning' but it continues to be a
problem because in practice, the state has "shown selective indifference to the
cultural practice." Joan Fitzpatrick, The Use of International Human Rights
Norms to Combat Violence Against Women, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN,
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 532, 538 (Rebecca J. Cook ed.,
1994). India has also formally abolished the institution of dowry, but the tradi-
tion continues and is being exacerbated by prospective husbands and mothers-
in-law who kill or maim brides whose families do not meet their escalating
demands. Id. Regardless of the severity of the situation, the state undertakes
few prosecutions. Id.
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2. Equating "Intentional Infliction" With "Specific Intent"
The aim of the Torture Convention's requirement that the
torture be "intentionally inflicted" was to exclude negligence or
accidental harm from the definition of torture.224 The Board,
however, has distorted the textual language and unduly
heightened the burden of proof by utilizing the "specific intent"
standard found in domestic criminal law statutes. For women
fleeing gender-based violence inflicted by a private actor, the
exact motivation behind the torture may be difficult to estab-
lish.225 As the Third Circuit recently held, "requiring an alien to
establish the specific intent of his/her persecutors could impose
insurmountable obstacles to affording the very protections the
community of nations sought to guarantee under the Conven-
tion Against Torture."226 The Third Circuit's rejection of a "spe-
cific intent" requirement is consistent with the underlying pol-
icy of the Torture Convention and should be followed by the
Board, rather than its narrow ruling in In re J- E- 227
In In re J- E-, the applicant sought Torture Conven-
tion protection, arguing that the Haitian government had a pol-
icy of imprisoning Haitians returned from the United States on
criminal grounds. 228 Coupled with the known deplorable prison
conditions and police mistreatment, J- E - argued that he
would be at risk of government-sanctioned torture if returned
to Haiti.229 The majority of the Board denied protection under
the Torture Convention, holding that the feared harm did not
223. Indeed, in a recent nonprecedential decision by the Third Circuit, the
Ghanaian government's prohibition against female genital cutting insulated it
from a finding that it acquiesced to torture, notwithstanding the prevalence of
the practice, the widespread violence against women, or the government's fail-
ure to intervene in domestic disputes. Moshud v. Blackmun, 68 Fed. Appx. 328
(3d Cir. 2003) (denying Ghanaian woman's motion to reopen proceedings to
assert Torture Convention claim based on fear of female genital cutting).
224. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 72, at 114.
225. See Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences? Divorcing Refugee Pro-
tections from Human Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1179, 1202 (1994)
(discussing that "the motivation and state of mind.., are difficult to ascer-
tain.., and prove" because "the victim may not know the exact motivation of
his or her persecutor").
226. Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 474 (3d Cir. 2003).
227. In re J- E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291 (B.I.A. 2002).
228. Id. at 293.
229. Id.
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constitute "torture."230 According to the majority, Haiti's policy
of mandatory indefinite detention is a lawful sanction aimed at
containing criminal activity; therefore, it is not "torture" as de-
fined by the Torture Convention. 23 1 Turning to the requirement
that the torture be "intentionally inflicted," the majority found
no evidence that the Haitian government detained criminal de-
portees with the "specific intent" to inflict severe physical or
mental pain or suffering. Similarly, the court found no evidence
that Haiti's detention policy was inflicted on criminal deportees
for a prohibited purpose. 232
The majority also rejected the applicant's claim that the
detention policy, in conjunction with deplorable prison condi-
tions and police abuse, constituted torture. Despite evidence
that the Haitian government intentionally detained criminal
deportees with full knowledge of the brutal prison conditions, 2
33
the majority held that this did not demonstrate the "specific in-
tent"234 required under the Torture Convention. Based on the
230. Id. at 304.
231. Id. at 299-300 (stating that 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(3) incorporates Arti-
cle l's language that "torture 'does not include pain or suffering arising only
from, inherent in, or incidental to lawful sanctions"'). "Lawful sanctions in-
clude judicially imposed sanctions and other enforcement actions authorized
by law, including the death penalty, but do not include sanctions that defeat
the object and purpose of the Convention Against Torture to prohibit torture."
Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(3)). However, as pointed out by the dissent,
the characterization of the detention policy as a lawful sanction is disingenu-
ous, given that the deportees have served prison time in the United States and
committed no other crimes in Haiti for which to be sanctioned. Id. at 308
(Schmidt, Bd. Mem., dissenting). As noted by two Board members in a sepa-
rate dissent, "[t]he majority opinion construes the Senate Reservations that
were issued in the course of ratification of the Convention, and the subsequent
regulations governing our implementation of the provisions of the Convention
Against Torture, to restrict, rather than extend, protection to such potential
victims." Id. at 310 (Rosenberg & Espenoza, Bd. Mems., dissenting).
232. Id. at 300. However, as explained by J. Herman Burgers and Hans
Danelius, the Torture Convention's list of "prohibited purposes" is non-
exhaustive as it is intended to cover any action that can be connected, even
remotely, with the interests or policies of the state and its organs. BURGERS &
DANELIUS, supra note 72, at 118-19.
233. In re J- F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 307 (Schmidt, Bd. Mem., dissent-
ing).
234. As discussed above, the Torture Convention requires only that the tor-
ture be intentional, as opposed to accidental or due to negligence. See supra
note 224 and accompanying text. However, in one of the Senate's Understand-
ings at the time of ratification, it stated that, "in order to constitute torture, an
act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering." 136 CONG. REC. S17,486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). The Board
subsequently interpreted this language to incorporate the concept of "specific
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majority's interpretation of intent under the Torture Conven-
tion, it appears that J- E - would have had to demon-
strate that the Haitian authorities were intentionally and de-
liberately creating and maintaining such prison conditions in
order to inflict torture.
The Board's requirement of specific intent in In re J-
E- is contrary to both the intent of the Torture Convention
and its implementing regulations. The holding is also inconsis-
tent with the way in which intent is construed in analogous
civil rights statutes and contrary to the definition of intent in
both criminal and tort law. With respect to gender-based vio-
lence, the requirement of a "specific intent" to inflict torture
charts a course that fails to protect women in the same way as
the emphasis on "motive" under asylum law has diminished
protection.
The Board's interpretation of the intent requirement is in-
consistent with the text of the Torture Convention. Scholars
and historians of the drafting process that led up to the Torture
Convention agree that the intent requirement was meant
merely to exclude negligent or accidental torture. As J. Herman
Burgers and Hans Danelius explain, "[i]t follows that where
pain or suffering is the result of an accident or of mere negli-
gence, the criteria for regarding the act as torture are not ful-
filled."235 According to Deborah Anker, "the requirement of in-
tentionality ensures that an accidental or negligent act cannot
constitute torture and is presumably designed to protect those
who might unknowingly cause suffering and to exclude those
acts intended to benefit the recipient (such as medical treat-
ment)."236 The intent requirement of the Torture Convention
has been specifically described as "the general intent to do the
act which clearly or forseeably causes terrible suffering."237
Because the text of the Torture Convention does not lend
support to the Board's heightened "specific intent" analysis, the
Board has relied instead upon one sentence in the U.S. regula-
tions interpreting Article 3. Pursuant to the U.S. regulatory
intent" as utilized in criminal law statutes. In re J- E-, 23 I. & N. Dec.
at 300-01.
235. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 72, at 118.
236. ANKER, supra note 84, at 485-86 (internal citations omitted).
237. Id. at 486 (citing Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the
Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291,
325 (1994)). In fact, the drafters of the Torture Convention specifically rejected
a U.S. proposal that the torture be "deliberately and maliciously inflicted."
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 72, at 41.
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language, "[i]n order to constitute torture, an act must be spe-
cifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering."238 Based on the ratification documents, the Board
concluded that this was a "specific intent" requirement rather
than a "general intent" requirement. 239 According to the Board,
specific intent under the Torture Convention requires the same
standard as domestic criminal law: the "intent to accomplish
the precise criminal act that one is later charged with."240 How-
ever, even the regulations make clear that the specific intent
language is aimed at targeting deliberate torture and not that
which results from negligence. 241
The Board's decision in In re J- E - failed to apply
this intent requirement properly. In that case, the Haitian gov-
ernment was deliberately continuing a policy that was known
to lead to torturous acts. 242 According to the U.S. State De-
partment Report on Haiti contained within the record:
Police mistreatment of suspects at both the time of arrest and during
detention remains pervasive in all parts of the country. Beating with
the fists, sticks and belts is by far the most common form of abuse.
However, international organizations documented other forms of mis-
treatment, such as burning with cigarettes, choking, hooding, and ka-
lot marassa (severe boxing of the ears, which can result in eardrum
damage). Those who reported such abuse often had visible injuries
consistent with the alleged maltreatment. There were also isolated al-
legations of torture by electric shock. Mistreatment also takes the
form of withholding medical treatment from injured jail inmates. Po-
lice almost never are prosecuted for the abuse of detainees.
243
The record also contained numerous articles and reports
238. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5) (2002).
239. In re J- E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 301.
240. Id. at 301 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 813-14 (7th ed. 1999)).
241. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5) ("An act that results in unanticipated or unin-
tended severity of pain and suffering is not torture.").
242. In re J- E- , 23 I. & N. Dec. at 307 (Schmidt, Bd. Mem., dissent-
ing). Relying upon Karen Musalo's writings analyzing intent in the asylum
context, Board Member Rosenberg concluded that it would be nearly impossi-
ble for an applicant to prove specific intent of a governmental actor as to pro-
spective torture. Id. at 316 (Rosenberg, Bd. Mem., dissenting) (noting that the
modification or softening of the requirement for proof of intent in criminal,
tort, and statutory civil rights law, "demonstrates judicial flexibility in the ac-
commodation of jurisprudential objectives" (quoting Karen Musalo, Irreconcil-
able Differences? Divorcing Refugee Protections from Human Rights Norms, 15
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1179, 1210, 1228 (1994))).
243. Id. at 306 (quoting BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, HAITI COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES-2000, at 2629 (2001), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2000/whaindex.htm).
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documenting known torture in Haitian prisons including an
admission by a warden that inmates are beaten, and conclu-
sions that "corruption, not just malnutrition, is killing inmates"
and that inmates receive "insufficient calories to sustain
life."244 The fact that J- E - was to be confined under con-
ditions where torture was known to occur satisfies the general
intent requirement of the Torture Convention.
Such an interpretation of intent is also consistent with the
definition of intent utilized in other areas of law, including tort
law. For example, a draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts
provides that intent is satisfied by a showing that either: (1)
the person intends to produce the consequences of that person's
action; or (2) the person knows to a substantial certainty that
the consequence will ensue from that person's conduct.245 In-
corporating such a definition of intent when analyzing the facts
of In re J- E- , results in a finding, at minimum, that the
Haitian authorities knew to a "substantial certainty" that tor-
ture would ensue from the government's conduct in indefinitely
detaining returned criminal deportees in prisons where acts of
torture are commonplace.
The Board's reliance on criminal law statutes for its
heightened "specific intent" requirement was misplaced, both
because of "the erosion of an intent requirement in criminal
law" and the new found "elasticity of the concept of intent and
its adaptation to serve societal interests."246 "Specific intent" is
also not required in the domestic civil rights statutes that are
more analogous to the remedial nature of Article 3. For exam-
ple, in litigation brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there is
no requirement of a "specific intent" to violate constitutional
rights.247 As articulated by the Sixth Circuit, "[w]hile it is true,
244. Id. at 307.
245. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 1
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) (noting that "the traditional criminal-law con-
cept of 'specific intent' is one that the Model Penal Code omits, finding it con-
fusing and unhelpful").
246. Musalo, supra note 225, at 1231-32. Karen Musalo provides provoca-
tive modern examples of this "elasticity" of intent in the criminal context, in-
cluding "environmental criminal prosecutions, where corporate officials have
been held criminally liable even though they did not know about, or intend to
cause, the prohibited harm" and "[p]rosecutions of women who ingest drugs
while pregnant under statutes that prohibit the delivery of drugs to a minor."
Id. at 1230.
247. John R. Williams, False Arrest, False Imprisonment and Malicious
Prosecution Claims Under Section 1983, in 20TH ANNUAL SECTION 1983 CIVIL
RIGHTS LITIGATION 185, 190 (Practising Law Institute ed., 2003); Rep ablo
[89:71
2004] GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE ABROAD 129
of course, that mere negligence is not sufficient to impose liabil-
ity, 'the intent in question is the intent to commit the act, not
the intent that a certain result be achieved."' 248 Rather, the
courts appear to use interchangeably the tests of recklessness,
deliberate indifference, or callous indifference. 249
By misconstruing the intent of the Torture Convention and
utilizing an intent standard that is both disfavored in criminal
and tort law and inapplicable to analogous remedial civil rights
statutes, the Board unnecessarily limits the potential for pro-
tection under the Torture Convention. This misinterpretation
of intent under the Torture Convention could have a dramatic
impact on gender-based claims. For example, it is not clear
whether practices such as female genital cutting would consti-
tute torture under the specific intent analysis in In re J-
E- . If a village elder, with the acquiescence of the govern-
ment, performs female genital cutting on a young woman with
full knowledge of the inherent danger of the procedure but with
the intent to purify the woman, rather than to inflict torture, is
the action no longer torture? While such an analysis sounds
implausible, it is consistent with the lengths to which the
Board has gone to restrict the terms of the Torture Conven-
tion.250 The Board's reasoning for requiring specific intent un-
der the Torture Convention mirrors the difficulties that have
plagued the Board's narrow interpretation of intent and motive
Hudson v. New York City, 271 F.3d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting assertion
that an intent to deprive a citizen of federal rights during a police search of a
home is required for a Fourth Amendment violation).
248. Williams, supra note 247, at 192 (quoting Fisher v. City of Memphis,
234 F.3d 312, 317 (6th Cir. 2000)).
249. Id. at 191.
250. For example, in In re J- E- , the Board looked to President Aris.
tide's promise to make judicial reform a top priority to justify its holding that
the torturous acts were not intentional, notwithstanding the government's
known policy of imprisoning returned criminal deportees in conditions in
which they are known to be starved, beaten, and subject to torturous acts. 23
I. & N. Dec. 474, 299-301 (2002). Moreover, in the highly publicized U.S. De-
partment of Justice memo to the President's counsel regarding the use of tor-
ture during interrogations, the Department of Justice made it clear that, in its
view, the Torture Convention only prohibits torture if the infliction of such
pain was "the defendant's precise objective." Memorandum from the Office of
Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President 3 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Torture Memo]. According to the Tor-
ture Memo, "even if the defendant knows that severe pain will result from his
actions, if causing such harm is not his objective, he lacks the requisite specific
intent even though the defendant did not act in good faith." Id. at 4.
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under asylum law. 25 '
In Zubeda v. Ashcroft, a recent case involving a gender-
based Torture Convention claim, the Third Circuit reversed the
Board's denial of Torture Convention relief to a rape victim who
feared imprisonment and rape if returned to a country in which
rape was "systematic."25 2 The immigration judge had relied
upon uncontested country reports to conclude that the rampant
brutality and widespread use of rape by soldiers, particularly in
the applicant's region, put Zubeda at risk of being raped if de-
tained upon return to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 253
However, in analysis characterized by the circuit court as
"terse," the Board relied on In re J- E - to hold that
Zubeda failed to show that she would be tortured or detained
upon return.254 In criticizing the Board's analysis, the court ex-
plained that the intent requirement "distinguishes between
suffering that is the accidental result of an intended act, and
suffering that is purposefully inflicted or the foreseeable conse-
quence of deliberate conduct."255 The court continued, "the Con-
vention does not require that the persecutor actually intend to
cause the threatened result."256
The Board's broad application of In re J - E- to dis-
miss Zubeda's gender-based claim highlights the risk that gen-
der-specific violence will be overlooked as the Board pursues
251. One of the most important aspects of the In re Kasinga decision was
its recognition that benign intent is irrelevant in an analysis of whether an act
constitutes persecution. See In re Kasinga, Interim Dec. No. 3278, at 12-13
(B.I.A. 1996). Prior to the Board's precedent decision in In re Kasinga, adjudi-
cators had denied asylum because of the lack of malicious intent. See supra
note 105 (discussing four cases as examples of a lack of intent).
252. 333 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2003).
253. Id. at 470-71.
254. Id. at 475.
255. Id. at 473 (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 474; see also Magistrate Report, Recommendation and Order at
28, Carry v. Holmes, (W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2003) (No. 02-CV-0369Sr) (denying
the government's motion to dismiss petitioner's writ of habeas corpus based
upon a Torture Convention claim). The magistrate criticized the Board's deci-
sion in In re J- E- , focusing upon the Board's finding that Haiti's in-
definite detention policy for returning criminal deportees from the United
States constitutes a lawful sanction. Magistrate Report, Recommendation and
Order at 20, Carry v. Holmes, (W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2003) (No. 02-CV-0369Sr).
As the magistrate stated, "[tlhere is nothing in the record before the Court...
to support the [Board's] determination that indefinite detention of criminal
deportees is permitted under Haitian law or that detention is being imple-
mented for a lawful purpose." Id. The magistrate also relied upon the Third
Circuit decision in Zubeda to hold that the Board's specific intent interpreta-
tion is erroneous and undermines the Torture Convention itself. Id. at 25.
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narrow interpretations of the Torture Convention to further
domestic policy goals, as discussed below. As noted by the Third
Circuit, the record in Zubeda was "replete with reports from
government agencies and human rights organizations that de-
tail what appear to be country wide [sic], systematic incidents
of gang rape, mutilation, and mass murder."257 The Board's
willingness to ignore gender-based violence and its characteri-
zation of the claim as one involving generally harsh prison con-
ditions discounts the gender-specific torture at issue in that
case. To understand why women's claims are overshadowed,
the following section explores the broader context in which
these Torture Convention claims are being decided.
C. THE BROADER POLICY CONCERNS SURROUNDING UNITED
STATES' INTERPRETATION OF ACQUIESCENCE AND INTENT: WHEN
DEEPLY HELD VIEWS ON CRIMINALITY AND GENDER-BASED
VIOLENCE INTERSECT
The United States' narrow interpretation of the Torture
Convention is greatly influenced by its domestic policy goal of
targeting and removing "criminal aliens." However, (noncrimi-
nal) women who seek Torture Convention protection under
such narrowly-defined terms must also confront the deeply-
held notions that have permeated asylum jurisprudence and
privatized gender-based violence. Although Torture Convention
adjudication does not require a nexus, the conceptualization of
gender-based harm as private has the potential to seep into
analyses of state action under the Torture Convention. Apart
from the extreme types of gender-based violence that are "for-
eign" to the United States, it may be difficult for women to
pierce the "privacy" notions that are at odds with the state ac-
tion requirement under the Torture Convention.
1. Criminality and an Elevated Burden of Proof
The concern with removing "criminal aliens" has not in-
fected the doctrinal development of asylum law because the
United States has broadly interpreted the exclusion grounds in
the Refugee Convention to apply to an ever-widening class of
"criminal aliens." Pursuant to Article 33 of the Refugee Con-
vention, any refugee "who, having been convicted by a final
judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger
to the community of that country" is excluded from protec-
257. Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 477.
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tion.258 The majority of the international community employs a
two-part analysis, determining first whether the conviction was
for a particularly serious crime, and second, whether the crime
poses a danger to the community.259 The United States, how-
258. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 33, 189
U.N.T.S. at 176. While the exclusionary clause in the Refugee Convention was
intended to apply only to dangerous criminals who pose a particularly serious
threat to the protecting state, recent legislative amendments to the immigra-
tion law, coupled with an expanding group of crimes characterized as "danger-
ous," have greatly eroded the intended base of protection. For example, in
1990, Congress created a new class of "aggravated felonies" that were by stat-
ute, deemed to be "particularly serious crimes." Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-649, §§ 501, 513, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048, 5052 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§
1101, 1253 (1990)). Although Congress was silent as to the interaction be-
tween the new "particularly serious crime" language and the "danger to the
community" language, the federal courts have interpreted the aggravated fel-
ony list as establishing per se dangerousness. See, e.g., In re Carballe, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 357, 360 (B.I.A. 1986). By 1996, Congress enacted the IIRIRA, chang-
ing the definition of a "particularly serious crime" to include aggravated felo-
nies that resulted in an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least five years.
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321, 546 Stat. 627, 628 (1996). In addition, Congress
dramatically expanded the list of aggravated felonies that triggered the statu-
tory mandatory bars. Id. In light of the 1996 IIRIRA legislation, the Attorney
General retains discretion only to determine whether crimes with aggregate
sentences of less than five years are "particularly serious crimes," which
serves to disqualify an applicant from withholding of removal protection. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 104-828, at 216 (1996). An example of the impact of this
change in the law can be seen in the way cases involving drug trafficking are
now adjudicated. While the Board had been utilizing a case-by-case analysis,
including drug trafficking cases, the Attorney General recently rejected the
Board's approach. Instead, the Attorney General established a rebuttable pre-
sumption that aggravated felonies involving drug trafficking with less than a
five-year sentence are nevertheless particularly serious crimes. See In re Y-
- --- , 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274 (B.I.A. 2002). Moreover, this presumption
can only be rebutted under the most extenuating circumstances "that are both
extraordinary and compelling." Id. at 274.
259. See Kathleen M. Keller, Note, A Comparative and International Law
Perspective on the United States (Non)Compliance with its Duty of Non-
refoulement, 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 183, 188 (1999) (referencing the
UNHCR guidelines as well as the German approach which requires the gov-
ernment "to establish that the alien is in danger of relapsing into crime and
thereby constitutes a serious threat to the community before refoulement is
allowed"). In addressing whether a crime is particularly serious, the interna-
tional community most often employs a balancing test to weigh the serious-
ness of the crime against the likely consequences for the refugee upon return.
See id. at 188. For example, Sweden and Canada are countries that utilize a
contextual approach. Id. at 189-90. Similarly, a review of earlier drafts of the
Refugee Convention shows that the drafters intended that the exception be
narrow. Id. at 189 (emphasizing that "the Conference wished to point out that
continuous criminality in itself should not motivate return to a country of per-
secution") (citation omitted). The UNHCR similarly advocates a contextual
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ever, eliminates this second step, instead inferring danger to
the community once there is a determination that the crime is
particularly serious. 260 Furthermore, Congress's actions in
categorizing an increasingly broad group of crimes as "particu-
larly serious crimes" serves as a per se exclusion of most "crimi-
nal aliens" from asylum eligibility.261
In contrast with the criminal exclusionary grounds set
forth in the Refugee Convention, Article 3 of the Torture Con-
vention contains no exclusionary grounds and was intended to
provide an absolute prohibition on returning a person to a
country in which there is a substantial danger of torture. 262
Whereas other articles of the Torture Convention apply to a
broader category of harms in addition to torture, including de-
grading and inhumane punishment or treatment, Article 3's
prohibition on return applies solely to torture. Therefore, under
Article 3, the nature of the claimant's activities in the territory
of the state in which she seeks protection may not be consid-
ered. 263 Similarly, the previous activities of the claimant are ir-
relevant to the assessment of whether a person at risk of tor-
approach:
Repatriation must only be applied as a last resort where no other
measures appear possible to prevent the person from endangering the
community .... What constitutes an offence permitting forcible repa-
triation in one case may not be such an offense in another case be-
cause of the circumstances of the crime and the character of the
criminal. Only where one or several convictions are symptomatic of
the basically criminal, incorrigible nature of the person and where
any other measure (detention, assigned residence, resettlement in an-
other country) are [sic] not practical to prevent him from endangering
the community may repatriation be resorted to.
Id. at 189 (citations omitted).
260. The Board initially utilized a contextual approach. See, e.g., In re
Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982) (explaining that the Board
looks to "the nature of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying facts
of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and, most importantly,
whether the type and circumstances of the crime indicate that the [refugee]
will be a danger to the community"). However, the Board changed course fol-
lowing a split among the U.S. circuit courts of appeals and followed the Elev-
enth Circuit's lead, rejecting a balancing approach and implying that the se-
verity of the persecution the refugee faced upon return was irrelevant. See In
re Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 360 (citing Crespo-Gomez v. Richard, 780 F.2d
932 (11th Cir. 1986); Zardui-Quintana v. Richard, 768 F.2d 1213 (11th Cir.
1985) (Vance, J., concurring)). The Board held that once a refugee's crime was
determined to be "particularly serious," it automatically followed that the refu-
gee was a "danger to the community." Id.
261. See supra note 258.
262. ANKER, supra note 84, at 518.
263. INGELSE, supra note 73, at 305.
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ture can be returned.264 This absolute protection when poten-
tial torture is at issue is also consistent with the many interna-
tional human rights documents that prohibit torture. 265
However, in enacting legislation to implement the U.S. ob-
ligations under the Torture Convention, Congress immediately
grafted the criminal exclusionary grounds applicable to Refu-
gee Convention-based withholding of removal onto the statu-
tory Torture Convention-based withholding of removal provi-
sion. Because excluding criminal noncitizens entirely from
protection under Article 3 would clearly violate the intention
and language of the Torture Convention, the United States cre-
ated a separate, lesser form of relief ("deferral of removal") for
this class in an attempt to comply with the terms of the Torture
Convention.266 By devising a procedural method that ferrets out
disfavored "criminal alien" claims but leaves the doctrinal in-
terpretation the same for all applicants-particularly with re-
spect to the definition of "intent" and "acquiescence"-the
United States has diminished the possibility for protection
across the board. Therefore, (noncriminal) women seeking pro-
tection under the Torture Convention encounter a doctrinal in-
terpretation of Article 3 clouded by the overarching policy goal
of removing "criminal aliens."
This same tension between restrictionist and humanitar-
ian policy goals has also influenced the United States' adoption
of an unduly high burden of proof under the Torture Conven-
tion. Article 3 requires a showing of "substantial grounds for
believing that [the person] would be in danger of being sub-
jected to torture."267 In ratifying the Torture Convention, how-
264. As Chris Ingelse states, "[tihe consequence of establishing a danger of
torture does not leave any room for balancing interests, but is absolute: the
person cannot be returned." Id.
265. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,
1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 71, 72, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948), re-
printed in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 127, 128 (Supp. 1949) (declaring that "[n]o one
shall be subjected to torture"); see also David Weissbrodt & Isabel Hortreiter,
The Principle of Non-Refoulement: Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Com-
parison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of Other International Human
Rights Treaties, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 6 (1999).
266. For a discussion of the two-tiered relief available under the Torture
Convention in the United States, see the discussion of withholding and defer-
ral of relief, supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
267. Torture Convention, supra note 9, at Art. 3(1). While the original
Swedish draft of the Torture Convention referred to "reasonable grounds" for
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ever, the Senate expressed an understanding that equated this
"substantial grounds" standard with the "more likely than not"
standard used for Refugee Convention-based withholding of
removal. 268 By conflating the standards of relief under the
Refugee and Torture Conventions, Congress unnecessarily
raised the standard of proof under the Torture Convention and
created a protection regime in which the standard of proof for
protection under either Convention is much higher than that
required for asylum relief.269
Moreover, in applying the burden of proof in cases arising
under the U.S. legislation implementing Article 3, the Board
has been so exacting in terms of the quantum of proof that it
has, in effect, elevated the standard of proof even beyond the
unduly high "more likely than not" standard. For example, in
believing that a person "might" be in danger of torture, the language was
changed in hopes of achieving greater clarity. See ANKER, supra note 84, at
510; BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 72, at 50, 204, 209.
268. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,486-92 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
269. See supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text. The heightened stan-
dard of proof applied in U.S. Torture Convention adjudication is contrary to
the practices of other signatory states. For example, the United Kingdom and
Canada have implemented Article 3 of the Torture Convention in ways that
provide greater protection and predictability. In an effort to avoid confusion
and inconsistent results, the United Kingdom has chosen to utilize the same
standards of proof for asylum and torture claims. IMMIGRATION &
NATIONALITY DIRECTORATE HOME OFFICE, ASYLUM POLICY INSTRUCTIONS:
HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION § 2.1, at http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/
en/home/laws policy/policyinstructions/apis/humanitarian-protection.html
(last visited Sept. 9, 2004). The Asylum Policy Instructions also state that the
standard of proof for determining "whether a person would face a serious risk
to life or person" is "a reasonable degree of likelihood or a real risk." Id. In con-
trast, Canada's standard of proof for Article 3 Torture Convention claims has
been articulated as requiring "less than a clear probability, or even a balance
of probabilities, but greater than a mere possibility." IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE BD., CONSOLIDATED GROUNDS IN THE IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
PROTECTION ACT. PERSONS IN NEED OF PROTECTION DANGER OF TORTURE 20
(2002) (citation omitted). The Canadian Federal Court of Appeals has stated
that "[t]he risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond 'mere
theory' or 'suspicion' but something less than 'highly probable'. The risk or
danger of torture must be 'personal and present."' Id. at 21 (citations omitted).
Rejecting the "mere possibility" standard on the one extreme and the "highly
probable" standard as the other extreme, the court adopted a "balance of prob-
abilities" standard requiring a showing that refoulement would expose the ap-
plicant to a "serious" risk of torture. Id. The Committee Against Torture and
the European Court of Human Rights have also adopted the same standard as
Canada. Id. at 19-21. Similarly, the approach advanced by the Canadian Im-
migrant and Refugee Board Legal Services is to utilize a single standard of
proof for all types of protection-namely the "reasonable chance" or "serious
possibility" standard. Id. at 22.
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In re M - B - A- , a noncitizen who had already com-
pleted her sentence for a drug offense committed in the United
States argued that she would be subjected to a five-year reim-
prisonment in Nigeria in violation of Article 3.270 To support
her claim, M- B- A- provided unrefuted evidence es-
tablishing that Nigerian citizens convicted of a narcotic drug
offense in a foreign country "shall be liable to imprisonment for
a term of five years without an option of fine."271 In addition to
the statutorily mandated re-imprisonment, M- B- A-
articulated specific individualized reasons that her life would
be in danger while in prison. Specifically, she named her status
as a woman, her medical conditions, and her former fiance's
ability to enlist prison guards in his quest for retribution be-
cause of her cooperation with drug authorities in the United
States.272
Notwithstanding the mandatory terms of the Nigerian
drug law, the Board's characterization of Nigerian prison condi-
tions as "harsh and life-threatening,"273 and its finding that
"Nigeria... has been a country with a poor human rights re-
cord and endemic corruption in its judicial system,"274 the
Board held that M- B- A- failed to demonstrate that
her torture would be "more likely than not."275 This conclusion
is difficult to reconcile with the preponderance of the evidence
in the case, and reflects the application of an even higher bur-
den of proof than the already elevated "more likely than not"
standard chosen by Congress. 276
270. In re M- B- A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 474, 475 (B.I.A. 2002) (en
banc).
271. Id. at 477-78 n.1 (quoting Decree 33 of the Nigerian National Drug
Law Enforcement Agency).
272. M - B- A- testified and provided supporting medical evi-
dence that she suffers from depression, an ulcer and asthma. Id. at 476.
Rather than relying upon generally harsh prison conditions, M - B-
A- claimed that there would be no one to provide medicine to her if impris-
oned in Nigeria, and that she feared being beaten and raped by prison guards.
Id. According to M- B- A- , most women are raped while in prison,
and the government lacks the ability to protect them. Id.
273. Id. at 479.
274. Id.
275. Id. (emphasis omitted). According to the Board, M- B- A-
failed to provide sufficient evidence regarding the manner of enforcement of
the provisions of Decree 33 on similarly situated individuals. Id.
276. In fact, in a concurring and dissenting opinion, Board Member
Rosenberg characterizes the standard of proof applied in the majority opinion
as "beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 485 (Rosenberg, Bd. Mem., concurring
and dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
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The majority opinion in In re M- B- A- exempli-
fies the type of rigid, formalistic application of the law that has
too often failed to protect women in the context of asylum.
Given the specificity of the claim, combined with Nigeria's
abysmal prison conditions 277 and poor human rights record of
protecting women from harm,278 the Board had the opportunity
to take a firm stand against torture and offer surrogate protec-
tion consistent with the intent of the Torture Convention. In-
stead, the Board effectively carved out an exception where drug
trafficking is involved, undercutting both the international con-
sensus that torture can never be justified and the mandate of
the Torture Convention. Further, rather than explore the gen-
dered component of the claim-that the applicant feared rape
while imprisoned in a country where violence against women is
prevalent and the government fails to take action-the Board
focused on Nigeria's sovereign right to combat drug trafficking.
Because the Board achieved the end result of removing the
drug trafficker by its finding that she failed to satisfy her bur-
den of proof, the decision not only applies the incorrect stan-
dard of proof but also reinforces the invisibility of gender-based
harm under the Torture Convention and severely undercuts
protection for women.27 9
Viewed together, the extension of the "criminal alien" ex-
clusionary grounds under the Refugee Convention and the
creation of a subclass under the Torture Convention for "crimi-
277. As noted by one of the Board members, "the Department of State
country report for Nigeria estimates that reputable human rights organiza-
tions have reported that inmates in Nigerian prison custody die daily due to
harsh conditions and the denial of medical treatment." Id. at 483 (Rosenberg,
Bd. Mem., concurring and dissenting).
278. According to a dissenting Board member, the U.S. Department of
State's Nigeria Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2000 establishes
that "Nigeria follows traditional Islamic law and that discrimination and vio-
lence against women is an endemic problem." Id. at 489 (Schmidt, Bd. Mem.,
dissenting). Women are often imprisoned with men. Id.
279. This example of women's invisibility under international law has deep
roots. Professor Hilary Charlesworth has observed:
An obvious sign of power differentials between women and men is the
absence of women in international legal institutions. Beneath this is
the vocabulary of international law, which generally makes women
invisible. Digging further down, many apparently neutral principles
and rules of international law can be seen as operating differently
with respect to women and men. Another, deeper, layer of the excava-
tion reveals the gendered and sexed nature of the basic concepts of in-
ternational law; for example, "states," "security," "order" and "con-
flict."
Charlesworth, supra note 179, at 381.
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nal aliens" have served to undercut the development of Torture
Convention jurisprudence in the United States with respect to
gender-based harms.280 The combination of an elevated burden
of proof and unduly narrow definitions of the "intent" and "ac-
quiescence" requirements of the Torture Convention may serve
to create an insurmountable barrier for women fleeing torture
inflicted by nonstate actors and deprive them of a final chance
for safety.281
280. Commentators have noted the prominence of "criminal alien" claims
under the Torture Convention. See, e.g., Andrea Montavon-McKillip, Note,
CAT Among Pigeons: The Convention Against Torture, a Precarious Intersec-
tion Between International Human Rights Law and U.S. Immigration Law, 44
ARIZ. L. REV. 247, 265 (2002) (citing Interview with Morton Sklar, Director of
World Organization Against Torture, USA (May 22, 2001)). Moreover, during
a recent hearing on the Torture Convention, Representative John N. Hostet-
tler, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Im-
migration, Border Security and Claims, testified regarding the need to change
the Torture Convention's implementing legislation. House Immigration Sub-
committee Holds Hearing on the CAT, 80 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1109, 1109
(2003). Chairman Hostettler "characterized the application for Torture Con-
vention benefits by criminals in removal proceedings as a 'disturbing and dan-
gerous' loophole." Id. Criticizing the Department of Justice's regulations im-
plementing the nonrefoulement provisions of the Torture Convention,
Chairman Hostettler remarked that the regulations "'disobeyed' the Senate's
instructions because they 'protectl bad actors."' Id. at 1110. Chairman
Hostettler further testified that the Department of Justice has adjudicated
53,471 applications for Torture Convention relief since the regulations took
effect in March 1999. Id. Of those applications, the Department of Justice has
granted 1741 claims, 683 of which involved "criminal aliens." Id.; see also Ra-
chel L. Swarns, Lawmakers Attack Immigrants' Use of Antitorture Law to
Block Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2003, at A8. Most strikingly, the EOIR
Statistical Yearbook states that the grant for Torture Convention claims was
approximately 2% for the fiscal year 2003. Office of Planning and Analysis,
Executive Office for Immigration Review, FY 2003 Statistical Year Book M1
(2004), at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy03syb.pdf [hereinafter EOIR
Statistical Yearbook]. In contrast, 37% of asylum claims that were decided on
the merits were granted before the Executive Office for Immigration Review.
Id. at K1 fig. 16.
281. Perhaps nowhere is that "criminal taint" more clear than in In re
J- E---, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291 (B.I.A. 2002), and the consolidated decisions
in In re Y- L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270 (B.I.A. 2002), issued by the Board and
Attorney General, respectively. See supra notes 206-16, 227-32 and accompa-
nying text. J- E- was convicted of selling -cocaine approximately ten
years after unlawfully entering the United States from Haiti. In re J- E-
-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 292-93. J- E- claimed that Haiti's policy of indefi-
nitely incarcerating those returned from the United States on criminal
grounds, combined with known inhumane prison conditions and abuse of pris-
oners, would subject him to torture in contravention of Article 3 of the Torture
Convention. See id. at 293. In rejecting his claim, the Board remarked that
"Haiti has a legitimate national interest in protecting its citizens from in-
creased criminal activity." Id. at 300. Similarly, in In re Y- L- , the At-
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While the Board has yet to issue a precedential decision
analyzing gender-based harm under the Torture Convention,
its narrow interpretation of key terms in the context of largely
"criminal alien" cases has resulted in a regime in which only
3% of Torture Convention claims are granted. 28 2 Because of
shortcomings in the Torture Convention itself, a broad and
flexible interpretation of the "intent" and "acquiescence" re-
quirements is necessary for Article 3 to have any meaning for
women fleeing the gender-based harm that is often inflicted by
intimate partners, family members, or communities.
2. Between "Us" and "Them": The Familiarity of Domestic
Violence
The fear of "opening the floodgates" to destitute immi-
grants seeking a better life in the United States permeates and
influences all aspects of immigration law. However, debate as
to whether gender-based violence should be recognized as a
ground for protection in the United States raises this concern
with particular passion. The United States' experience in pro-
tecting those fleeing gender-based violence reflects a contin-
uum, with female genital cutting at one end, domestic violence
at the other end, and a large gray area in between. American
tribunals are less likely to protect against "foreign" harms that
are equally prevalent in the United States. 28 3 Therefore, to the
extent that the feared persecution involves a foreign practice
such as female genital cutting, the Board and the courts seem
more inclined to offer protection.
Female genital cutting can be characterized as savage,
barbaric, and "other":28 4 it is associated with tribes, it is widely
torney General dismissed the need for protecting a drug trafficker from tor-
ture and noted that "[t]hose who engage in the illegal drug trade quite com-
monly expose themselves to the risk of violence; it is an occupational hazard."
In re Y- L- , 23 1. & N. Dec. at 283.
282. According to C. Stewart Verdery, Assistant Secretary for Policy and
Planning within the Border and Transportation Directorate at the DHS, more
than 97% of Torture Convention claims fail. See House Immigration Subcom-
mittee Holds Hearing on the CAT, supra note 280, at 1100.
283. See Anita Sinha, Note, Domestic Violence and U.S. Asylum Law:
Eliminating the "Cultural Hook"for Claims Involving Gender-Related Persecu-
tion, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1562, 1589 (2001).
284. For a more in-depth critique of the incorporation of a "them" and "us"
cultural dichotomy, see Bhabha, supra note 50, at 162-66. Bhabha harshly
criticizes asylum advocates' use of derogatory characterizations of their clients'
home countries, describing the practice as "cultural arrogance." Id. at 162. The
practice is then readily consumed by adjudicators, ultimately 'legitimiz[ing]
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practiced in African countries, and it is alien to the United
States. In contrast, domestic violence-based protection claims
do not fare as well, perhaps in part because no norm exists
against which to judge them.28 5 Shrouded in entrenched no-
tions of "privacy," domestic violence continues to be a pervasive
problem in the United States.28 6 As opposed to tribal practices,
confronting domestic violence conjures up images of the "pri-
vate" realm of familiar "nuclear families."28 7 The U.S. govern-
ment has been largely ineffective in protecting its female citi-
zens from domestic violence. 288 Because of the discomfort in
and perpetuat[ing] simplistic stereotypes." Id. According to Bhabha, "This re-
ductive and stereotypical portrayal of non-western forms of oppression is prob-
lematic and short sighted. It exploits the relative ignorance among western
decision-makers of the context in which 'distant wrongs' arise, to promote
what may end up being short-lived access to 'local rights."' Id. at 163.
285. For further discussion of this proposition, see Sinha, supra note 283,
at 1562 (analyzing three recent gender-based asylum claims adjudicated in the
United States and concluding that the outcomes "turned on whether the gen-
der-related violence [could] be linked to practices attributable to non-Western,
'foreign' cultures").
286. Leading up to the enactment of the Violence Against Women Act of
1994, Congress held hearings, compiled evidence, and issued reports examin-
ing the impact of domestic violence on women in the United States. Sally F.
Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use
and Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 66 (2002). Statistics assem-
bled by Congress demonstrated that rape and domestic violence were occur-
ring at "epidemic levels." Id. According to the congressional hearings, domestic
violence is a principal cause of injury and death to women. Id. As Anita Sinha
points out, as compared to female genital cutting, "[d]omestic violence cannot
be coined a 'practice' or 'custom' attributable to a particular nonwhite race be-
cause it frequently happens within the United States' own borders." Sinha,
supra note 283, at 1589.
287. For example, in the recent debate as to whether domestic violence
should serve as a basis for asylum protection, Ira Mehlman, a spokesman for
the Federation for American Immigration Reform, remarked, "You cannot
have an asylum policy that allows everybody to claim asylum based on private
relationships people have with their spouses or other members of their com-
munity .... It makes the United States somehow responsible for everybody's
marriage in the world." Emily Bazar, Asylum-Seekers Make Gender an Issue,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 9, 2004.
288. The Committee on the Judiciary's Report on the Violence Against
Women Act of 1990 explicitly recognized that "State and Federal criminal laws
do not adequately protect against the bias element of gender crimes, which
separates these crimes from acts of random violence, nor do they adequately
provide victims the opportunity to vindicate their interests." S. REP. NO. 101-
545, at 23 (1990). In 2001, almost 700,000 incidents of domestic violence oc-
curred in the United States. Press Release, President George W. Bush, Na-
tional Domestic Violence Awareness Month, 2003 (Oct. 8, 2003),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031008-6.html. As an-
nounced by President Bush, approximately one-third of female murder victims
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labeling as "torture" that which is familiar and prevalent
within the United States, an effort is often made to highlight
the "otherness" associated with different races, cultures, or re-
ligions. As articulated by Audrey Macklin:
What this means in the refugee context is that we suppress the com-
monality of gender oppression across cultures to ensure that what is
done to Other women looks so utterly different from (or unspeakably
worse than) what is done to women here, that no one would notice a
contradiction in admitting them as refugees.
289
As illustrated by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Morrison,290 congressional attempts to de-
privatize domestic violence and focus national attention on it as
a civil rights-type violation have been thwarted by
(mis)conceptions about the nature of domestic violence. 291 The
Court's invalidation of the civil rights remedy for gender-based
violence created by the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
(VAWA) has been characterized as a "stinging defeat for
women's rights that graphically demonstrate[s] the continued
resistance to treating violence against women as a serious prob-
lem worthy of the attention and remedial powers of Con-
gress." 292 As noted by Martha Chamallas:
Because violence against women is largely committed by persons who
are "not public officials or acting with what is recognized as state au-
thority," it is branded as "private" and "local" and unreachable by the
are killed each year by their current or former husband or partner. Id. Indeed,
based on the prevalence of domestic violence in the United States, it has been
argued that at least some U.S. women could have viable Refugee or Torture
Convention claims. See, e.g., Macklin, supra note 24, at 268. In analyzing "ac-
quiescence" under Article 3 of the Torture Convention, I propose a balancing
test that considers the prevalence of domestic violence as well as the govern-
ment's actions in criminalizing, prosecuting, and allocating resources to reme-
diate domestic violence. See infra note 371 and accompanying text.
289. Macklin, supra note 24, at 273; see also Sinha, supra note 283, at
1589-90 (commenting that U.S. asylum case law suggests that claimants may
fare better if the domestic violence is associated with religious fundamental-
ism--"another stereotype of 'primitive cultures"').
290. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
291. In United States v. Morrison, a five-member majority held that Con-
gress lacked the authority under the Commerce Clause to prohibit gender-
motivated crimes of violence because such crimes were neither economic in na-
ture nor national in scope. Id. Moreover, the Court determined that the Act
was directed at private conduct rather than state action, and therefore, was
not consistent with Congress's power to enact legislation under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Morrison decision rein-
forced the public/private dichotomy that has served to insulate gender-based
violence and de-emphasize the role of the state in its perpetuation.
292. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 268
(2d ed. 2003).
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national legislature. However, perpetrators of gender violence know
that they "act with virtual total assurance that, as statistics confirm,
their acts will be officially tolerated, they themselves will be officially
invisible, and their victims will be officially silenced."293
In the international arena, the focus on state action in in-
ternational human rights instruments has historically served
to insulate and de-politicize gender-based violence. 294 Focusing
specifically on persecution by nonstate actors under the Refu-
gee Convention, Deborah Anker has noted the particular com-
plexity posed by domestic violence-based claims "due to differ-
ent levels of interweaving responsibility and enabling of the
'private' harm by the state."295 According to her:
In many countries where protection is not available, "it is the very in-
attention and inaction by the state in relation to battering that tacitly
condones and sustains it as a systematic practice. In other words, the
fact that [a] state does not adequately protect women from domestic
and sexual violence is both an institutional manifestation of the de-
graded social status of women and a cause of its perpetuation." 296
Rather than viewing the relegation of women to the private
sphere as a function of discriminatory state action and itself a
violation of women's human rights for which the state should
be held accountable, violence against women is too often viewed
as a cultural norm beyond the realm of the state's responsibil-
ity. 297 In arguing for the recognition of domestic violence as tor-
293. Id. at 268-69 (quoting Catharine MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sover-
eignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135, 172 (2000)).
294. Catharine A. MacKinnon, On Torture: A Feminist Perspective on Hu-
man Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A GLOBAL
CHALLENGE, supra note 171, at 21, 26-27. According to MacKinnon,
[a] reason often given ... in considering atrocities to women not hu-
man rights violations, politically or legally, is that they do not involve
acts by states. They happen between non-state actors, in civil soci-
ety .... But the state is not all there is to power. To act as if it is pro-
duces an exceptionally inadequate definition for human rights when
so much of the second class status of women, from sexual objectifica-
tion to murder, is done by men to women prior to express state in-
volvement.
Id. at 26-27.
295. Deborah Anker, Refugee Status and Violence Against Women in the
"Domestic" Sphere: The Non-State Actor Question, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391,
392 (2001).
296. Id. at 392-93 (quoting Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border Shopping for
Ideas: A Critical Review of United States, Canadian, and Australian Ap-
proaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 25, 48
(1998)).
297. Thomas & Beasley, supra note 183, at 1122. Dorothy Thomas and
Michele Beasley identify four interrelated factors that have contributed to the
exclusion of domestic violence frnm international humsn rights practice:
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ture ten years ago, Rhonda Copelon noted that
[t]he insistence on state involvement ignores the role and function of
male violence-and especially intimate violence-in women's lives. It
can no longer be justified as simply a reflection of a neutral or tradi-
tional state-centered ordering of international law; rather, it is rooted
in and perpetuates the culture as well as the structure of the patriar-
chal state.298
IV. A PROTECTION-BASED APPROACH TO
"ACQUIESCENCE" UNDER THE TORTURE CONVENTION
For the Torture Convention to provide meaningful relief to
women fleeing gender-based violence, "acquiescence" must be
interpreted broadly to encompass either a state's failure to
prosecute or its encouragement of torture by nonstate actors,
including its awareness of an environment in which torture oc-
curs.299 This is essential because most forms of gender-based
violence are inflicted by nonstate actors in countries that con-
done or fail to punish in such situations. 300 Much like the U.S.
Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the state's constitu-
tional duty to protect against domestic violence has both im-
(1) traditional concepts of state responsibility under international law
and practice, (2) misconceptions about the nature and extent of do-
mestic violence and states' responses to it, (3) the neglect of equality
before and equal protection of the law without regard to sex as a gov-
erning human rights principle, and (4) the failure of states to recog-
nize their affirmative obligation to provide remedies for domestic vio-
lence crimes.
Id. at 1124.
298. Copelon, supra note 237, at 297.
299. See, e.g., INGELSE, supra note 73, at 225 (noting that while not explic-
itly set forth in the Torture Convention, the failure to prosecute those who en-
gage in torturous activities must fall within the definition of torture set forth
in Article 1, paragraph 1).
300. In a recent critique of the Torture Convention and its potential to pro-
tect victims of nonstate actors, one commentator dismissed a broad reading of
"acquiescence" as "unfruitful" because "it is difficult ... to maintain that a
state has 'acquiesced' in torture by rebel forces against which it is actively
fighting and over which it has no authority." Samuel L. David, A Foul Immi-
gration Policy: U.S. Misinterpretation of the Non-Refoulement Obligation Un-
der the Convention Against Torture, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 769, 773 n.16
(2003). Rather than focusing on an expansive reading of "acquiescence," Sam-
uel David argues that a broader reading of "person acting in an official capac-
ity" should be utilized to encompass situations in which there is an ongoing
armed conflict and "non-state actors" exercise substantial authority and con-
trol. See id. at 773 n.16, 792-93, 804-06. While focusing on those "acting in an
official capacity" is appropriate for situations in which there is ongoing armed
conflict, a broader reading of "governmental acquiescence" is essential in the
context of gender-based violence.
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munized states from culpability for nonfeasance and left
women without adequate protection, 30 1 a restrictive interpreta-
tion of "acquiescence" leaves the nation state unaccountable for
harm that it effectively tolerates by private actors within its
borders.
A state's "willful blindness" to torture inflicted "privately"
within its borders should be sufficient to establish state action
under the Torture Convention. This broader, more gender-
inclusive interpretation of "acquiescence" is also consistent
with the international community's evolving norms concerning
women's human rights. Such an interpretation would also be
consistent with recent decisions by both the Second and Ninth
Circuits, 302 the Canadian model for implementating the Tor-
ture Convention, 30 3 and the interpretation of "torture" under
the European Convention on Human Rights. 304
In effect, the domestic efforts to expand the state's consti-
tutional duty to take affirmative steps to protect women from
domestic violence would hold the state as an "accomplice" when
its failure to protect against domestic violence results in tor-
ture. 305 The U.S. Supreme Court held in DeShaney v. Winne-
bago County Department of Social Services, that the state has
no duty under the Due Process Clause to protect against known
danger when returning an abused boy to his father's custody.30 6
Critiquing DeShaney, G. Kristian Miccio has noted that "the
public/private dichotomy attempts to legitimate a public policy
that places the safety of abused mothers and children outside
the ambit of state concern-requiring neither affirmative action
nor proactive methodologies." 3 07 In lieu of relying on the pub-
lic/private dichotomy to determine whether state action is pre-
sent under the Fourteenth Amendment, G. Kristian Miccio has
argued that the state's failure to take affirmative steps to pro-
tect battered women from intrafamilial violence signifies its
301. See supra notes 290-93 and accompanying text.
302. See Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2004); Zheng v.
Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003).
303. See supra note 269.
304. See supra notes 73, 77.
305. See G. Kristian Miccio, With All Due Deliberate Care: Using Interna-
tional Law and the Federal Violence Against Women Act to Locate the Contours
of State Responsibility for Violence Against Mothers in the Age of DeShaney, 29
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 641, 645-46, 677 (1998) (discussing a theory of
"state-as-accomplice").
306. 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989).
307. Miccio, supra note 305, at 644.
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complicity in creating the harm, giving rise to state action.308
The two major theoretical approaches to assessing respon-
sibility in situations involving a nonstate agent of persecution
are "accountability" and "protection."309 The accountability ap-
proach subscribed to by the minority of states requires a strong
link between persecution and the state, while the protection
approach focuses instead on the absence of state protection.31 0
To protect women fleeing gender-based violence, the absence of
state protection must be applied to an Article 3 analysis. Such
an absence of protection could be analyzed by comparing the ef-
fectiveness of the state's protection of women with that of other
groups in society.311
A broader interpretation of "acquiescence" is also consis-
tent with the Second and Ninth Circuits' rulings that the
heightened "willful acceptance" standard for "acquiescence" vio-
lates both the Torture Convention and congressional intent.312
In sharp disagreement with the Board's interpretation in In re
S- V- , the Zheng court stated that
to interpret the term acquiescence as the [Board] did.., misconstrues
and ignores the clear Congressional intent ... the [Board] ignored the
Senate's clear intent and constructed its own interpretation of acqui-
escence, an interpretation that requires more than awareness, in-
cludes "willfully accepting of," and seemingly excludes "willful blind-
ness."313
In Khouzam, the court similarly stated, "in terms of state
action, torture requires only that government officials know of
308. Id. at 645.
309. Tirk, supra note 79, at 98.
310. Id.
311. See Macklin, supra note 118, at 303-04; see also Randall, supra note
24 (arguing that the reality that most states are unable to protect women from
male-inflicted violence should give rise to a presumption that the home coun-
try has failed to protect against gender-based violence).
312. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Zheng and notes 217-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of Khouzam.
In Zheng, the Ninth Circuit characterized the Board's interpretation of "acqui-
escence" to require that government officials "willfully accept" torture to their
citizens by a third party as contrary to the clearly expressed congressional in-
tent to require only "awareness," and not to require "actual knowledge" or
"willful acceptance" in the definition of "acquiescence." Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332
F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003). The Senate, in one of its Understandings prior
to the ratification of the Torture Convention, expressly stated that the term
"acquiescence" requires that, prior to the torturous activity, the public official
be aware of the torturous activity and thereafter breach its legal responsibility
to intervene. Id.
313. Id.
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or remain willfully blind to an act and thereafter breach their
legal responsibility to prevent it."314
A broad reading of "acquiescence" would also be consistent
with the Canadian interpretation-a model method of utilizing
the Torture Convention's "acquiescence" language to protect
against torture. As interpreted by the Canadian immigration
authorities, "state involvement exists when a state official acts
in such a way that state approval of acts of torture may be in-
ferred."315 Among the circumstances that give rise to such an
inference are a state's failure to: "(i) intervene when there are
reasonable grounds to believe that an act of torture will be, or
is being, committed; (ii) investigate when there are reasonable
grounds to believe that an act of torture has been committed; or
(iii) prosecute those responsible for such acts."316 Canadian au-
thorities note that "the [United Nations] Special Rapporteur for
questions of torture [recently] equate[d] the state's failure to
respond to violence with encouragement of further acts of vio-
lence, implying state responsibility."317 In assessing police inac-
tion in the face of private racial violence, the Special Rappor-
teur concluded, "[tihis lack of reaction from public officials
further encourages such private violence." 318
In the case of gender-based violence, police inaction and
failure to prosecute are often documented by the U.S. Depart-
ment of State. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for ex-
ample, the State Department reports that domestic violence is
pervasive. 319 There are no shelters for battered women and do-
mestic violence is not a crime under the penal code.320 Simi-
larly, India has no law that addresses domestic violence in its
entirety, 321 as even those parts of its penal code that arguably
314. Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2004); see supra notes
217-23 and accompanying text (discussing Khouzam).
315. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD., CONSOLIDATED GROUNDS IN THE
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PROTECTION Ac7, PERSONS IN NEED OF
PROTECTION, DANGER OF TORTURE 43 (2002).
316. Id.
317. Id. at 45.
318. Id. (quoting Civil and Political Rights Including the Questions of Tor-
ture and Detention: Report of the Special Rapporteur, Sir Nigel Rodley, submit-
ted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/43, U.N. DOC.
E/CN.4/2001/66 (2001)).
319. In re D- K-, slip op. at 5 (EOIR Immigr. Ct. Aug. 1, 2000).
320. Id.
321. See REFUGEE WOMEN'S RES. PROJECT, REFUGEE WOMEN AND
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: COUNTRY STUDIES 23 (4th ed. 2003) (asserting that
while the Penal Code provisions "may cover some areas of domestic violence
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prohibit domestic violence have been criticized as being am-
biguous. 322 Moreover, in India, marital rape is explicitly ex-
cluded from the definition of rape.323 Thus, in those countries
whose laws fail to protect adequately against domestic violence,
(either because such laws do not exist or are not enforced) state
nonaction can be interpreted as encouragement sufficient to
satisfy a more liberal protection-based interpretation of "acqui-
escence" under the Torture Convention. 324
Because, as discussed previously, the legal landscape has
changed considerably with regard to women's human rights
since the drafting of the Torture Convention, the Torture Con-
vention must be interpreted in keeping with current human
rights norms.325 Just as international law holds nonstate actors
of torture or persecution liable for their acts, victims of torture
must also be entitled to protection, regardless of the status of
the torturer.326 In interpreting torture under the analogous
they are lacking in a number of respects"). "The everyday or less immediately
life-threatening regular violence is not recognized and the standard clauses on
assault tend not to be used by women against their husbands." Id.
322. Id. at 23-24 (describing the conclusions of a study carried out by the
International Center for Research on Women). According to the study:
While section 498A of the Indian Penal Code makes "cruelty" a pun-
ishable, cognizable offense in the Indian Penal Code, "cruelty" is a
vague term and courts are often reluctant to define it. The judicial
system's definition of mental cruelty and trauma is especially unclear
and even judges who are sensitized to the issue of domestic violence
may find themselves constrained in the types of rulings they can
make. The lack of clarity leaves room for inconsistency among judg-
ments, particularly as a large segment of the judiciary is not yet fully
sensitized to the dynamics and dimensions of domestic violence. Thus
in some cases, psychological abuse and mental "torture" may be rec-
ognized and punished, while, in others, it is ignored.
Id.
323. Id. at 25 (citing India's Penal Code, Article 375 exemption: "Sexual
intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years
of age, is not rape").
324. See Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 161 (2d Cir. 2004). A similar
position has been advanced by Professor Rhonda Copelon, who states that
[i]f the purpose of the "consent or acquiescence" language was to cover
situations where the state machinery does not work, then gender-
based violence is a case in point .... Where domestic violence is a
matter of common knowledge and law enforcement and affirmative
prevention measures are inadequate, or where complaints are made
and not properly responded to, the state should be held to have "ac-
quiesced" in the continued infliction of violence.
Copelon, supra note 237, at 355-56.
325. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
326. Tirk, supra note 79, at 107 (discussing protection for victims of non-
state persecution under the Refugee Convention). Volker Tiirk argues that the
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European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court
has called for the same type of "living" interpretation "in light
of present-day conditions."327
In fact, Article 3's prohibition on returning a person to a
country in which there is a danger of torture was inspired by
the case law of the European Commission on Human Rights in-
terpreting Article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.3 28 According to the Commission, the prohibition on tor-
ture and inhuman or degrading treatment contained in Article
3 of the European Convention does more than obligate a state
to prevent torture within its jurisdiction. 329 Though not explic-
itly stated in the European Convention, the Commission has
crimes that are prosecuted in international criminal tribunals (genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes) are persecutory acts that cause the vic-
tims to flee and seek international protection. Id. at 106-07; see also Chris
Jochnick, Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New Fields for the
Promotion of Human Rights, 21 HuM. RTS. Q. 56, 61 (1999) (arguing "that in-
ternational law has long contemplated duties for non-state actors"). In addi-
tion to conventions and treaties focused upon genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity, Chris Jochnick relies upon early treaties outlawing piracy
and slavery, as well as major human rights treaties that address both private
and state duties. Jochnick, supra, at 61-62. For example, the Universal Decla-
ration on Human Rights is intended as a "common standard of achievement
for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every or-
gan of society shall ... promote respect for these rights and freedoms." Id. at
63. The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man specifies: "The
fulfillment of duty by each individual is a prerequisite to the rights of all." Id.
Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights state that "the indi-
vidual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he
belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of
the rights recognized in the present Covenant." Id. (quoting International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GOAR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)). Others have argued that
the language of the statutes enacted by the Senate to bring the United States
into compliance with the Torture Convention demonstrates that the Senate
has construed Article 1 to include some private actors. See, e.g., David, supra
note 300, at 798 (focusing on the language of the Torture Victim Protection Act
which imposes liability on "an individual who, under actual or apparent au-
thority, or color of law, of any foreign nation" commits torture).
327. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 31 (1978).
However, it can be argued that the Torture Convention is distinct because it
contains a definition of torture while the European Convention on Human
Rights leaves torture undefined. Compare Torture Convention, supra note 9,
with Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1980, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
328. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 72, at 125.
329. Id.
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interpreted it to also prohibit a state from handing a person
over to another country in which she might be subject to such
treatment.
3 30
Despite the fact that only the Torture Convention contains
an explicit ban on returning a person to a country in which she
is at risk of being subjected to torture, the Human Rights
Committee has also interpreted the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights to authorize a ban on non-
refoulement in certain circumstances. 33 1 Also, it has been noted
that in all likelihood, the Human Rights Committee considers
the return of a person to a state in which there is a risk of tor-
ture by nonstate actors to be in violation of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 332
V. ALTERNATIVES AND REMEDIES: BETWEEN THE
PRACTICAL AND THE ELUSIVE
By ratifying and implementing the Torture Convention,
the United States has taken an important step toward joining
the international community's condemnation of torture. Spe-
330. Id. According to the Commission:
[E]xtradition may under certain exceptional circumstances constitute
treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. This is the case,
for example, where the person concerned is in danger of being sub-
jected in the State to which he is to be extradited, to torture or any
treatment contrary to Article 3.
Id. (quoting 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 231-32). Similarly, in Ahmed v.
Austria, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) concluded that deport-
ing the applicant to Somalia would breach Article 3 of the ECHR for as long as
he risked being subjected to torture or degrading or inhuman treatment there.
Tilrk, supra note 79, at 106.
331. INGELSE, supra note 73, at 308 ("In the view of the Committee, States
Parties must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way
of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement." (quoting General Comment 20,
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 30 (1994))).
332. Id. The inter-relationship between the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights and the Torture Convention was first articulated by the drafters
of the Torture Convention. The Torture Convention's admonition in Article
17(2) that members of the Human Rights Committee should also serve on the
Committee Against Torture suggests that the drafters of the Torture Conven-
tion intended for the Committee Against Torture to draw upon the jurispru-
dence of the Human Rights Committee. Anne Bayefsky et al., Protection Un-
der the Complaint Procedures of the United Nations Treaty Bodies, in HUMAN
RIGHTS PROTECTION FOR REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS, AND INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PERSONS 23, 75 n.194 (2002) (citing Sitn Lewis-Anthony, Treaty-
Based Procedures for Making Human Rights Complaints Within the U.S. Sys-
tem, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 53 (Hurst Han-
num ed., 3d ed. 1999)).
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cifically, with regard to Article 3, the United States has agreed
not to return a person to a country in which there is a threat of
torture. With regard to women fleeing torture, the United
States has shown a willingness to recognize gender-based harm
as torture. However, by elevating the standard of proof and
narrowly interpreting the intent and "acquiescence" require-
ments, the United States has undermined the protection possi-
ble for women fleeing torture by nonstate actors.333
A. THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE:
UNREALIZED POTENTIAL
Given the influence of domestic policy issues on the inter-
pretation of the Torture Convention, particularly the focus on
"criminal aliens," are there alternatives that would allow the
law to develop outside of these concerns? One existing alterna-
tive is the United Nations Committee Against Torture (Com-
mittee). While the United States is unlikely to agree to the ju-
risdiction of an international monitoring committee, the
Committee provides a comparative model with distinct advan-
tages and disadvantages. 334 Furthermore, comparing the ex-
333. Even for those women lucky enough to be afforded protection under
the Torture Convention, the United States policy of denying family reunifica-
tion or permanent status results in severance of family ties for persons that by
definition cannot rejoin families in their home country. See supra note 90 and
accompanying text. While this Article focuses on the way in which the United
States interpretation of "torture" fails to protect against gender-based vio-
lence, others have focused on the need for legislative change to allow for ad-
justment of status and family reunification for women who are afforded pro-
tection under the Torture Convention. See, e.g., Montavon-McKillip, supra
note 280, at 279 (proposing a legislative amendment to allow permanent resi-
dency for those granted withholding of removal under Article 3 of the Torture
Convention after concluding that Torture Convention relief, despite its limita-
tions, can be a life-saving alternative if no other options exist); Barbara Coch-
rane Alexander, Note, Convention Against Torture: A Viable Alternative Legal
Remedy for Domestic Violence Victims, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 895, 938-39
(2000 (arguing that Congress should amend the Immigration and Nationality
Act to allow adjustment of status for Torture Convention domestic violence
victims modeled on VAWA's battered spouse adjustment provisions). Modeling
legislation on VAWA has also been suggested to remedy other inequities in the
law, including those facing undocumented workers. See, e.g., Lori A. Nessel,
Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection
and the Need for Reform, 36 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 388-90 (2001) (util-
izing VAWA as a model for promoting justice, Lri A. Nessel argues for de-
ferred action status for undocumented workers who wish to pursue guaran-
teed labor rights).
334. The United States could submit to the jurisdiction of the Committee
pursuant to Article 22 of the Torture Convention. See Torture Convention, su-
pra note 9 (noting that under Article 22, a state party to the Torture Conven-
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perience of the Committee in adjudicating Article 3 claims with
that of the United States provides broader insight into whether
the gender-neutral language of the Torture Convention can
tion may declare at any time that "it recognizes the competence of the Com-
mittee to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals
subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by a State
Party of the provisions of the Convention"). Not surprisingly, the United
States has refused to allow the Committee to adjudicate claims against it aris-
ing under Article 3 of the Torture Convention. See Office of the High Comm'r
for Human Rights, Declarations Recognizing the Competence of the Commit-
tee Against Torture Under Articles 21 and 22 (2004) [hereinafter Torture Con-
vention Declarations], at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cat/treaties/
convention-reserv.htm; see also Status of the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. GOAR,
53d Sess., para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/53/253 (1998). For another example of an in-
ternational treaty that the United States has refused to sign, see Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999. See also
International Criminal Court, States Parties, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/states
parties.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004) (listing the ninety-seven States Parties
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court as of September 27,
2004).
The United States is not alone in its refusal to be bound by an independ-
ent international monitoring body. See Torture Convention Declarations, su-
pra (listing the countries that have agreed to submit to the Committee's juris-
diction). Of the 136 countries that have ratified the Torture Convention, only
fifty countries have accepted either Article 21 or 22. See Torture Convention
Declarations, supra (listing parties that have accepted Article 21 or 22); Office
of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Status of Ratification of the Conven-
tion Against Torture (2004), at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cat-
ratify.htm (listing parties to the Torture Convention). That so few states have
agreed to the jurisdiction of the Committee Against Torture is itself problem-
atic. Canada, however, has agreed to Article 22 jurisdiction in addition to ad-
judication by domestic immigration tribunals and Australia vests sole jurisdic-
tion over Article 3 Torture Convention claims with the Committee. See Torture
Convention Declarations, supra. In countries such as Australia which have
agreed to the jurisdiction of the Committee Against Torture pursuant to Arti-
cle 22, the claimant must first exhaust all domestic remedies. Savitri Taylor,
Australia's Implementation of Its Non-Refoulement Obligations Under the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 17 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 432, 470 (1994). Therefore, the Committee
plays a role similar to a de facto merits review body. Id. Sweden effectively
takes a middle ground by fully incorporating Article 3 Torture Convention pro-
tection into its domestic immigration law. See for example, Chapter 8, section
1 of the Swedish Aliens Act which incorporates Article 3 of the Torture Con-
vention and provides that an alien who has been refused entry or who shall be
expelled may never be sent to a country where there are reasonable grounds to
believe that he or she would be in danger of suffering capital or corporal pun-
ishment, or of being subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading
treatment. Aliens Act, 1989:529, ch. 8, § 1 (1997) (Swed.), available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rsd/rsddocview.htm?CATEGORY=RSD
LEGAL&id=3ae6b5Oalc&page=research:.
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adequately protect against gender-based harm.
If the goal is to interpret the Torture Convention inde-
pendent of domestic policy concerns, the Committee presents
clear advantages. It is an international human rights commit-
tee composed of persons independent of the state in which pro-
tection is being sought who are intimately familiar with apply-
ing Article 3 of the Torture Convention. 335 Notably, the
Committee is composed of ten experts, making it the smallest
of all the treaty bodies.336 Although members are nominated
and selected by state parties for four-year terms, they are not
meant to be deputies or representatives of their native
states.337 Rather, all members are to act in a personal capacity
and are prohibited from receiving instructions from states. 338
The Committee is positioned to interpret the terms of the
Torture Convention more broadly, as both the European Court
of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee have done
in interpreting similar human rights instruments.339 Proceed-
ing before the Committee would offer distinct advantages from
a human rights perspective. First, the applicant would proceed
under the actual terms of the Torture Convention rather than
the United States' implementing legislation. Significantly, this
would affect the standard of proof (the Committee's standard
being significantly lower than that of the United States).340
Second, free from domestic concerns, the Committee should be
able to interpret the terms from a protection-oriented, rather
than restrictionist, viewpoint.
335. See Taylor, supra note 334, at 471. In fact, this independence has led
to threats from Australia that it will withdraw from Article 22 because of con-
cerns over sovereignty. See Peter Burns, The United Nations Committee
Against Torture and Its Role in Refugee Protection, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 403,
407 (2001).
336. See INGELSE, supra note 73, at 93.
337. Id.
338. Id. However, the fact that members can be re-elected raises concerns
about compromised impartiality, as members may be less critical of states dur-
ing election years. Id. Additionally, a finding by the Committee that Article 3
has been violated is similar to that of a declaratory judgment with the state
deciding whether to abide by the recommendation of the Committee. Id. at
305. While this declaratory judgment does not necessarily lead to any particu-
lar immigration status in the state of protection, the state of protection must
take measures that are in agreement with Article 3. Id.
339. See supra notes 329-32 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text for discussion of the
varying interpretations of the standard of proof required by the Torture Con-
vention.
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Notwithstanding the notable advantages to adjudications
before the Committee, the small body of case law that has
emerged is not as favorable as might be expected. 341 However,
the Committee's grant rate is striking when compared with
rates under U.S. domestic adjudication. Whereas the Commit-
tee recommended protection in nearly 20% of the cases decided
on the merits, the United States has granted approximately 3%
of the Torture Convention claims filed in the past four years.342
Turning specifically to the Committee's experience in in-
terpreting the Torture Convention's requirement of state ac-
tion, it appears that "the Committee is struggling between
functional and formal conceptions of the definition of torture
and states parties' obligations under Article 3."343 Initially, the
341. In the ninety-nine decisions that were available in English, the Com-
mittee found in only fourteen instances that the applicant would be tortured if
returned to his or her homeland. See UNIV. OF MINN. HUMAN RIGHTS LIBRARY,
DECISIONS AND VIEWS OF THE COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE UNDER ARTICLE
22 OF THE CONVENTION, at http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/cat/decisions/cat-
decisions.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2004) (listing decisions of the Committee
under Article 22). However, of the ninety-nine decisions, only sixty-eight were
issued on the merits, with the others dismissed because of a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. See id. Of the sixty-eight individual complaints con-
sidered on the merits by the Committee between 1994 and 2002, sixty-two in-
volved asylum seekers and others facing deportation, and in fourteen of those
instances, the Committee found that Article 3 protection was appropriate. See
id.
342. See supra note 282 and accompanying text. Perhaps the most striking
difference in the adjudication of Torture Convention claims before the Com-
mittee is that the applicant is afforded the benefit of the doubt in credibility
determinations. See, e.g., Seid Mortesa Aemei v. Switzerland, Communication
No. 34/1995, Committee Against Torture, 18th Sess., para. 9.6, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/18/D/34/1995 (1997) (stating that in the interest of the author's secu-
rity, "it is not necessary that all the facts invoked by the author should be
proved; [rather,] it is sufficient that the Committee should consider them to be
sufficiently substantiated and reliable"); Alan v. Switzerland, Communication
No. 21/1995, Committee Against Torture, 16th Sess., para. 11.3, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/16/D/21/1995 (1996) (finding that "complete accuracy is seldom to be
expected by victims of torture and that such inconsistencies as may exist in
the author's presentation of the facts are not material"); Mutombo v. Switzer-
land, Communication No. 13/1993, Report of the Committee Against Torture,
U.N. GOAR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 44, Annex 5, at 51, U.N. Doc. A/49/44 (1994)
(stating that "even if there are doubts about the facts adduced by the author, it
must ensure that his security is not endangered"); see also INGELSE, supra
note 73, at 297 (stating that "even if there were '[...]lingering doubts as to the
truthfulness of the facts presented [...]'or the complainant had originally lied
to the national authorities about his identity and nationality and given an in-
consistent account, the complainant should be given the benefit of the doubt"
(quoting H- D- v. Switzerland, complaint 112/1998, U.N. Doc. A/54/44
(1999))) (footnote omitted).
343. David, supra note 300, at 777.
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Committee adhered to a literal interpretation of the state actor
requirement under Article 3, dismissing, without analysis, the
fear of torture by the guerrilla forces in Peru as relating to a
nongovernmental entity operating without the government's
consent or "acquiescence" and thus, "outside the scope of article
3 of the Convention."344 In a later decision involving the fear of
torture in a country without any centralized government in
place, the Committee appeared to take a step away from its
prior rigid adherence to the state actor doctrine. Recognizing
that Somalia had been without a centralized government for
years and that the international community negotiated with
the warring factions, some of which had set up quasi-
governmental institutions, the Committee held that members
of those factions constituted "public officials or other persons
acting in an official capacity" as required by Article 3.345 Recon-
ciling its decisions interpreting torture by nonstate actors, the
Committee later held that
the issue whether the State party has an obligation to refrain from
expelling a person who might risk pain or suffering inflicted by a non-
governmental entity, without the consent or acquiescence of the Gov-
ernment, falls outside the scope of article 3 of the Convention, unless
the non-governmental entity occupies and exercises quasi-
governmental authority over the territory to which the complainant
would be returned.346
Digging deeper into the -Committee's experiences with ad-
dressing gender-based claims uncovers little. In fact, the Com-
mittee's work to date in addressing the torture of women, even
that committed by state actors, has been described as "my-
opic." 347 In the two gender-based torture claims in which the
344. See G- R- B- v. Sweden, Communication No. 83/1997,
Committee Against Torture, 20th Sess., para. 6.5, U.N. Doc.
CATIC/20/D/83/1997 (1998); David, supra note 300, at 774-75 (discussing
G- R- B- v. Sweden).
345. See Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Australia, Communicaton No. 120/1998, Com-
mittee Against Torture, 22nd Sess., para. 6.5, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/221D/120/1998
(1999); David, supra note 300, at 775-78 (discussing Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Aus-
tralia and its implications for determining nonstate actors).
346. S- S- v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 191/2001, Com-
mittee Against Torture, 30th Sess., para. 6.4, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/30/D/
191/2001 (2003).
347. See, e.g., Andrew Byrnes, Toward More Effective Enforcement of
Women's Human Rights Through the Use of International Human Rights Law
and Procedures, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 222, at 214. However, Byrnes also
expresses hope that "in the course of time the Committee will be persuaded to
take an expansive view of the definition of torture in the Convention and apply
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Committee recommended protection, there was no analysis
particular to gender other than the Committee's finding in one
of these two cases that a rape victim would not necessarily ini-
tially recount that she had been raped. 348
Perhaps more disheartening than the paucity of gender-
specific analysis with regard to complaints of torture under Ar-
ticle 3 is the Committee's silence on gender issues in the con-
text of its reporting requirements.3 49 According to Andrew
Byrnes, the Committee fails to systematically "ask the woman
question" and elicit gender-specific information.3 50 By failing to
do so, the Committee is unable to identify patterns of gender-
specific mistreatment and therefore lacks the empirical data
necessary for formulating appropriate recommendations to ad-
dress violations of the Torture Convention. 351
The failing of the Committee to interpret the terms of the
Torture Convention in such a way as to realize its true spirit is
particularly disappointing given that it should be less influ-
enced by the domestic immigration policy concerns that influ-
ence adjudication by the United States. However, adjudication
by the Committee is limited in significant ways. First, as dis-
cussed below, the text of the Torture Convention itself is un-
necessarily narrow. By conditioning the very definition of tor-
ture on the existence of state action or "acquiescence," the
drafters were less inclusive of the more "private" ways in which
women experience torture. Second, while the Committee could
interpret "acquiescence" broadly, as with most other conven-
tion-monitoring committees, almost all the members are
the Convention to private violence against women in which the state acqui-
esces." Id.
348. See Muzonzo Paku Kisoki v. Sweden, Communication No. 41/1996,
Committee Against Torture, 16th Sess., U.N. Doc. CAT/C/16/D/41/1996 (1996);
A- S- v. Sweden, Communication No. 149/1999, Report of the Commit-
tee Against Torture, U.N. GOAR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 44, at 185, U.N. Doc.
A/56/44 (2001).
349. As reported by Andrew Byrnes, "gender issues have attracted little
systemic attention." Byrnes, supra note 168, at 206.
350. Id. at 207 (stating that "[o]verall, the Committee has paid little atten-
tion to the question of whether women may be subjected to torture or other ill
treatment in a manner or under circumstances that differ from the experi-
ences of men"). Specifically, Andrew Byrnes notes that the Committee fails to
inquire into the following: (1) the number of women held in pretrial custody or
on remand, even though these are time periods that pose particular hazards
for women; (2) the rape of female detainees; and (3) the patterns of "female
criminality" which may lead to women being imprisoned for discriminatory
reasons or as the result of discriminatory legal processes. Id. at 206.
351. Id. at 207.
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male. 352 As has been seen in other areas of the law, gender-
neutral laws interpreted solely by men tend to have a disparate
impact on women. Compounding this problem, gender-neutral
laws that require state action fail to protect against the less
public ways in which women are harmed. The Committee's re-
strictive interpretations of state action and "acquiescence" sug-
gest that the problem is not only analytical but also founda-
tional.
B. GENDER-BASED LEGISLATIVE OR REGULATORY CHANGE
Both the Refugee and Torture Conventions intend to offer
surrogate protection only when the state has failed to do so.
However, under the Refugee Convention, the failure of the
state to protect against persecution is analyzed from the refu-
gee's perspective. To fall within the definition "refugee," a
woman must be unwilling or unable to avail herself of her
state's protection because of persecution on account of an enu-
merated ground.353 The United States has interpreted this
definition to apply to persecution committed either by the gov-
ernment or by forces that the government is "unwilling or un-
able to control."3 54 The focus on the empirical reality-the fail-
ure of state protection rather than intentionality by the state-
is correct and offers the potential to encompass a broad range of
harms, including those arising within the home. Historically,
however, the gender bias that has plagued the Refugee Conven-
tion has been reflected in the absence of gender from the enu-
merated grounds for protection. Women have been left in the
precarious position of connecting gender-based harm with their
membership in a "particular social group." Because of the re-
strictive definition of "particular social group" under U.S. juris-
prudence, statutory or regulatory guidance is needed to explic-
itly recognize women as a "particular social group" for asylum
purposes. 355
352. INGELSE, supra note 73, at 95 (noting that only four of the twenty-one
members who have served on the Committee have been women). Ingelse notes
that the only treaty bodies with a majority female membership are the Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the Commit-
tee on the Rights of the Child. Id. at 95 n.22.
353. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 33, 189
U.N.T.S. at 152.
354. See supra note 59.
355. The recognition of women as a cognizable social group for asylum pur-
poses in the United States has been advocated by many commentators. See
supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text. As discussed above, the DHS's
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Such a change would bring the United States into confor-
mity with the growing international recognition of women as a
social group. 356 It would also be consistent with the interpreta-
tion of the UNHCR.357 Gender-specific legislation would also
appropriately acknowledge that gender-neutral human rights
instruments have failed to adequately protect women's human
rights.358
Viewed within the broader context of the immigration re-
gime, there is precedent for enacting specific legislation that
targets a particular group that has been adversely affected by
discriminatory application of an otherwise neutral law. For ex-
ample, Congress has passed legislation that specifically allows
conferral of asylum status for Chinese applicants who fear the
forced sterilization that results from China's "one-couple-one-
child" birth control policy.359 Similarly, the Nicaraguan Ad-
justment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) was
aimed at ameliorating the discriminatory application of asylum
law that resulted in the denial of asylum to El Salvadoran and
Guatemalan applicants during the late 1980s. 360 Both of the
Violence Against Women Acts contained immigration provi-
sions that specifically targeted women in abusive situations.
36 1
In addition to creating an avenue for abused women within the
United States to obtain status without the assistance of their
spouses, VAWA created a new form of relief from removal with
much more lenient statutory requirements than normally re-
quired.362
recognition of married women as a particular social group under certain cir-
cumstances in In re R- A holds promise for greater relief for women
fleeing domestic violence under the Refugee Convention. See supra notes 159-
61 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 106-11, 153.
357. See supra note 106.
358. For example, recognition that the gender-neutral United Nations Dec-
laration on Human Rights has not adequately protected women's human
rights resulted in the creation of the Covenant on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation Against Women (CEDAW). See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying
text.
359. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 26.
362. Normally, cancellation of removal requires the applicant to have re-
sided in the United States continuously for ten years and to demonstrate that
her removal would cause "exceptional and extremely unusual" hardship to a
U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident immediate family member. Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1) (2000). However, in the case
of battered spouses, the requirements are relaxed, and the applicant need only
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One way to address the gendered consequences that flow
from a narrow interpretation of the Refugee and Torture Con-
vention provisions would be through complementary gender-
specific legislation. An example of this approach is the recently
proposed Widows and Orphans Act of 2003 (Widows and Or-
phans Act) aimed at protecting women and children who are
particularly at risk of harm in their home countries due to their
age, gender, or status as a widow or orphan. 363 Without altering
the statutory refugee framework, the Widows and Orphans Act
would provide refugee-like benefits to a newly created class of
"special immigrants" who would be identified and processed
prior to entering the United States. These "special immigrants"
would be required to demonstrate a credible fear of harm and
lack of adequate protection related to sex or being under ten
years of age. 364
Although unlikely to be enacted given the current trends
toward restricting immigration categories, the proposed Wid-
ows and Orphans Act is an approach that explicitly recognizes
the different ways in which women are persecuted because of
their gender. 365 It also acknowledges the systematic exclusion
of "women at risk" from the existing U.S. refugee protection re-
gime.3 66 However, because it aims to create a new "special im-
migrant" category for admission rather than amend the refugee
or asylum provisions, it fails to address the gender-bias in asy-
lum and refugee law. Protection under the Refugee or Torture
Conventions would still remain the only hope for women seek-
ing protection at or within our borders.
In addition, treating women as "special immigrants,"
show three years of continuous residence and "extreme hardship" to herself or
a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident immediate family member. Id.
§ 1229(b)(2).
363. See Widows and Orphans Act of 2003, S. 1353, 108th Cong. (2003).
364. See id.
365. See Posting of Wendy Young, Women's Commission for Refugee
Women and Children & Christopher Nugent, Holland & Knight LLP, christo-
pher.nugent@hklaw.com, to childimmigration@lists.lirs.org, detention
watchnetwork@lists.lirs.org, aclu-detention@lists.aclu.org, septllarrests@
lists.aila.org (July 28, 2003) (copy on file with author) (stating that "[w]omen
such as widows and girls face severe forms of gender-based violence including
rape, molestation, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, and forced marriages").
366. Id. "Despite the victimization of these vulnerable women and children,
they are not currently prioritized for refugee resettlement to the United States
since they cannot necessarily meet the stringent statutory definition of 'refu-
geel'...." Id. Of the 27,100 refugees admitted in fiscal year 2002, only 500
women at risk were processed. Id.
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rather than refugees, creates the dual risk that: (1) the protec-
tion afforded will be less robust; and (2) human rights law will
continue to develop in the context of the more public male ex-
periences rather than incorporating women's experiences.
First, the proposed legislation only allows for women granted
special immigrant status to be accompanied or reunited with
children less than ten years of age. In contrast, refugee status
allows for derivative children under the age of twenty-one. As
has happened in the countries that provide multitiered hierar-
chies of protection, there is the danger that women will be af-
forded the least beneficial form of relief.3 67 Second, the nonre-
367. In countries with multitiered protection regimes, women's claims tend
to be depoliticized and, while protected, women often receive the least benefi-
cial relief. See Conference, Discussion, in WOMEN IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 94, at 153-54 (noting that some countries already have a
second-class asylum category). Germany, for example, has "big asylum" and
"little asylum," with little asylum often granted in gender claims and provid-
ing fewer benefits. Id. at 154. In the United Kingdom, for those applicants who
can establish a well-founded fear of persecution based on a non-Convention
ground, there is "humanitarian protection" or "discretionary leave" (formerly
known as "exceptional leave"). See IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY DIREC-
TORATE HOME OFFICE, ASYLUM POLICY INSTRUCTIONS: HUMANITARIAN
PROTECTION AND DISCRETIONARY LEAVE APU NOTICE 1/2003, at http://www
.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/enhome/lawspolicy/policyinstructions/apis/hum
anitariansprotection0.html. Significantly however, both humanitarian protec-
tion and discretionary leave are temporary protections. Id. While the United
Kingdom's regime's inclusion of temporary protection for those who cannot
qualify for Refugee Convention-based relief is preferable to the United States'
model, female applicants for asylum in the United Kingdom are more likely
than men to be granted either "humanitarian protection" or "discretionary
leave" on compassionate or humanitarian grounds. Crawley, supra note 137,
at 322. Significantly, "[n]ot only does [exceptional leave to remain] provide
substantially fewer rights and privileges than Convention refugee status, but
it also reflects a particular conceptualization of women as 'victims' and depoli-
ticizes their experiences of persecution." Id. Women granted humanitarian
protection are not normally entitled to family reunification. See IMMIGRATION
& NATIONALITY DIRECTORATE HOME OFFICE, ASYLUM POLICY INSTRUCTIONS:
FAMILY REUNION, at http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/en/home/laws
policy/policyinstructions/apis/familysreunion.html. Only after maintaining
humanitarian protection status for three years can the applicant seek indefi-
nite leave to remain, thus qualifying her for family reunification. Id. For those
granted discretionary leave, there is no automatic right to family reunification
until after six years, at which point the person can seek indefinite leave to re-
main. Id. For those who fall within exclusionary grounds, ten years of discre-
tionary leave must be completed before one can apply for indefinite leave to
remain. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1) (2000).
Similarly, in Switzerland, women were historically relegated to the "pro-
visional admission" category. Walter Klin, Gender-Related Persecution, in
SWITZERLAND AND THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES, supra note
79, at 111. In those instances in which gender-based persecution led to a need
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foulement obligation under both the Refugee and Torture Con-
ventions represents a clear intersection between human rights
and refugee law.368 As stated by Deborah E. Anker, "In many
respects, refugee law crosses the threshold of justiciability and
enforceability past which human rights law has found it diffi-
cult to proceed. Refugee law provides an enforceable remedy-
available under specified circumstances-for an individual fac-
ing human rights abuses."369 Internationally, refugee law has
certainly played a crucial role in the development of women's
rights. Anker explains that "[b]y interpreting forms of violence
against women within mainstream human rights norms and
definitions of persecution, refugee law avoids some of the prob-
lems of marginalizing women's rights in international law.3 70
Removing women's claims from the traditional refugee context
may then interfere with the cross-fertilization occurring be-
tween human rights and immigration law.
Therefore, in addition to proposed special legislation such
as the Widows and Orphans Act, complementary changes need
to be made to the Refugee and Torture Convention forms of re-
lief. Because of the discretionary nature of asylum and the
many bars to relief, even if social groups based solely on gender
were ultimately recognized, many women would still need to
avail themselves of protection under the Torture Convention.
Moreover, all human rights instruments need to be accessible
to women and must reflect the different ways in which women
are harmed.
In terms of the Torture Convention, corrective measures
must be taken to ensure that the intersection of gender-neutral
language and state action does not result in exclusion for
women fleeing gender-based harm. For example, on the crucial
issue of acquiescence, the state's role could be defined through
for protection, the woman was "provisionally admitted." Id. It was not until
1997 that the Swiss asylum law was changed to explicitly incorporate gender-
based persecution. Id. at 112-13 (citing to Article 3 Asylum Act 1998 amend-
ing the Article 3(2) definition of persecution to reflect gender by adding: "Mo-
tives of flight specific to women shall be taken into account."). Even with the
changes to the Swiss asylum law, Walter Kalin notes that there is no informa-
tion available about cases in which the asylum seeker claimed that the denial
of state protection from domestic violence constituted persecution, in part be-
cause those female claimants may be granted provisional admission. Id. at 121
(noting that provisional admission is the first instance in the asylum proce-
dure).
368. Anker, supra note 13, at 149.
369. Id. at 138.
370. Id. at 139.
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statutory or regulatory language setting forth a balancing test
with factors to apply in determining whether the state has ac-
quiesced to gender-based violence. Such factors should include
the following: (1) the status of women in society; (2) the exis-
tence of laws that discriminate against women; (3) the exis-
tence of laws that criminalize gender-based violence; (4) the
state's history of prosecuting gender-based violence; (5) the
prevalence of gender-based violence; and (6) the support struc-
ture for women attempting to flee gender-based violence.37 1
Explicitly articulating the ways in which the state fails to
protect against gender-based torture would be consistent with
the expressed congressional intent in enacting gender-specific
legislation to target gender-based crimes and discrimination. 372
Based on a voluminous record of hearings, testimony, and re-
ports attesting to the prevalence of domestic violence and the
inability of the states to control it, Congress created a federal
civil rights remedy for gender-based crimes. 373
CONCLUSION
We are in the early stages of the very difficult and thankless task of
construing the Convention. Only time will tell whether the... narrow
reading of the torture definition and its... highly technical approach
to the standard of proof will be the long-term benchmarks for our
country's implementation of this international treaty.374
Twenty-four years after enactment of the Refugee Act in
the United States, it is clear that the gender-neutral asylum
law has been interpreted unevenly in protecting women fleeing
gender-based harm. Because jurisprudence under Article 3 of
the Torture Convention is still at a relatively formulative stage
in the United States, the potential to chart a different course
371. Other scholars have advocated alternate factors for determining "ac-
quiescence." See, e.g., Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra note 265, at 70. David
Weissbrodt & Isabel Hrtreiter propose that "acquiescence" be determined
based upon the following:
(a) whether the applicant sought and was denied protection by the
government; (b) whether the government institutions where [sic]
aware of the danger of torture and did nothing to protect that person;
and © [sic] whether the individual has other reason to believe that it
would be futile to seek protection of the government from torture.
Id.
372. See supra notes 26, 292-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of
VAWA.
373. See supra note 26.
374. In re J- E- , 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 309 (B.I.A. 2002) (Schmidt, Bd.
Mem., dissenting).
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exists-a course which is more consistent with the intent of the
Torture Convention to protect victims of torture abroad. How-
ever, in order to protect Article 3 of the Torture Convention
from falling victim to the same exclusionary pattern of gender-
biased interpretation, the way in which women experience tor-
ture and the state's failure to protect-or its willful blindness to
the violence suffered-must, as demonstrated in In re D-
K-, be the standard for granting Article 3 relief. This inter-
pretation is consistent with the international community's
growing recognition that women's human rights include the
right to be free from state-condoned domestic violence. Failing
a correct, protection-based, interpretive approach, there is a
need for specific statutory or regulatory language to alter the
existing formalistic, male-biased way in which the law is inter-
preted, which excludes from "public" protection the more "pri-
vate" harms suffered by women.
